

Societas

European society for research in ethics
Europäische Forschungsgesellschaft für Ethik
Société européenne de recherche en éthique

Ethica

Climate Change,
Sustainability, and an Ethics
of an Open Future

50th Societas Ethica Annual Conference
August 22nd-25nd 2013
Kontakt der Kontinenten, Soesterberg

The conference is realized in cooperation with the
ESF Network «Rights to a Green Future» and the
Ethics Institute in Utrecht

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Universiteit Utrecht

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Conference programme

Thursday / Donnerstag 22 August 2013

- 18:00 Dinner / Abendessen
- 19:15-20:45 **Welcome Address** and thematic introduction by /Begrüßung und thematische Einführung durch Prof. Göran Collste (Linköping University, President of Societas Ethica) and Prof. Marcus Düwell (Utrecht University, Organizer)
Keynote Session I / Plenarvortrag I
Dr. Jeroen van der Sluijs (GeoSciences, Utrecht University)
Scientific Scenarios for the Development of Climate Change
- 21:00 Social Evening / geselliger Abend

Friday / Freitag 23 August 2013

- 9:00-10:15 **Keynote Session II / Plenarvortrag II**
Professor Stephen M. Gardiner (University of Washington, Seattle)
The Ethics of Climate Extortion
- 10:45-11:45 Short Papers I-II / Kurzvorträge I-II
parallel sessions / parallele Sitzungen
- 12:00-13:00 Short Papers III-IV / Kurzvorträge III-IV
parallel sessions / parallele Sitzungen
- 13:00 Lunch / Mittagessen
- 14:15-15:15 Short Papers V-VI / Kurzvorträge V-VI
parallel sessions / parallele Sitzungen
- 15:30-16:30 Short Papers VII-VIII / Kurzvorträge VII-VIII
parallel sessions / parallele Sitzungen
- 17:00-18:15 **Keynote Session III / Plenarvortrag III**
Professor Ingrid Robeyns (Erasmus University Rotterdam)
Sustainable Procreative Freedom
- 18:30 Dinner / Abendessen
- 19:45-20:45 **Gastvortrag zur Geschichte der Societas Ethica**
Prof. em. Dr. Karl-Wilhelm Dahm (Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster) *with an english summary* by Dr. Lars Reuter (The Møller Foundation)
- 20:45-21:15 **Launching of De Ethica**
A Journal of Philosophical, Theological and Applied Ethics
Prof. em. Brenda Almond (Editor in Chief, University of Hull) and Maren Behrens, Ph.D. (Associate Editor, Linköping University)
- 21:15 Social Evening / geselliger Abend

Saturday / Sonnabend 24 August 2013

- 9:00-10:15 **Panel Session / Forum**
Prof. Hille Haker (Loyola University Chicago): *Energy Ethics*
Prof. Marcus Düwell (Utrecht University): *Rights to a Green Future*
- 10:45-11:45 Short Papers IX-X / Kurzvorträge IX-X
parallel sessions / parallele Sitzungen
- 12:00-13:00 Short Papers XI-XII / Kurzvorträge XI-XII
parallel sessions / parallele Sitzungen
- 13:00 Lunch / Mittagessen
- 14:15-16:00 General Assembly and concluding discussion
/ Mitgliederversammlung und Abschlussdiskussion
- 16:00 Excursion to Utrecht with celebration of Societas Ethica's 50th
conference / Ausflug nach Utrecht mit feierlichem Abendessen
anlässlich der 50. jährlichen Societas Ethica-Konferenz, *including /*
einschließlich: Young paper Award Ceremony / Verleihung des
Nachwuchspreises

Sunday / Sonntag 25 August 2013

- 9:00-10:15 **M. session IV / Plenarvortrag IV**
Professor Simon Caney (University of Oxford)
Tolstoy's Question: The Ecological Preconditions of Justice
- 10:45-12:00 **Keynote session V / Plenarvortrag V**
Professor Michael Northcott (University of Edinburgh)
Cosmopolitical Ethics in the Anthropocene
- 12:00 Lunch / Mittagessen

All keynotes, panels, general lectures and the general assembly will take place in the large lecture hall "St. Jan." The Short Paper presentations will take place in "St. Jan" and five rooms in the "Afrika" wing of the conference centre (see detailed program below). "St. Jan," the "Afrika" wing, and the restaurant are all on the first floor of the conference centre.

Keynote speakers

Professor Simon Caney (University of Oxford): *Tolstoy's Question: the Ecological Preconditions of Justice*

Simon Caney is Professor in Political Theory at the University of Oxford and Director of the Centre for the Study of Social Justice. His research interests are primarily in contemporary political philosophy. He has a particular interest in the ethical issues raised by global climate change. He is the author of *Justice Beyond Borders* (Oxford University Press, 2005) and co-editor of *Climate Ethics: Essential Readings* (Oxford University Press, 2010). Caney was also a member of the working party producing the Nuffield Council on Bioethics report *Biofuels: Ethical Issues* (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2011). He is currently working on a book entitled *On Cosmopolitanism* and a book entitled *Global Justice and Climate Change* co-authored with Derek Bell (both forthcoming from Oxford).

<http://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/index.php/profile/simon-caney.html>

Professor Stephen M. Gardiner (University of Washington, Seattle): *The Ethics of Climate Extortion*

Stephen Gardiner is Professor for the Department of Philosophy and holds the Ben Rabinowitz Endowed Professor in Human Dimensions of the Environment in the College of the Environment, both at the University of Washington, Seattle. His areas of specialization are ethics, environmental ethics, and political philosophy. He is widely published in political and environmental ethics. He is the author of *A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of Climate Change* (Oxford University Press, 2011), a co-editor of *Climate Change: Essential Readings* (Oxford University Press, 2010), and the editor of *Virtue Ethics: Old and New* (Cornell, 2005).

http://www.phil.washington.edu/people_gardiner.htm

Professor Michael Northcott (Edinburgh University): *Cosmopolitan Ethics in the Anthropocene*

Michael Northcott is Professor of Ethics at the University of Edinburgh. He is best known for his research and writing on the ethical and theological implications of climate change and the ecological crisis. He has authored or edited ten books and over eighty research papers. To mention a few examples, he is the author of *A Moral Climate: The Ethics of Global Warming* (Orbis Books, 2007) and *Cuttlefish, Clones and Cluster Bombs: Preaching, Politics and Ecology* (Darton Longman & Todd 2010). He is a co-editor of *Theology After Darwin* (Paternoster Press, 2009) and *Diversity and Dominion: Dialogues in Ecology, Ethics, and Theology* (Cascade Books, 2010).

http://www.ed.ac.uk/schools-departments/divinity/staff/search?uun=northcom&cw_xml=bio.php

Professor Ingrid Robeyns (Erasmus University Rotterdam): *Sustainable Procreative Freedom*

Ingrid Robeyns is professor in Practical Philosophy at the Erasmus University in Rotterdam. Her research focuses on the capability approach, theories of justice, family justice, the assessment of economic systems from a multi-value perspective. She is Board Member of the Netherlands School for Research in Practical Philosophy and she is member of the editorial board for the Journal of Human Development and Economics and Philosophy. She has published widely on the capability approach. She is the co-editor of *Measuring Justice: Primary Goods and Capabilities* (Cambridge University Press, 2010) and *Amartya Sen's Work and Ideas: A Gender Perspective* (Routledge 2005).

<http://www.ingridrobeyns.nl>

Docent Jeroen van der Sluijs (GeoSciences, Utrecht): *Scientific Scenarios for the Development of Climate Change*

Docent Jeroen van der Sluijs is a Senior researcher at the Department of Innovation, Environmental and Energy Sciences at the Copernicus Institute, Utrecht University. He is the coordinator of the research cluster « Energy and Global Change: Dealing with Risks and Uncertainties. He has been working on uncertainty in model based environmental risk assessment, along with the development of methodologies that facilitate a better management of uncertainty, quality, plurality and value judgements in risk assessment, integrated assessment, and sustainability assessment. Recently he has in commission of Rathenau Institute lead-authored a report to parliament "Room for Climate Debate", presenting an in depth analysis of uncertainty and controversy on climate change and proposed new ways to address climate change uncertainties in the science policy interface. He has over sixty scientific publications.

<http://www.uu.nl/staff/JPvanderSluijs>

Programme – Paper sessions

Friday / Freitag 23 August 2013 10.45-11.15 Session I/ Kurzvorträge I		Room
Channel 1 <i>Chair: Rico Sneller</i>	FEI TENG: Carbon Emission Right in the Context of Climate Change	St. Jan
Channel 2 <i>Chair: Göran Collste</i>	MICHEL BOURBAN: Climate Change, Potential Catastrophes and the Rights of Future	Angola
Channel 3 <i>Chair: Andrea Günter</i>	LIESKE VOGET-KLESCHIN: Sustainable Development in Between the Priority of the Right and the Priority of the Good: The Need for a Substantial but Incomprehensive Notion of the Good Within a Concept of SD	Ghana
Channel 4 <i>Chair: Ioan Stuhec</i>	JENNY EHNBERG: Natural Law and Sustainable Development	Kenia
Channel 5 <i>Chair: Neil Messer</i>	MARTIN KOPP: Towards a Christian Voluntary Simplicity? Growth Questioned by Theological Ethics	Mozambique
Channel 6 <i>Chair: Arne Manzeschke</i>	MARTIN PETERSON: The Last Man Argument Revisited	Tanzania
Friday / Freitag 23 August 2013 11.15-11.45 Session II/ Kurzvorträge II		Room
Channel 1 <i>Chair: Rico Sneller</i>	AUKE POLS: Irreversible Social change	St. Jan
Channel 2 <i>Chair: Göran Collste</i>	ERIC BRANDSTEDT: Individual Climate Duties	Angola
Channel 3 <i>Chair: Andrea Günter</i>	BEN-WILLIE GOLO: Indigenous Ecological Knowledge, Environmental Sustainability and Political Ethics of an Open Future in Ghana	Ghana
Channel 4 <i>Chair: Ioan Stuhec</i>	ANDREA GAMMON: Climate as Assemblage and Distributive Agency for Climate Ethics	Kenia
Channel 5 <i>Chair: Neil Messer</i>	MARIA ANTONACIO: Humanism and the Cultural Logic of Sustainability	Mozambique
Channel 6 <i>Chair: Arne Manzeschke</i>	MATTHEW RENDALL: Carbon Leakage and the Argument from no Difference	Tanzania

Friday / Freitag 23 August 2013 12.00-12.30 Session III/ Kurzvorträge III		Room
Channel 1 <i>Chair: Rico Sneller</i>	JONATHAN PARKER: From Knowledge to Action: Developing Sustainable Lifestyles in Response to Climate Change	St. Jan
Channel 2 <i>Chair: Göran Collste</i>	AURÉLIE HALSBAND: How Much Biodiversity Should We Conserve for Future Generations?	Angola
Channel 3 <i>Chair: Andrea Günter</i>	BERNICE BOVENKERK: Public Deliberation and the Representation of Future Generations, Animals and Nature	Ghana
Channel 4 <i>Chair: Ivan Stuhec</i>	MICHAEL HACKL: Naturschutz als Grundlage und Voraussetzung für den Erhalt der Freiheit. H. Jonas' Verantwortungsphilosophie und F.W.J. Schellings Metaphysik der Freiheit	Kenia
Channel 5 <i>Chair: Neil Messer</i>	PATRICK NULLENS: The Reformed and Evangelical Doctrine of Total Depravity and Ecological Wisdom"	Mozambique
Channel 6 <i>Chair: Arne Manzeschke</i>	MICHAEL LUCAS: Transformational Infrastructure and Intergenerational Ethics at Morro Bay	Tanzania
Friday / Freitag 23 August 2013 12.30-13.00 Session IV/ Kurzvorträge IV		Room
Channel 1 <i>Chair: Rico Sneller</i>	TIM CHRISTION MYERS: Understanding Climate Change as an Existential Threat: Confronting Climate Denial as a Challenge to Climate Ethics	St. Jan
Channel 2 <i>Chair: Göran Collste</i>	EKATERINA BATUEVA: Rethinking Education for Our Sustainable Future	Angola
Channel 3 <i>Chair: Andrea Günter</i>	STEFAN HEUSER: Auf dem Weg zu einer großen Transformation? Welche Ethik wir angesichts des Klimawandels brauchen	Ghana
Channel 1 <i>Chair: Ivan Stuhec</i>	ROLAND MEES: Ethics of the Distant Future and Moral Corruption	Kenia
Channel 5 <i>Chair: Neil Messer</i>	JAN JANS: A Frog is Not an Elephant ... On Anthropocentrism in Ecological Ethics	Mozambique
Channel 6 <i>Chair: Arne Manzeschke</i>	JOS PHILIPS: How Sufficiencyarianism Can Help Us Improve Our Accounts of Precaution	Tanzania

Friday / Freitag 23 August 2013 14.15-14.45 Session V/ Kurzvorträge V		Room
Channel 1 <i>Chair: Lars Reuter</i>	TATJANA VISAK: Shall I Cooperate? Duties for Individuals Arising from Climate Change and the Capacity of Utilitarianism to Solve Collective Action Problems	St. Jan
Channel 2 <i>Chair: Gotlind Ushöfer</i>	MARC DAVIDSON: Intergenerational justice as Equal Treatment	Angola
Channel 3 <i>Chair: Jan Jans</i>	GABRIEL FONTELES: Ethical Clashes: the Belo Monte Case Dam Construction and Conflicts Between Indigenous and Non-indigenous Ethics	Ghana
Channel 4 <i>Chair: Ivan Stuhec</i>	RALF LÜFTER: Die Zukunft der Nachhaltigkeit	Kenia
Channel 5 <i>Chair: Rico Sneller</i>	STEVEN C. VAN DEN HEUVEL: Human Beings as Masters over Nature: The Relevance of Bonhoeffer's Anthropocentrism for Environmental Ethics	Mozambique
Channel 6 <i>Chair: Göran Collste</i>	PIETRO LANZINI: Positive Spillover Between Pro-Environmental Behaviors: The Quest for the Magic Button	Tanzania
Friday / Freitag 23 August 2013 14.45-15.15 Session VI/ Kurzvorträge VI		Room
Channel 1 <i>Chair: Lars Reuter</i>	ROBERT HEEGER: Climate Change and responsibility to Future Generations: What Normative Questions Should we Address?	St. Jan
Channel 2 <i>Chair: Gotlind Ushöfer</i>	RUTGER CLAASSEN: The Capability Rights of Future Generations	Angola
Channel 3 <i>Chair: Jan Jans</i>	HEIDI JOKINEN: Contents and Process – How the Habermasian Discursive Model Gives Too High Hopes of Solving Global Climate Problems	Ghana
Channel 4 <i>Chair: Ivan Stuhec</i>	NEIL MESSER: Theological and Ethical Resources in the Face of Climate Change: Sin, Repentance and Hope	Kenia
Channel 5 <i>Chair: Rico Sneller</i>	JANN REINHARDT: Sustainability and Jewish Law?	Mozambique
Channel 6 <i>Chair: Göran Collste</i>	DICKSON KANAKULYA: Ethics and the Re-Conceptualization of Sustainability	Tanzania

Friday / Freitag 23 August 2013 15.30-16.00 Session VII/ Kurzvorträge VII		Room
Channel 1 <i>Chair: Lars Reuter</i>	DAVID KRONLID: Moving-and-Mooring in Uncertain Terrains. A Capabilities Approach to Climate Change Ethics	St. Jan
Channel 2 <i>Chair: Gotlind Ulshöfer</i>	SASKIA FIKKERS: Rights of Future Generations – The Right Approach?	Angola
Channel 3 <i>Chair: Jan Jans</i>	CAMERON VAZIRI: Inevitability Ethics: Revisiting Eco-Authoritarianism	Ghana
Channel 4 <i>Chair: Ivan Stuhec</i>	ANGELA ROOTHAAN: In Search of An Open Future – Against an Unsustainable Society	Kenia
Channel 1 <i>Chair: Rico Sneller</i>	GEORGE KODIMATTAM JOSEPH: Intergenerational and International Justice: Sustainability and the Dilemma of Developing Nations	Mozambique
Channel 6 <i>Chair: Göran Collste</i>	OLLE TORPMAN: Environmental Pragmatism and the Objection from Impracticality	Tanzania
Friday / Freitag 23 August 2013 16.00-16.30 Session VIII/ Kurzvorträge VIII		Room
Channel 1 <i>Chair: Lars Reuter</i>	ANDERS NORDGREN: From a Project on Meat Production and Climate Change	St. Jan
Channel 2 <i>Chair: Gotlind Ulshöfer</i>	PATRIK BAARD: Risk and Goal-Setting	Angola
Channel 3 <i>Chair: Jan Jans</i>	CHRISTIAN BAATZ: What can Be Said in Defense of the Equal Per Capita View? An Analysis of Two Rivaling Approaches in Climate Ethics	Ghana
Channel 4 <i>Chair: Ivan Stuhec</i>	JOEL PARTHEMORE: Conceptual Frameworks and Climate Change: (Re-)Framing the Debate	Kenia
Channel 2 <i>Chair: Rico Sneller</i>	JOAN MCGREGOR: Just Food: How Our Eating Shapes Our Future	Mozambique
Channel 6 <i>Chair: Göran Collste</i>	JONATHAN JOSEFSSON: The Best Interest of the Child in Times of Migration Management – A Case Study of Decision-Making in the Swedish Migration Court of Appeal	Tanzania

Saturday / Sonnabend 24 August 2013 10.45-11.15 Session IX/ Kurzvorträge IX		Room
Channel 1 <i>Chair: Andrea Günter</i>	CHRISTIAN BAATZ & LIESKE VOGET-KLESCHIN: Individual Responsibility for Global Environmental Problems	St. Jan
Channel 2 <i>Chair: Neil Messer</i>	AMY DEBEATS: Environmental Responsibility and the Ethics of Radical Life Extension	Angola
Channel 3 <i>Chair: Arne Manzeschke</i>	IVO WALLIMANN-HELMER: How to Defend Institutional Redesign for Sustainable Policy Making	Ghana
Channel 4 <i>Chair: Lars Reuter</i>	LUIGI RUSSI: Wild Things: Stories, Transition and the Sacred in Ecological Social Movements	Kenia
Channel 3 <i>Chair: Gotlind: Ulshöfer</i>	GERHARD BOS: A Right to Protection from Moral Tragedy, Safeguarding a Sustainable, Habitable Environment	Mozambique
Channel 6 <i>Chair: Jan Jans</i>	KARMA GUINDON: Ecological Ethics for Contemporary Social Work	Tanzania
Saturday / Sonnabend 24 August 2013 11.15-11.45 Session X/ Kurzvorträge X		Room
Channel 1 <i>Chair: Andrea Günter</i>	FRANCESCA PONGIGLIONE: Individual Responsibility and Climate Change: Beyond Selfishness and Altruism	St. Jan
Channel 2 <i>Chair: Neil Messer</i>	GÉRALD HESS & HUGUES POLITIER: About the Possibility of a (Distant) Future Ethics : The Motivation Problem	Angola
Channel 3 <i>Chair: Arne Manzeschke</i>	DENIS MALHERBE & DAVID WELLMAN: Authority, Power and Control in the Work of Building Transnational Sustainable Communities within the European Union	Ghana
Channel 4 <i>Chair: Lars Reuter</i>	EGIDIO ALCIDES DE BUSTAMANTE AZEVEDO: Transrational Interpretations of Peace and its Contribution to Alternative Worldviews for a Sustainable, Ethical and Aesthetical Present	Kenia
Channel 3 <i>Chair: Gotlind Ulshöfer</i>	JO DIRIX: Diversified Climate Action : The Top-Down Failure and the Carbon Markets Emergence	Mozambique
Channel 6 <i>Chair: Jan Jans</i>	SUSAN BROWN: Conceptualizing Digital Ethics for 21st Century 'Grand Challenges'	Tanzania

Saturday / Sonnabend 24 August 2013 12.00-12.30 Session XI/ Kurzvorträge XI		Room
Channel 1 <i>Chair: Andrea Günter</i>	CHON TEJEDOR: The Most Dangerous Assumption in the Climate Change Debate: Neutrality and Future Generations	St. Jan
Channel 2 <i>Chair: Neil Messer</i>	ALIX DIETZEL: Relational vs Non-Relational Justice in Climate Ethics	Angola
Channel 3 <i>Chair: Arne Manzeschke</i>	MAY THORSETH: Sustainability Politics and the Liberal Dilemma	Ghana
Channel 4 <i>Chair: Lars Reuter</i>	HERMANN DIEBEL: Gesellschaftliche Fragen, theologische Antworten – das doppelte Problem theologischer Wirtschaftsethik im Hinblick auf die Gestaltung einer unsicheren Zukunft	Kenia
Channel 3 <i>Chair: Gotlind Ulshöfer</i>	BART MIJLAND: Composing the Future We Want?	Mozambique
Saturday / Sonnabend 24 August 2013 12.30-13.00 Session XII/ Kurzvorträge XII		Room
Channel 1 <i>Chair: Andrea Günter</i>	CHRISTOPH BAUMGARTNER: Climate Ethics of the Anthropocene. An analysis of our moral obligations to future generations in a new geological epoch	St. Jan
Channel 2 <i>Chair: Neil Messer</i>	KIAN MINTZ-WOO: Discounting for Epistemic Reasons	Angola
Channel 3 <i>Chair: Arne Manzeschke</i>	NORBERT CAMPAGNA: Climate change and the duties of nations	Ghana
Channel 4 <i>Chair: Lars Reuter</i>	PHILIP FREYTAG: Promising a Future for Everyone. On the Moral Foundations of Sustainability	Kenia

Book of Abstracts

Abstracts in alphabetic order by author's last name

Humanism and the Cultural Logic of Sustainability

Maria Antonacio, Bucknell University, Lewisburg, USA

Humanism and environmentalism have often been portrayed as rivals, if not outright adversaries. Some of the classic arguments for environmental protection have been inseparable from the critique of "anthropocentrism." Moreover, the environmentalist preoccupation with destructive human impacts has presupposed that human interventions into nature should be minimized. The prevalence of these assumptions in environmentalist rhetoric has often had the effect of silencing concerns about human dignity or human flourishing and perpetuating a myth of "pristine nature" as a realm apart from human striving. Recently, however, the terms of the humanism-environmentalism debate have radically shifted. Prompted by the recognition that every place on earth bears the mark of human impacts, as well as by renewed philosophical reflection on the meanings of the term "nature," scholars across a range of disciplines are rethinking the human-nature relationship.

Among the most influential of these recent efforts have been the cultural developments associated with "sustainability." The term originated with the 1987 Brundtland Commission of the United Nations, which defined the goal of "sustainable development" as "development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." Since then, the concept of sustainability has accrued a wider set of connotations both in the academy and in the culture at large. Sustainability has been embraced as a way of articulating the material, moral, and spiritual values that are needed to sustain human cultures in the face of unprecedented challenges. It is also being cited as a core value of a liberal arts education in the United States. Perhaps surprisingly, sustainability has even been hailed as an essential management principle for corporations seeking the so-called triple bottom line of "people, profit, and planet." Whether these various uses of "sustainability" are talking about the same thing, however, or even pointing in the same direction, is open to question.

The aim of this paper is to explore the "cultural logic" of sustainability as a "master term" in twenty-first century thinking (Yates 2012). I argue that understanding the cultural logic of sustainability yields two important insights. First, it allows us to see the rise of sustainability discourse as a reflection of widespread anxiety about what sustains human life in an era when the biophysical conditions of life are at risk and "the impact of humans on the natural world is now as great, and in some instances greater, than nature's impact on humans" (Yates 2012). From this point of view, sustainability is a rhetorical site where the contested meanings of the end of nature are being actively negotiated. For some thinkers, sustainability represents a "recovery narrative" in which "humanity will live in a relationship of balance and harmony with the natural world" (Merchant 1995). Others are more skeptical about "whether long-term human economic interests and the long-term integrity of the natural world really do coincide" (Holland 2010).

These alternating responses to the risks associated with the end of nature yield a second insight. The widely varying uses of sustainability discourse point to a deep ambivalence about whether humanity's relation to nature is (or should be) defined primarily by the notion of limit, or rather by the drive to surpass limits in pursuit of a renewed plenitude. Sustainability rhetoric has been used to support both of these contrasting images of the human. For example, some of the most familiar norms associated with sustainability (e.g., sufficiency, frugality, voluntary simplicity, humility, sacrifice, restraint, living within nature's limits, etc.) carry quasi-religious resonances of renunciation. Sustainability is thereby portrayed as an ascetic practice that calls for the disciplined restraint of human appetites for the sake of a higher good. However, other thinkers use the rhetoric of

sustainability to dispute the notion of limits altogether; they contend that the human impulse to refashion nature should be encouraged as the fulfillment of our highest potential as "makers" and "managers."

I contend that the ambivalence between these two meanings of sustainability exposes a tension at the heart of human self-understanding in the contemporary age. As such, it provides leverage on current debates in philosophy, religious studies, and environmental and biomedical ethics about how to define the being of the human both within and over against the rest of the natural world.

Clapp, Jennifer and Peter Dauvergne. *Paths to a Green World: The Political Economy of the Global Environment, 2nd edition* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2011).

Holland, Alan. "Sustainability." In Dale Jamieson, ed., *A Companion to Environmental Philosophy* (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2001), 390-401.

Kibert, Charles J. et al, *Working Toward Sustainability: Ethical Decision Making in a Technological World* (Hoboken, N.J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2012).

Maniates, Michael and John M. Meyer, eds. *The Environmental Politics of Sacrifice* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2010).

McKibben, Bill. *The End of Nature* (New York: Random House, 1989).

Merchant, Carolyn. "Reinventing Eden: Western Culture as a Recovery Narrative." In William Cronon, ed., *Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in Nature* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1996), 132-159.

Princen, Thomas. *Treading Softly: Paths to Ecological Order* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2010).

Schor, Juliet B. *Plenitude: The New Economies of True Wealth* (New York: Penguin Press, 2010).

Wapner, Paul. *Living Through the End of Nature* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2010).

Yates, Joshua J. "Abundance on Trial: The Cultural Significance of 'Sustainability.'" *The Hedgehog Review* (Summer 2012): 8-25.

Risk and Goal Setting

Patrik Baard, Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden

Impending impacts of climate change will bring great harms that are imperative to avoid or limit. Action-guiding normative ideals should be coupled with abilities to be attained, as stated in the classic principle 'ought implies can'. Often the principle is interpreted to mean that an ought is revised in light of what an agent is able to bring about. The notion of abilities is not trivial, especially in complex issues involving long time frames, great uncertainty regarding consequences, and sufficient actions to reduce harm. Nevertheless, when it comes to decisions involving possible but not certain harm of a great magnitude, great consideration should be taken to survey abilities, actual as well as possible developments, before an 'ought' is revised. This is especially the case with oughts carrying such weight as in the case of impacts related to climate change, where it is often agreed that the current generation have a great duty that can only at great hardship be achieved due to institutional inadequacies, short planning time frames, and a fossil fuelled-based economy (cf. Gardiner, 2011). Still, despite such believed inability, there are good reasons for why the normative ideal, the ought, should not be revised.

This presentation will combine discussions of decision-making under risk and uncertainty, realistic goal-setting, and the principle of 'ought implies can'. Social decision-making involving possible but not certain harm which might affect people other than the decision-maker, results in obligations of avoiding or limiting the possible harm. Such a view is based on individuals having rights not to be exposed to possible harm, as well as consequentialist risk management in which minimizing disutility levels is the primary decision-making principle (cf. Hansson, 2007). Future possible harm implies goals, i.e. it is a desired state of affairs that the harmful event is avoided or kept within acceptable limits. Realistic goals should furthermore relate to abilities. Goal setting is a common tool in planning related to climate change, such as emission mitigation targets or sustainable development.

The classic moral principle of 'ought implies can' combines both a desired state of affair with a normative function and its relation to abilities, or available options of action. The principle is often proposed to entail that a normative ideal should be revised in light of what is currently believed to be achievable. Drawing on current discussions, it is suggested that an 'ought' lacking a 'can' might function as a 1) demand-enabler or 2) demand-waiver, entailing that a normative ideal carries such weight that we have to find means to attain it (1), or state that the inability to match the ideal leads to a revision of the ideal (2) (Herzog, 2012: 277; cf. Besch, 2011). This requires forming a belief on abilities, both currently existing and possible developments.

Abilities to manage the impacts of climate change has to consider multiple forms of expertise, possible development of means, and long time frames, which are challenges to decision-makers. Nevertheless, avoiding the possible harm of climate change is a goal with a strong normative content. In the light of believed inability to be attained, the question is whether the ought should be revised. The presentation suggests that the possible harm related to the impact of climate change is an 'ought' that should not lightly be revised without careful consideration of what available actions there are. There might however be justified beliefs on limits to what we can do to avoid future harm, which in turn require discussions on how a goal should be revised, i.e. define acceptable levels of risk. The primary problem is identifying whether the status of the ought, which is dependent on beliefs on abilities as well as what possible harm is defined as acceptable.

Besch, T. 2011. 'Factualism, Normativism and the Bounds of Normativity'. *Dialogue* 50l, 347-365.

Gardiner, S. 2011. *A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of Climate Change*. Oxford University Press: New York.

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What Can Be Said in Defense of the Equal Per Capita View? An Analysis of Two Rivaling Approaches in Climate Ethics

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The popularity of the equal per capita view (ECPV), i.e. the view that every person is entitled to the same amount of greenhouse gas emissions, has gained momentum. ECPV receives broad support from academics (cf. e.g. Singer 2002, Athanasiou & Baer 2002) and NGOs, and leading politicians. Criticism of EPCV usually seems to be motivated out of self-interest from high polluters. Recently, however, Derek Bell (2008) and Simon Caney (2009) brought forward an interesting line of argument. They criticize EPCV for being *Atomist* and *Isolationist*.

Atomist approaches deal with mitigation and adaptation separately, i.e. they apply different principles of justice in each domain. According to Bell and Caney such an approach is implausible because the same normative considerations apply to both mitigation and adaptation and, hence, there is no reason to treat both realms differently. Instead, one should consider all climate change related responsibilities together and propose a principle that governs the total package of responsibilities (*Holism*).

In addition, ECPV treats climate responsibilities in isolation from other considerations about global justice such as trade, development, poverty and health: the principle of equality is applied to a specific good, emission permits, in isolation from other considerations (it thus is *Isolationist*). According to Bell and Caney, when reflecting what to do about climate change we should do so in an *Integrationist* fashion: we should treat the ascription of climate responsibilities in conjunction with considerations about global justice in general.

In our opinion they develop forceful arguments to support their claim. Still, a holist-integrationist approach faces problems of its own. For instance, it is criticized in terms of practicality and feasibility (Meyer & Roser 2010). Caney rejects this critique (2012). These issues need a much more detailed discussion though. We want to further the emerging debate by analyzing the plausibility of Bell's and Caney's approach and by contrasting it with our own, moderately atomistic and isolationist, approach. Our analysis will not only assess the approaches on the theoretical level, but it will also account for the level of application as well as non-ideal considerations such as a lack of institutions or a lack of (political) will to act in accordance with what justice requires.

If an atomist-isolationist approach turns out to be mistaken, a commitment to ECPV can hardly be sustained. Also, distributing benefits and burdens resulting from climate change to achieve, say, global equality of primary goods (Integration) would result in a rather different allocation than trying to just equalize these benefits and burdens (Isolation). Therefore, what is to be regarded as a just outcome significantly depends on which approach is adopted and not only on the theory of global/international justice as well as the scope, metric and pattern that is applied. Analyzing the plausibility of both rivaling concepts will provide important insights what we should do about climate change.

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Individual Responsibility for Global Environmental Problems

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While it is beyond dispute that remedying global environmental problems necessitates regional, national, and global institutions, the role and responsibility of individuals is much less clear. In so far as individual responsibility for global environmental problems and sustainable development respectively is addressed, it is often dealt with in isolation from the institutional dimension. In contrast, the proposed contribution aims at linking these two dimensions. To this end, we address three aspects:

1. Institutions aiming at overcoming global environmental problems imply constraints on individuals. They are often objected to by pointing to the liberal principle that the state should not interfere with individuals' ideas about how to live (principle of neutrality). We present two arguments from within the realm of liberalism that allow criticizing such objections: First, the principle of neutrality is qualified by the harm-principle. Accordingly, in so far as certain individual choices result in negative impacts on other (contemporary and future) people, constraining these choices can draw on the liberal harm principle. Second, any institutional scheme inevitably results in restricting lifestyle choices and probably favoring certain lifestyles over others. (cf. Rawls 1988) Accordingly, we propose that rather than asking if such constraints are legitimate we need to focus on how and to what degree individuals' choices can be legitimately constrained.
2. Although institutions result from collective action broadly conceived, such collective action is not detached but rather emerges from individual behavior. We substantiate the claim that that individuals are primarily obliged to engage in collective action towards establishing institutions (cf. Rawls 2005; Forst 2012; in regard to climate change cf. Johnson 2003; Sinnott-Armstrong 2005).
3. In our non-ideal world most individuals do not comply with these duties. Consequently, institutional remedy for global environmental problems is widely lacking. One of the central questions regarding the consequences of such non-compliance is whether compliers must take up the slack. (Murphy 2003; Hohl, Roser 2011) In this regard we differentiate between (i) duties to bring forward institutions governing global environmental problems (cf. 2.) and (ii) duties to reduce one's individual environmental impact. Concerning the latter, it is often argued that effects of individual actions are too small to significantly contribute in mediating/mitigating global environmental problems. We show why this counter-claim is flawed and thus acknowledge both kinds of duties. Finally, we therefore investigate how the two kinds of duties relate to each other.

Throughout the paper, we argue from a cosmopolitan perspective of intra- and intergenerational justice. We focus on the examples of (i) climate change and (ii) the environmental issues related to global agricultural production. We thereby also investigate to what extent individuals' responsibility differs in these two fields of action.

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Rethinking Education For Our Sustainable Future

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For the past decade the global community has faced the set of challenges which form the World's image today: climate change and scarce resources, growth of population and growing disparities among people and countries, global financial crisis and escalation of conflicts. As a matter of fact, the 21st century with its modern technologies, progress and globalization, fails to react in time to challenges occurred and to address the target groups influenced. Complexity of the issue and interconnections of challenges need firm, consistent and conceptual approach towards development and future of our humankind.

Nobody can predict what kind of future is waiting for us there but what is certain is that decisions we make and path we choose today is tightly bounded with events and consequences that will expect us tomorrow. Sustainability as an approach towards our common present and future has the potential to enable the humankind to lead harmonic well-being within ecological, economic, political and cultural dimensions. Being complex and diverse this way of thinking, understanding things and behaving needs long-term commitment from community and governments, from each of us in order to function and bring the visible results for us and for future generations.

Education is an integral tool which we as society possess for rethinking our past, for reacting on challenges of present, for redirecting our paths towards future in order to achieve coherence and sustainability. The author does not state that education all alone can change the situation in the World today but clearly education has a significant role in shaping modern realities in the direction of greater respect between people and people, between people and environment.

To be able to work together on the issues of development our society needs to address the topic of human capacities and constant work on their improvement through education. Though the author supports the general pattern of opening greater access to education Worldwide, it should be mentioned that the existing education systems do not correspond the needs of our society and has to be rethought with respect to knowledge, skills, perspectives and values of society and environment and their interconnections. This pattern can bring more active participation and involvement in political and economic spheres of life; can initiate new, more responsible ways of thinking and behaving in everyday life and in the long-term perspective.

The author would try to deliver the interdisciplinary approach to the presented issue, working with the theoretical concepts and practical inputs in regards to education and its significance for the development and sustainable future. With the examples and best practices the author will try to present the possibilities of new education patterns towards the sustainable future such as learning from indigenous people, sustainable agriculture, sustainable community, etc. In addition, the author will introduce the possible techniques and methods for reorienting the existing education learning strategies such as non-formal education, experiential learning, problem solving, etc.

The author herself is an educator that uses formal and non-formal education learning strategies in her work, she is actively involved in the projects on communities' development on local and international levels both in non-governmental and academic spheres; this approach can bring more personalized and first-hand experience to the paper.

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Climate Ethics of the Anthropocene. An Analysis of Our Moral Obligations to Future Generations in a New Geological Epoch

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The aim of this paper is to explore the normative relevance of the view that we are living in a new geological epoch, the Anthropocene, and to clarify the structure of some of our moral obligations to future generations in a 'climate ethics of the Anthropocene'.

'Conservative' positions in environmental ethics often focus on our moral obligation to *preserve* our natural environment, either because ecosystems or non-human living beings are considered intrinsically valuable, or because they are seen as valuable resources for humans. In the latter case, our obligations to future generations can require us to use natural resources carefully and to reduce emissions of toxic substances and greenhouse gases to a minimum. Such 'conservative' positions act on the assumption that humans live in a 'natural' environment that can be affected by human conduct, but that is not substantially shaped by our actions, unlike, e.g., cities and transport infrastructures. This assumption, however, is challenged by research in geosciences that shows that the effects of humans on the global environment have escalated and that we shape the composition and the quality of the soil, the atmosphere, the climate, etc. to such an extent that our traces will remain visible for many millennia. In light of such insights, Nobel Prize Laureate Paul Crutzen and others argue that mankind has driven the world into a new geological epoch, the Anthropocene, the epoch in which mankind shapes all of its 'natural' environment *significantly*. The proposal to speak of the Anthropocene as the successor of the Holocene (the period of the past 10-12 millennia), has gained much attention and support. There is, however, surprisingly little research on the possible ethical implications of the view that we live in the Anthropocene.

This paper focuses on the question of how we should understand our obligations to future generations in the context of climate change in light of the concept of the Anthropocene, i.e. the view that the atmosphere, the climate, the quality of water in rivers and lakes and so forth are significantly shaped by human actions.

The normative framework of my analysis is provided by Peter Rinderle's intergenerational libertarianism, especially the *Principle of Sufficiency* according to which the members of future generations have a right to the satisfaction of their elementary needs.

The Principle of Sufficiency can be interpreted in different ways. According to a conservative approach it could require us to *save and preserve 'nature'* so that future people are able to satisfy their elementary needs. This can be conceptualized as a negative duty of present people not to consume too much natural resources and not to poison the environment to an extent that makes it impossible or unacceptably burdensome for future generations to satisfy their elementary needs.

An 'ethics of the Anthropocene', however, could argue differently, namely that given the fact that we do shape the atmosphere, climate etc., we not only have negative duties like those mentioned above, but also positive duties to *purposefully manipulate our environment*, including the atmosphere and the climate, if possible, in such a way that future generations can satisfy their elementary needs. Such geo-engineering (e.g. solar radiation management that tries to control the amount of sunlight reaching the surface of the earth e.g. by cloud brightening) is already discussed in climate research and climate ethics. The focus of this paper, however, is not on (the legitimacy of) geo-engineering. Rather, it aims to clarify the structure of our moral obligations to future generations in a world that takes seriously the

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A Right to Protection from Moral Tragedy: Safeguarding a Sustainable, Habitable Environment

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This paper proposes, in terms of human rights, a way of reconstructing the present generation's responsibility regarding safeguarding a habitable, sustainable environment. The ambition is to frame such a responsibility in terms of rights of human individuals presently alive, and not as the correlate of rights that future human beings (will have) have. This paper is in four parts. The first introduces the idea of a right to protection against moral tragedy. The second argues that, unless the present generation adjusts its behavior in significant ways, some of that generation will be actors in such a moral tragedy. Then, the third, concludes that ascribing such a right to members of our generation would entail a duty regarding safeguarding a habitable, sustainable environment. The fourth and final section, observes that such a human rights approach to sustainability would sidestep problems associated with the non-existence and non-identity of future human beings.

1) Imagine the morally tragic situation in which a human being addresses us (individually or the human community) with a claim to the object of one of his human rights, which (i.e., the claim) cannot be satisfied due to environmental conditions. How are we to respond to such a claim? Would we hold that, given the present environmental circumstances, he has no rightful claim? Or, would we feel the moral pull of his claim, quite independent of whether his claim can be satisfied here and now? Obviously, the latter response would be the right one. In a moral sense, then, having human rights depends on spatio-temporal conditions for fulfilling it, but only because and insofar as it entails a normative requirement regarding such conditions. That is, the claim should be satisfied if spatio-temporal conditions allow for it, and if these conditions do not allow for that, then spatio-temporal conditions should be realized in which this claim can be satisfied.

2) If the present generation will not adjust its behavior, then some of its members will end up as actors in a future moral tragedy defined by an environment in which future claims (that these actors or their future contemporaries will potentially make) cannot be satisfied. To be sure, such a moral tragedy will entail a horrifying existential experience if only because one cannot have one's own rights satisfied and one cannot satisfy the rights of others. The moral tragedy is deeper than that, however, because some of these human beings alive in the future are already alive now, and will be actors in the moral tragedy as a foreseen result of actions that their past contemporaries performed. Protecting members of the present generation against such a future tragedy would entail preventing such a tragedy from arising.

3) If there is a human right to be protected from moral tragedies, then we have it and any member or any future generation will have it equally. Hence we should be protected not only from a situation in which our future contemporaries cannot have food etc., but also from a situation in which they will not be able to protect their future contemporaries from moral tragedies. In my view, the possession of such a right would correlate with a duty regarding safeguarding a habitable, sustainable environment. The environment should be habitable in the sense that it should allow for the satisfaction of rightful claims that our future contemporaries will potentially make. It should be sustainable, because among these claims is the claim to protection of such a habitable environment for their future contemporaries. Because their future contemporaries will have the same right-full claims and so on, it follows that protecting a habitable environment for our future contemporaries boils down to a protecting a habitable environment which can be passed on from one generation to the next.

4) Such a duty regarding safeguarding a habitable, sustainable environment would be independent of assumptions that future human beings have rights (individually or as future group-members) or that we would have duties towards future human beings. Moreover the duty would be independent of assuming a present or future generation's right to a sustainable, habitable environment. The duty regarding safeguarding a habitable, sustainable environment depends merely on a right of human beings to be protected from moral tragedies for the duration of their life. The merit of this approach to sustainability that it coheres with the paradigmatic idea that rights belong to human individuals, and that rights imply actual duties only if these belong to actual (not merely potential) human individuals.

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Climate Change, Potential Catastrophes and the Rights of Future Generations

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It is now widely accepted that the average temperatures of the globe are rising, that this warming is mostly caused by anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases, and that the effects of the changes of the world's climate are going to be overwhelmingly harmful for all forms of life on Earth, in particular for humans. Climate change, like other problems of global justice such as world poverty, is a problem at the confluence of different disciplines – economics, political and social sciences, natural sciences and philosophy, among others. Inspired by the empirical data collected by scientists, my paper will adopt a philosophical approach, whose objective is to show the strong link between climate change, sustainability and intergenerational justice.

Problems of intergenerational climate justice are twofold. The first issue deals with the transfer of duties of justice from past people to present persons: should historical emissions been taken into account when we assess the distribution of the burdens of climate change? The second deals with the duties of justice that currently living people have vis-à-vis future persons: should we take into account the rights and interests of members of future generations when designing climate policies? My paper will focus on the second question and try to show why we must answer positively if we are to fulfil our duties of intergenerational justice.

The first part of my paper aims at showing why climate change is a problem of intergenerational justice. The core of the problem is that projected effects of global warming are likely to be pretty dire: if we focus on the expected consequences of the changing of the Earth's climate by 2100, we realise how much the global poor, especially in Africa, Asia, small islands and Latin America, will suffer. For instance, tens of millions of additional poor people could be at risk of malaria in some regions of Africa, where water pressure may intensify with up to 75 per cent reduction in flows of some rivers and where many large coastal cities could suffer from severe damages from sea level rise. Moreover, if we assess the effects of climate change beyond 2100; if we take into account the dangers posed by positive feedbacks and the amplification effect of the carbon cycle on global warming; and if we realize that climate change, far from being a static problem, has greater probabilities to become catastrophic as decades pass by and as global emissions grow, then we understand why it is so crucial to be worried about the fate of future people in a warming world. From an intergenerational justice point of view, what is most likely to happen is not always the most important concern; a low probability may be the most important consideration if its effects will be very harmful.

My second part tries to show why a human rights approach can be enlightening in the debates of intergenerational climate justice. If we consider human rights as moral thresholds beyond which nobody should fall and as guarantees of the fulfilment of basic interests shared by all humans, then not only can we show why climate change is a problem of global justice threatening human rights of today's global poor, but also why it is a problem of intergenerational justice jeopardizing the satisfaction of future people's basic interests. I will take three examples to illustrate my approach: the human rights to life, health and subsistence. This approach can be subsumed under the category of sufficientarianism in the sense that it is grounded on the notion of an absolute threshold; and it can be linked to the notion of sustainability in the sense that its aim is to find a way to meet the needs of the present generations without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs.

In the last part I will defend this human rights approach against some common objections made to theories of intergenerational justice. Three unavoidable critiques to this position are the following: the impossibility for a future person to enjoy rights; our ignorance of the values, knowledge and technological capacities of members of future generations; and the non-identity argument, according to which it is impossible for the members of a given generation to harm the members of the following generations. By trying to show how a sufficientarian approach is not vulnerable to those objections, I will show its relevance in the debates on intergenerational theories of climate justice.

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Public Deliberation and the Representation of Future Generations, Animals and Nature

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Climate change poses an important challenge to existing democratic structures. First of all, climate change is a global phenomenon, while democracies mostly operate on the level of the nation state. Second, climate change is a phenomenon that is experienced mostly in the future, but that requires sacrifices now. Political decision-making in democracies is largely skewed in favour of short-term thinking, however. Third, the particular characteristics of climate change easily lead to passivity, as they create the perfect conditions for 'moral corruption' (Gardiner 2006). Finally, even if people were willing to take a long-term view, the particular characteristics of climate change make it difficult to reach agreement on the goals and instruments of combating climate change. Climate change could be described as a 'complex' or 'unstructured' policy problem. In this type of problem we encounter disagreement on both facts and values, about the definition of the problem and about policy aims, procedures, and instruments. Moreover, in unstructured problems the division between lay persons and experts is artificial (Wynne 1996).

How should democratic institutions deal with such a complex problem? As Sarewitz (2004, 386) has powerfully argued, a technocratic solution does not work, because bringing more expertise to bear on a complex policy problem only tends to make it more intractable: 'the notion that science is a source of facts and theories about reality that can and should settle disputes and guide political action' is misguided. Due to the diversity of disciplinary lenses through which climate change can be approached, it is possible to find a scientifically legitimate set of facts to support each different value-based view. Experts, then, cannot have the last word in policy decisions; their voice is but one among other voices. Policy decisions need to be made on the political level, with a discussion about relevant values and politicians can no longer 'hide behind scientific controversy'. But what does such political discussion look like? Many political theorists argue that public deliberation is called for, because it will encourage an 'enlarged mentality' (Arendt 1961). In the words of Barber (2013, 1), democratic deliberation will allow people 'to move from "me thinking" to "we thinking" and to substitute long-term, future-minded thinking for short-term, present-minded, special-interest thinking'.

According to theories of deliberative democracy, all those potentially affected by a decision should have the opportunity to participate in the drafting of that decision. However, in the context of climate change many potentially affected can not speak for themselves, either because they do not yet exist (future generations) or because they cannot speak (animals and nature). Could these groups nevertheless be represented in public deliberations? In my paper, I will focus on the questions what obstacles have to be overcome before these groups can be represented. In particular, the non-identity problem is a potential obstacle in the case of future generations (Heyward, 2008), and the pluralism problem in the case of animals and nature (Dryzek, 1995). Furthermore, as climate change is a global phenomenon it would seem that a global solution is required (although some argue for the opposite, more local solutions) (Barber, 2013). Creating a deliberative system on the global level, however, faces even greater obstacles than on the national level. This problem is exacerbated by the tension between the needs of the ecologically marginalized today and the needs of future generations, animals, and nature (Hayward 2013). This raises the question of who would have the prerogative to represent these groups.

Who are legitimate proxies for the voiceless? O'Neill (2001) distinguishes three possible sources for such legitimacy. Representation is legitimate when 1) the represented have given

their authorisation and the proxies are accountable to them, 2) members of the particular group are present, where group membership rests on shared identity (cf. Phillips' idea of a politics of ideas versus presence, 1995), 3) proxies have special knowledge regarding the interests of the represented group. In the case of future generations and arguably also in the case of animals and nature, the first two sources of legitimacy are absent. This leaves the last source. However, as argued above, in unstructured problems the role of expert knowledge is contested. Who is an expert is in part a normative decision: 'the spokespersons for nature speak in different voices' (O'Neill 2001, 496). Moreover, deliberative democracy is essentially about preference transformation. This seems to require the actual presence of future generations, animals, and nature.

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Individual Climate Duties

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Climate change is perhaps the worst collective action problem ever faced. It is thus not surprising that much of the work in, what has been called, “climate ethics” (Gardiner, 2004) has been focused on collective moral responsibility, that is, on what nation-states or whole generations owe to others in virtue of their contribution to climate change. An intractable problem for any such account is the fact that the existing incentive structure these agents face suggests that abatement action is not to be expected: quite to the contrary, the political deadlock with the resulting “intergenerational buck-passing” seems to be the inevitable, though tragic, outcome (Andreou, 2006; Gardiner, 2011). Even if I do not think we should give up the task of specifying a justified and feasible distribution of collective climate responsibility, I want to approach the ethical dimension of the problem in a slightly different way in this text. The topic of this paper is individual responsibility in relation to the problem of climate change. Its relevance can be motivated in the following way. Given the lack of political leadership individual action is needed to create a momentum, or to demonstrate a willingness to comply with envisioned institutional solutions. It can also reasonably be argued that as individual life styles are the drivers of global warming, and as such they need to change in the end anyhow.

The scant literature on individual climate responsibility is almost exclusively based on consequentialist frameworks. I will argue that this has led the discussion astray. A clear example is the discussion following after Walter Sinnott-Armstrong’s (2005) article and what has been called “the argument from inconsequentialism” (Sandberg, 2011). The debate about individual climate responsibility has been polarised in two extremes: one camp denies it altogether (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2005; Sandberg, 2011), or settles for a weak and derivative duty to “vote green” (Maltais, forthcoming); another camp tries to specify such responsibility through farfetched and highly speculative (expected) utility calculations (Nolt, 2011; Hiller, 2011). The reason why the debate has been locked into this damaging junction, I will argue, has to do with the underlying assumptions of consequentialism. More particularly, individual emissions of greenhouse gases are seen as inconsequential and ineffectual when evaluated against the large picture of all emissions; as marginal effects, then, are assumed for the ascription of moral responsibility, individual climate responsibility will be difficult to ascertain. I will argue that this is the wrong approach to the subject matter.

The second part of the paper presents, what I take to be, a more promising, deontological, conception of individual climate responsibility. An approach that has been suggested in passing, and without any details, by John Broome in his latest book (2012, p. 81). Basically, the idea is that one (as an individual) has duties of justice in relation to the problem of climate change that are qualitatively different from duties of beneficence; even if one is not in a position to make any noticeable difference (either for better or worse) to climate change, one has duties to refrain from excessive emissions, offset emissions (or whatever it may be). I will argue that these duties (let us call them “climate duties” for short) are, what Immanuel Kant (following Hugo Grotius and Samuel von Pufendorf) referred to as, imperfect. There are two (related) features of these duties that make them imperfect: first, they do not have corresponding rights, and, second, although they can be enacted by all they cannot be enacted for all. Our finite powers and abilities as human beings make it impossible to enact certain duties for all (a typical example is the duty of care). Given the kind of person one is, and the kind of situation one find oneself in, only so much can be done. This is not to say that these duties are less important or rigid than other duties, it is only that they are conditional in a sense. Neither should this proposal necessarily be understood as a

submission of so-called positive duties; it may well be the case that an imperfect duty is a negative duty (and, in fact, this will be my suggestion). The content of the duty vindicated in this text takes the following general form: individuals have imperfect moral obligations not to contribute to the creation of unacceptable risks to future people. More specifically, individuals have reasons to refrain from supporting and/or participating in those activities that give rise to the unacceptable risks of climate change. Given one's particular predicament this might mean different things. These conditional, imperfect duties could be translated into unconditional and perfect duties with the right institutional order; a reasonable argument can be made, though not in this text, that we (as citizens) have reasons to support the creation of such an order.

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Conceptualizing Digital Ethics for 21st Century 'Grand Challenges'

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Digital discourse- defined here as the language/communications that develop out of sociocultural and digital processes -now significantly shapes our understandings of global 'grand challenges' (e.g. climate change; biodiversity loss; increased). If, in the past, the discourse of the few influenced the understandings of the many, digital discourse is now evolved by the many for the many, blurring the division between authorship and audience. Increased access to a global commons, a conflation of authorship and audience, opportunities to move beyond the dominance of discourses related to large vested interests offer unprecedented opportunities for building new discourses and, thereby, rich understandings of grand challenges and how to respond to these.

With such opportunity comes responsibility. If each of us can affect understandings of grand challenges through our contributions to evolving digital discourse then we need to see ourselves as responsible agents in digital space. What constitutes responsible digital agency and discourse with respect to these grand challenges is the question informing the conceptualization of digital ethics in this paper.

In responding to this question, the paper draws on notions in the fields of education for sustainability (e.g. Sterling, 2004, Wals, 2010), information ethics (Ess, 2006/2009 & Capurro, 2011) environmental ethics (Rolston, 2011) and environmental discourse analysis (Mühlhäusler & Peace, 2006). Central to much of the literature in education for sustainability is the notion that environmental engagement is founded on a holistic rather than binary mind-set. That holistic mind-set is underpinned by an awareness of one's own assumptions and biases, by an awareness that people's views are grounded in diverse ways of thinking and by a capacity to engage with ambiguity and complexity. Such a mind-set may be crucial to an information ethic that works towards common ethical values informed by a plurality of visions of the environmental/social good. Nature itself, according to Rolston (2011) is the matrix of multiple values, providing a multifaceted lens through which to view and engage with the World around us. These multiple perspectives can be channelled into dynamic discourses of our integral relationships with the World, discourses which digital space, given its nature and affordances, can facilitate. Such dynamic discourses and the holistic mind-set underpinning these may allow us to formulate together ethics adequate to respect life on Earth, in other words it allows us to formulate what Rolston (ibid) refers to as Earth Ethics in a digital context.

The paper also draws on examples of existing discourses in digital space, crafting a typology of digital discourses relating to the grand environmental/social challenges to which we need to respond. These examples act as springboards for the initial formulation of digital ethics for environmental/social sustainability articulated in the paper.

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Climate Change and the Duties of Nations

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In the coming decennia, global climate change will lead to a general rising of the sea-level – I will restrict myself to this consequence, knowing full well that there are many other consequences –, making inhabitable large portions of territory which are still inhabited today, often islands. If the climate change were merely due to natural causes upon which man has no influence whatsoever, a duty to receive upon one's territory the direct victims of the general rising of the sea-level or to help them in other ways, including the help in taking preventive measures, would not be assignable to a specific nation. Yet as things stand, present climate change is due to human activities and is also known to be due to them. Under these conditions, the question whether those nations who profit most from the activities leading to global climate change do not have a duty of justice – and not merely a duty of humanity – to act in favor of those who will be the victims of their activities arises. Even though there is no intention to harm, likely harm to other nations is nevertheless accepted as a consequence of one's activities.

In my contribution, I want to argue that those nations profiting most from the activities leading to global climate change stand under a strict duty of justice towards those nations likely to suffer most from global climate change. I will also show that this duty may either take the form of a duty to accept upon one's territory those populations who will have had to flee from their native territories or else of a duty to help those populations build dams or implement other devices likely to protect them from the rising of the sea-level. I will also show that actions corresponding to the said duty of justice are not only due by the generations living at the time when lands will be inundated, but that the generations now living already have to act according to the said duty, for example by laying aside land-tracts for those who will have to emigrate or by creating a fund for financing the works necessary to preserve the territories from inundation. If it were still possible to prevent the rising of the sea-level by stopping immediately our activities causing the said rising, we would stand under a duty to stop these activities, unless we were willing to take upon ourselves the burden of fulfilling the duties we incur by continuing those activities.

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Understanding Climate Change as an Existential Threat: Confronting Climate Denial as a Challenge to Climate Ethics

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If climate change cannot be solved by experts alone, climate ethics answers a call to empower public responsibility on this issue. Unfortunately, however, publics typically find themselves impotent to respond to this unprecedented challenge. Drawing on phenomenology and important ethnographic findings on climate denial, I argue that climate change is an existential threat that most are not prepared to cope with. I suggest, accordingly, that the development of any viable “climate ethics of an open future” must begin with an adequate understanding of the way climate change is received by the public. Specifically, I claim that climate ethics must first contend with climate *denial* if it is to get off the ground.

It is important to recognize that climate change does not affect personal experience directly. Rather, it affects the “background” of experience that informs a community’s basic ways of thinking, feeling, and perceiving – what phenomenologists call the “life-world.” But more to the point, climate change *threatens* this background. Few issues so strongly contradict the basic assumptions we take for granted and rely on to get by in life. Consider, for example, the interlocking institutions that structure social relationships. Or the various conceptual, affective, and normative structures constituting the cultural metaphors and narratives that help us make sense of what it is to be human, what the good life is, and how we ought to relate to each other and to nature. The momentum of this entire socio-cultural complex is profoundly challenged by the implications of climate change.

As a danger to the life-world, climate change threatens what Anthony Giddens calls “ontological insecurity” – an existential condition marked by an anxiety that we’re profoundly motivated to avoid. As climate ethicists tell us, our most basic intuitions about space, time, causality, and right and wrong, simply fail us in the face of climate change because they’re infinitely complicated by this issue. Is it right to drive, fly, or even flick on the lights? What ultimately happens when I do? Who’s affected? When, and where? Ultimately, climate denial exists because climate change – as a threat to the life-world itself – defies confrontation. Typically, this isn’t a denial of the reality or seriousness of climate change, but rather a denial of the way one’s life is fundamentally *implicated* in this issue.

As sociologist Kari Norgaard’s ethnographic findings on climate denial show, communities work together (mostly unconsciously) to preserve the life-world via collective strategies that keep the troubling implications of climate change at bay. Insofar as such attempts are successful, the anxious threat of climate change is minimized, allowing everyday life to continue more or less unscathed. Consequently, as long as climate change is received primarily as a threat to life-world security, public responsibility on this issue will remain virtually impossible.

This existential account confronts climate ethicists with a catch-22 scenario. If they opt to articulate the grave implications of climate change in an effort to motivate public responsibility, they risk aggravating life-world security – and hence invite stepped-up efforts to deal with the anxiety that results by keeping climate change at a safe remove. Those sensitive to this problem encourage a softening of rhetoric to make climate change more palatable. On the other hand, however, if the implications of climate change are softened too much, this undermines the need to *reform* life-world sensibilities in more active and responsible directions. Cultural reform, of course, requires a life-world shift that will

move us to get serious about the various mitigation and adaptation efforts demanded by this issue.

Under these conditions, I argue, the task of climate ethics is to challenge life-world structures that preserve lifestyles inimical to a healthy climate, but do so without encouraging the life-world insecurity that prompts climate denial. A climate ethics of this kind would articulate a more secure and fulfilling world beyond the trappings of the one that created the climate crisis in the first place. More concretely, it would involve working through anxieties that close us down in denial by cultivating moods, like wonder, capable of opening us up to new horizons of possibility. In this regard, I conclude this paper by calling for a cross-pollination of climate ethics with the environmental humanities to empower responsibility in the face of uncertainty.

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The Capability Rights of Future Generations

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The capability approach, as developed by Martha Nussbaum, is a human rights approach: it proposes to give every human being a constitutionally guaranteed entitlement to ten central capabilities for human flourishing. This paper investigates a topic that has not yet received much attention, i.e. what this approach could say about intergenerational justice (Gutwald et al. 2011). Do future human beings also have rights to central capabilities? If so, what does this mean for the capabilities of present generations? How can we resolve conflicts between capability-claims of current and future generations?

The first part of the paper discusses the conceptualization of the *rights* of future generations in the capability approach. It argues against approaches extending capability rights to nature (Schlosberg 2007) or creating a 'meta-capability' to the environment (Holland 2008a). Instead we should attribute capability rights to human individuals in the future, as we do for human individuals living now (Anand and Sen 2000). Thus, the capability approach provides a different - and arguably superior - metric to express the object of future generations' interests, compared to their utility levels or their resource holdings (Page 2007).

This step, however important, is insufficient to identify our *obligations* to future generations, since the effect of our choices on future generations' capabilities is mediated by the natural (and social, economic and political) systems that we leave behind (Lessmann and Rauschmayer 2013). As a second step, then, our obligations cannot be directly related to future generations' capabilities, but must have as their object currently existing natural systems (both resources and sinks). I will discuss what stance the capability approach can take with respect to these obligations; most notably whether it should adopt a 'strong' or a 'weak' definition of sustainability (Scholtes 2011), and whether this would lead us to adopt 'capability ceilings' on the actions of present generations (Holland 2008b).

The third part of the paper addresses the question of the *moral justification* of these obligations to respect future generations' capability rights. Nussbaum's suggestion that we could simply follow Rawls's solution to this problem is curious, given the differences between both theories (Nussbaum 2006; Watene 2013). The problem of accepting claims on behalf of future generations arises for Rawls given his commitment to the reciprocity of the contracting partners. The capability approach, as a non-contractualist approach, does not have to assume such reciprocity. But Nussbaum's solution, to rely benevolence and compassion from current towards future generations, is at least as problematic. The capability approach is committed to the universality of capability rights (these are to be the basis of constitutional entitlements, in Nussbaum's approach). So it cannot rest content with a reliance on benevolence but must assume strict obligations to fulfill these rights.

Assuming such rights and obligations has been controversial in the literature. I will argue that we can identify present generations as bearers of these obligations, because through unsustainable action they can harm (i.e. violate the rights of) future generations. The distance in time between the harming action and the actual harm is morally irrelevant (Vanderheiden 2009, 131). Moreover, the fact that future persons do not yet exist, or the fact that their identity is affected by choices about sustainable policies, is no obstacle to the attribution of rights to them (Gosseries 2008).

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Intergenerational Justice As Equal Treatment

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Our present emissions of greenhouse gases involve substantial risk of damage to human health and property due to climate change (IPCC, 2007a and 2007b). Because of the inertia of the climatic system, however, most of the impacts of our present acts will not be clearly felt for another 50 years or more, when the planet is occupied by future rather than present generations (Hansen, 2005). Although the future costs of climate change may be substantial, so too are the present costs of mitigating such change, for there is no cheap 'technological fix' available. Climate policy making is therefore pre-eminently a matter of intergenerational justice.

Moral philosophers and economists have evaluated the intergenerational problem of climate change by applying the whole gamut of theories on distributive justice. It has been argued, for example, that climate policy should maximize utility over all generations (see e.g. Broome, 1992; Stern, 2006), following Sidgwick (1874) who argued "that the interests of posterity must concern a Utilitarian as much as those of his contemporaries". Others have investigated intergenerational justice from the perspective of prioritarianism (Adler, 2009), sufficientarianism (Meyer and Roser, 2009) or have defended an 'agent-relative ethics', according to which we are justified to care less about the risks of climate change for the simple reason that future generations are remote from us (Beckerman and Hepburn).

Although each of these theories of distributive justice may be defensible as theories about the *general* organization of society, their application to the particular case of climate policy is misplaced. The reason is that climate policy is not about setting new rules for the general organization of society, but about applying moral standards to a specific group, in this case future generations. In that case the formal principle of equality, originating in the writings of Aristotle, simply requires us to treat like cases as like (see also Rawls, 1972). Imagine, for example, that in former times, when debate did not revolve around justice between the generations but around justice between the sexes, men had discussed whether social security for women should be based upon utilitarian or sufficientarian principles. Clearly, such a discussion would have been inappropriate. Justice would have required granting women equal rights to the *existing* social security already open to men. A discussion whether social security should be based upon utilitarian or sufficientarian principles could only apply to the general structure of society, i.e. for both men and women simultaneously, not for one of the sexes in isolation. In this respect, the debate on intergenerational justice differs fundamentally from the debate on *intra*-generational justice. In the latter debate, the principles of distributive justice are to be applied to all and not to a particular group.

The purpose of this paper is therefore to argue that intergenerational justice requires future generations to receive the same treatment under the law and the same treatment from the authorities, as far as cases are like. It is argued that climate damage is indeed a wrongful harm to the property and health of future generations just as trans-national air pollution, for example, is a wrongful harm to contemporaries living across the border. Particularly when it comes to the handling of the risks we impose on others, there are general standards of conduct and laws which can be applied equally to future generations and to ourselves. Since climate policy is concerned with mitigating the risks imposed by present generations on future generations, the reasonable man standard from tort law is of particular relevance. There is no justification to handle pollution across generational boundaries according to norms different from the (international) laws for handling pollution across national borders.

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Transrational Interpretations of Peace and its Contribution to Alternative Worldviews for a Sustainable, Ethical and Aesthetical present

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Currently, a considerable number of peoples still perceive in their reality a (modern) world that is addicted to growth, development, and the belief in science as a source of absolute truth. All this guided by human reason and rationality oriented towards progress. This world is strongly marked by a totalizing project that leaves no space for diverse interpretations, as it carries some latent phobic aspects derived from a residual morality. We have seen that this one-world project is affecting the Earth to the extent of producing climate change and a consumption of resources beyond the planetary ecosystem's capability to replenish.

In this sense, to avert such project, how could one resignify our human relations with the world we live in and with the environment - the world which in fact we are an indissociable part of (the *Mitwelt*)? How could one foster/energize marginalized cosmologies and interpretations of the world towards a plural, sustainable and ethical planetary community? In this paper I would like to propose a possible answer to these issues deriving from the area of peace studies.

The aim of this paper is, in one hand, to explain how the five images or interpretations of peace proposed by professor Wolfgang Dietrich (energetic, moral, modern, postmodern and transrational) provide a compelling framing/mapping of various interpretations of peace in different histories and cultures (Dietrich, 2012). With that, I would like to propose that this mapping resignifies and potentializes marginalized approaches and worldviews such as Arne Naess' Deep Ecology (Sessions, 1995), Ecofeminism (Mies & Shiva, 1993; Shiva, 1997), the Subsistent Perspective (Mies & Bennholdt-Thomsen, 1999) and the Quechuan cosmology embodied in the Sumak Kawsay (Boff, 2009). Framing them as energetic/transrational interpretations, which are fundamental in a holistic approach towards peace understood as harmony, these otherwise silenced perspectives move to the center of our focus.

With that, it is also the objective of this paper to explain how these marginal approaches turned focal center provide consistent answers for a plural, sustainable, ethical and aesthetical world, shifting from an anthropocentric mindset and a crisis-ridden world towards an ecocentric/ecological and liberative tao (Hathaway & Boff, 2010).

In order to do that, the first necessary step is to go through and explain the five families of peaces proposed by Dietrich. The greatest feature of Dietrich's work is to present us with the transrational and energetic interpretations along with the traditional moral, modern and postmodern interpretations of the world. Following such endeavour, a second step would be explaining the approaches of Deep Ecology, Ecofeminism, the Subsistent Perspective and the Sumak Kawsay cosmology.

These perspectives become important contributions for harmonious, sustainable and ethical relations because each of them stress what Dietrich deems the energetic view, comprising an underlying unity of humans with the whole cosmos/universe, much suppressed by modern-mechanistic interpretations which separate humans from all the rest, logic still pervasive nowadays. With Dietrich's transrational framing bringing the energetic as fundamental part of our life, these perspectives, more than being just valid alternatives worldviews, carry the seed for a change in the way we understand and place ourselves in relation to the *Mitwelt*. With that, beyond stressing rights, disciplinary codes of conduct and

setting up political agendas for a sustainable future, we can allow these harmonious, sustainable and ethical elements to flourish from within ourselves and our conscience, halting a modern world project that is affecting the planet in a way that might forever alter it.

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Environmental Responsibility and the Ethics of Radical Life Extension

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As the global population grows, vital resources can become scarce. Humans in many parts of the world have enjoyed longer life spans, though inequality of food, shelter, healthcare, and other resources results in inequality of average life span as well. Emerging medical technologies in genetics, nanotechnology, and biotechnology are beginning to develop techniques and treatments that could significantly extend the possible human life span to 150 years or more. These include stem cells, 3-D organ printing, telomere and other forms of intracellular repair, and gene therapies.

These new technologies are still in their infancy, and the dream of extending the human lifespan beyond its traditional limits may not come to pass. But if even some of the technologies are successfully developed and become available for use, it would cause social, economic, and environmental disruptions and needs to be addressed ethically.

As with any new set of healthcare technologies, these require large-scale investment in research and development. Ethical questions arise regarding allocation of scarce resources, including public investment in technologies to extend lifespan. Nations have limited funds and facilities for healthcare research, so public allocations to develop life extension technologies would take away from other urgent public funding priorities, and so should be part of a broader public discussion.

New technologies, and especially healthcare technologies, are invariably expensive and available only to the wealthy, and while they become less expensive in time, they remain unaffordable to the majority of the world's population. Life extension could further increase the gap between the rich and poor of the world, offering long, healthy lives to the former at the expense of the basic health needs of the latter. These technologies have the potential to concentrate economic, social, and political power in the hands of the few who could afford them.

If radical life extension technologies were to be adopted on a broad basis, even among wealthy nations, the environmental toll could be disastrous. Though the OECD countries make up only 17% of the world's population, they generate 42% of the world's carbon emissions. Significantly increasing the population of the highest-use nations would further exacerbate growing environmental problems of carbon emissions, water usage, loss of wildlife habitat, and food allocation.

Helping people to live longer, healthier lives is a worthy goal, but it must be sought in a way that minimizes the negative impacts on the social and natural environment. This presentation will explore the ethical and political choices in research and development, funding, and access to life extension technologies and their environmental impacts on sustainability, resource utilization, and population growth.

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Gesellschaftliche Fragen, theologische Antworten – das doppelte Problem theologischer Wirtschaftsethik im Hinblick auf die Gestaltung einer unsicheren Zukunft

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Unsere heutige Welt ist globalisiert und bis in den Kern von wirtschaftlichen Aktivitäten durchzogen und die Welt von morgen wird es aller Voraussicht nach auch sein. Wann immer Entscheidungen auf dem (nach Luhmann) funktional differenzierten Feld der Wirtschaft getroffen werden, die echte Entscheidungen sind – also in denen echte Optionen vorliegen – ist Unsicherheit im Spiel bezüglich der Auswirkungen auf den zukünftigen Zustand der Welt. Diesen Entscheidungen kann man ethische Überlegungen zugrunde legen. Die theologische Wirtschaftsethik hat ein doppeltes Problem, wenn sie in den Prozess der Entscheidungsfindung regelbildend eingreifen will:

Das eine ist das Problem der ‚Reichweite‘. Eine theologische Ethik hat die Eigenschaft, eine Komponente in sich zu tragen, die nicht von allen geteilt wird – da sie auf theologische Strukturen zurückgreift, die nicht von allen Akteuren in der Sphäre der Wirtschaft geteilt werden. Eine Begründung dieser theologischen Ethik findet nicht allein auf Basis der Vernunft statt, sondern greift zudem auf Strukturen zurück, die außerhalb dessen liegen, was *jeder* Mensch teilt, z.B. im Bereich des Transzendenten. Da die Sphäre der Wirtschaft jedoch eine umfassende ist, die in (fast) jeden Bereich des Lebens hineingreift und die gemäß Karl Homann ein Spiel mit Regeln ist, das nicht einfach angehalten werden kann, müssen (Regel-) Veränderungen so begründet werden, dass sie von allen verstanden und mitgetragen werden können.

Das größere Problem ist, dass eine genuin theologische Wirtschaftsethik nicht in der Lage ist, auf Grundlage theologischer Aussagen Entscheidungen begründet zu treffen, die gleichzeitig allgemein akzeptiert werden können und auf der anderen Seite genuin theologisch sind, d.h. *wirklich* aus dem Bereich der theologischen Ethik kommen.

Dies will ich u.a. an drei theologischen Wirtschaftsethiken exemplifizieren: Meckenstocks *Wirtschaftsethik*, Herms' *Die Wirtschaft des Menschen – Beiträge zur Wirtschaftsethik* und Oermanns *Anständig Geld verdienen – Protestantische Wirtschaftsethik unter den Bedingungen globaler Märkte*. In allen drei Werken heißt es mehr oder weniger explizit, dass die Theologie von Haus aus keine Mittel hat, aus sich selbst heraus in diesem Feld tätig zu werden, nämlich aus dem Grund, der das erste Problem darstellt – dennoch formulieren alle drei in ihren Wirtschaftsethiken konkrete theologische Bezüge, die dazu führen, dass die Theologie letztlich nur noch wie ein „Anhang“ erscheint (u.a. Oermann 2007: 60; Meckenstock 1997: 18.32; Herms 2004: 156f.).

Meine These ist, dass die Theologie und mithin die theologische Ethik in Problembereichen, die sich erst in der näheren Vergangenheit etabliert haben, sich nicht als selbstständiger Akteur mit theologischen Mitteln wirksam betätigen kann, sondern (lediglich) mit bestimmten Vorstellungen des sozialen Miteinanders nach aktuellen christlichen Vorstellungen im Hinterkopf, gemeinsam mit Anderen auf dem Gebiet der Ethik Lösungen für eine unsichere Zukunft entwickeln kann.

Soll eine Wirtschaftsethik unter den Bedingungen einer unsicheren und globalisierten Zukunft wirksam werden können, muss eine Begründung für ein wirtschaftsethisches Konzept gefunden werden, die allgemein anschlussfähig ist, sofern man das Ziel erreichen

möchte, eine möglichst breite Unterstützung zu gewinnen. Die Leistung der Theologie dabei kann sein, eine Wirtschaftsethik (mit) zu entwickeln, die in der Zeit ihrer Entstehung – also heute – mit dem Teil der neutestamentlichen Botschaft kompatibel ist, der ein soziales Miteinander als vorzugswürdig erscheinen lässt.

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Relational vs. Non-Relational Justice in Climate Ethics - the Case for a Mixed Approach

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Climate change has been established as an issue of global justice by political theorists in recent years. Although there seems to be a consensus on this matter, there exists a divide within political theory which makes it difficult for scholars to agree on issues such as how much we owe future generations and who is responsible for sustainable practices. The divide lies in the distinction between relational and non-relational conceptions of justice. A strict dichotomy seems to exist between the two accounts, as most theorists implicitly or explicitly choose one or the other. Relational justice scholars emphasize the importance of relationships as a basis for justice, and often stress the nature of shared and political institutions. Non-relational accounts of justice reject the idea that the content, scope, or grounds of justice depend on the relations in which individuals stand. Examples of climate justice scholars who use relational conceptions of justice are Patrick Hayden and Steven Vanderheiden, who both use a globally applied Rawlsian conception of justice and emphasize the nature of global relationships as defining the scope of justice. An example of a non-relational scholar of climate justice is Simon Caney, who rejects the importance of global relationships as grounds for justice and instead argues that persons should be included in the scope of justice by virtue of their humanity alone.

Both relational and non-relational accounts of justice have advantages in the case of climate change. Relational accounts emphasize that climate change creates a unique set of global relationships, for example between less developed and developed countries, which can help to reveal issues of responsibility. Relational accounts also stress the fact that creating more just conditions will necessarily involve institutional change, which helps to highlight the importance of finding effective means of institutional reform in the case of climate change. Non-relational accounts, on the other hand, can tackle questions of individual responsibility, as the scope of justice relies on a conception of the rights and duties of individuals. This is useful for questions of who is responsible for sustainability. Furthermore, the non-relational account has an advantage for addressing questions of how much we owe future generations, because non-relational accounts assume equal moral worth across generations and reject rights discounting. Although both accounts have their strengths, the paper will focus on what can be gained by combining the approaches, and whether weaknesses of the individual accounts may be overcome through a mixed approach.

It seems that the perceived dichotomy between the non-relational and relational approaches represents a lacuna in justice theory. A combined approach may be useful not only to address this lacuna, but also to create a stronger and more substantial justice theory in the case of climate change. The paper aims to explicate how and why the relational and non-relational accounts could be combined in the special case of climate change. The argument that will be defended is that a global justice position on climate change should be grounded in justice which is both relational and non-relational. It will be argued that non-relational justice defines a moral threshold, but says nothing specific about what we owe to whom in cases where actual interactions are taking place. In these special circumstances, of which climate change is one, relational conditions must be properly factored in. The paper will argue that the approaches are mutually constitutive and compatible. In order to defend this mixed approach, the paper will explain what a mixed approach can reveal about what we owe to future generations, which institutional reforms will be necessary, and finally who is responsible for sustainability in the case of climate change.

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Diversified Climate Action: The Top-Down Failure and the Carbon Markets Emergence

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In 2012 global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions topped a 39% increase relative to 1990 levels (Le Quéré et al. 2009: 831; UNEP 2012: 10). Although global emissions would have to peak and decline before the end of this decade to limit warming to 2°C global mean temperature, world leaders have agreed to postpone negotiations on a new binding treaty to 2015, coming into effect no sooner than 2020 (Arnell et al. 2013: 2; Rogelj et al. 2012: 7; UNFCCC 2011). The world is therefore on track to see a rise of 4°C by 2100, instead of 2°C which the UNFCCC and EU adopted in their climate policies (Betts et al. 2011: 80-2; Le Quéré et al. 2009: 831). In the absence of further global mitigation action, achieving the 2°C goal appears to become unlikely.

As the top-down approach on climate action did not deliver the hoped-for results commentators suggest several reasons for the failure, we will discuss three. First, because of the structure of the UNFCCC a clear conflict of interests emerges. While the industrialized countries are refusing to one-sidedly reduce emission levels, the developing countries are demanding precisely that, since they will be hit by climate change's most severe consequences (Diringer 2011: 291). Nevertheless, since it is estimated that the emission levels of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South-Africa) and non-OECD countries will top those of the industrialized countries in the third decade of this century, mitigation action will need to be broadened so as to include these groups of countries (van Vuuren 2009: 5355). Second, parties to the FCCC enjoy radically unequal negotiating positions, hence the outcome of the process will most likely be biased in favor of the most powerful parties and the highest emitters. Notwithstanding that this practice is customary in international affairs this *modus operandi* assumes the absence of any prior grounds of responsibility (Shue 2001: 453). Furthermore, it is argued that in promoting a consensus-driven path, the pledges made under the top-down international agreements have respected the stance of the least ambitious parties and discussions have focussed on "binding-or-nothing" targets (Au et al. 2011: 30; Diringer 2011: 291; Prins and Rayner 2007: 974-5). We therefore argue for, *inter alia*, an adjustment of the decision making process as well as a temporal focus on the emergence of domestic support for international policies. A third, more general critique, states that international institutions are simply not designed for, did not evolve in response to, and are ill-equipped to deal with global environmental problems that transcend both the lifespans of many generations and the conventional international reciprocal ties that countries know today (Jamieson 2010: 83).

In contrast to the top-down failure a development of bottom-up initiatives is beginning to take shape. In addition to the emergence of a number of ambitious cross-national projects primarily focusing on subnational, regional and/or urban mitigation and adaptation initiatives, a significant number of countries are voluntarily deploying emissions trading schemes (Han et al. 2012: 10-11). Through the cap-and-trade approach these countries aim to incentivize the development of renewable energy sources and hence reduce GHG emission levels. We argue that certain elements of cap-and-trade, implemented through the Kyoto Protocol and EU ETS, in particular the grandfathering of emission entitlements and offsetting of surplus emissions, pose significant ethical dilemmas with regard to distributive, participatory and intergenerational justice.

Nevertheless, in light of the political inaction and the necessity of making emissions peak and decline before 2020, in our view, pleading for a *tabula rasa* of the current policy would be counterproductive in reducing emission levels since it is doubtful that an effective policy alternative can be put in place, in time. Therefore, we submit that justice demands a level of pragmatism and realism since failing to adjust the current system will result in a delay of emission reductions, which is a clear violation of Caney's effectiveness criterion of justice (2010: 199). We believe that critical adjustments to cap-and-trade regimes would render them more just and that the emergence of bottom-up initiatives will strengthen domestic support, thereby, hopefully, instigating a sorely needed effective top-down regime.

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Natural Law and Sustainable Development.

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The ethical questions surrounding the current threat to a sustainable future for humans and other sentient beings on earth are hotly debated today. Moral philosophers and theologians alike engage in the discourse as to how to understand responsibility for future generations, is there any such responsibility, can it be argued that the current generation have responsibilities, duties, towards future generations? And who or what should in that case be included within the sphere of responsibility? In reply to these question the claim has been raised from several theologians that what is needed is an ethics for the future, an ethical approach that is based on a theological understanding of nature, and further, this understanding is best articulated within the framework of the natural law tradition. Arguing from a theological, and Christian perspective, professors William Schweiker and David Hollenbach respectively appropriates this tradition and claims that theology and theological discourse have a distinct contribution to the discussion on how to make a sustainable future possible.

Albeit belonging in different Christian traditions, Schweiker in a reformed protestant tradition and Hollenbach within Catholic moral theology, they both argue for the relevance of the concept of natural law in ethical theological reasoning. This concept and the tradition that it stems from is re-appropriated and reworked within their theories. This raises the question of what warrants this focus on natural law? Within the natural law tradition the concept of "nature" is commissioned a central position, this special emphasis does nevertheless not conceal the fact that the connotations of this concept spans over a broad spectra and there are many proposal for its interpretation. The central emphasis does not render the attitudes that it evokes devoid of ambiguity, "nature" carries very different connotations that cannot be subsumed into one coherent notion expressed in all theories on natural law alike.

This paper engages the work of Schweiker and Hollenbach in order to discuss the merits of the concept of a natural law as a distinctive contribution from Christian ethics to the current debate on ethical responses to the environmental crisis. It does so in order to argue that while some of the interpretations of "nature" within this wide tradition are deeply problematic there are arguments and proposal put forth by these theorists about how to ethically understand and value "nature" that can have a relevance for the working-out of a critical stance from which ethical theory might speak to governmental bodies, policy-makers and popular opinion.

This paper in part engages in the discussion as of what, if any, contribution theology and theological ethics can give to the discussion on how to achieve a sustainable development and therefore approaches the larger questions of the contribution of theology to political theory and the role of theology in the political sphere. These questions will only be discussed in extension to the main issue of the contribution of the natural law tradition to deliberation on questions of sustainability. It is argued that when we deliberate on questions regarding sustainable development part of the focus must necessarily be put on the role that political institutions and other societal arrangements have in shaping individual choices and they must therefore be part of the normative analysis.

The proposals, analyzed and presented in the paper, are not radically different but nevertheless diverge at some crucial points. This creates an interesting dialectic that is used

in this paper to formulate an own proposal for the contribution of theology to sustainable development. An initial overview of both the idea of a natural law and the debate around sustainable development will be presented, in order to place the questions address in their respective contexts.

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Rights of Future Generations – The Right Approach?

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In 1989, Edith Brown Weiss, one of the founders of the legal theory on intergenerational equity, stated that 'the translation of the expressed concern for future generations into normative obligations that relate the present to the future to protect future generations still needs to be done.' (Brown Weiss, 1989, p. 30) While there is some consensus on the existence of normative or moral obligations towards future generations, the existence of legal obligations towards future generations is still debated.

A core question of the Societas Ethica Annual Conference is 'How could we extend the current system of human rights to incorporate the rights of future generations?' In my paper, I will argue that incorporating rights of future generations into the human rights system may not be the only solution to do justice to the rights or interests of future generations. My paper will answer two central questions:

What is the problem with the (human) rights approach for rights of future generations?

How can we safeguard future generations' interest or needs without ascribing them rights - what are the alternatives for rights?

1) In the current debate, most scholars agree that future generations have certain pressing needs. However, this does not necessarily mean that future generations should be awarded (human) rights. How do we decide what needs are so pressing that they should be protected by means of rights? This discussion touches upon the debate between adherents of the will-theory and the interest-theory. Even if we do ascribe rights to future generations, isn't there the danger of meaningless 'rights talk' without any way of guaranteeing that their rights are actually respected? What exactly does it mean for future generations to have a legal right if there are no enforceable obligations for present generations?

2) There are possibilities to safeguard future generations' interests without directly ascribing them rights. I shall discuss two proposals. For instance, in new forms of regulation such as goal regulation, that put the intended purpose or end-state of the legislation central instead of prescribing behavioral rules, the interests of future generations could be incorporated into broader goals, thereby creating duties for present generations without explicitly creating rights for future generations. However, this option might entail that the rights and interests of future generations still need to be considered, albeit in a more derivative way. Furthermore, future generations could be given a voice by means of representation at governmental decision-making. This could be done through a governmental official who acts as a guardian and who has a vote in affairs that concern future generations, an Ombudsperson for future generations, or governmental commissions that take into account the interests of future generations. Both options are well worth considering.

Summarizing, even when it is possible to call the entitlements of future generations 'rights', the question still remains if incorporating those rights into the human rights framework is the best approach. I will argue that awarding human rights to future generations could call for several problems that could be avoided by further exploring the other options to safeguard the interests of future generations.

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Ethical Clashes: The Belo Monte Case Dam Construction and Conflicts Between Indigenous and Non-Indigenous Ethics.

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Globalization is a complex phenomenon which involves ethical and moral conflicts as it advances. The encounter of different societies and cultures expands the western moral circle and sometimes blur and redefine its boundaries by the inclusion of new moral subjects that once were excluded from the previous order. Thanks to new issues that emerge with the current phase of globalization, these excluded subjects gain voice, representation and support to bring to discussion their ethics and morals. That is the case of indigenous peoples. Once silenced in the national and global order, now, thanks to the focus on climate changes and sustainable development, these societies are at the core of those contemporary issues.

There are practical aspects that involve these clashes between non-indigenous and indigenous ethics. At this paper, we address the construction of a dam, called Belo Monte, at Pará state, Brazil, which affects indigenous lands. This case brings to question the notion of common good, which is different in each of these ethical views. Also, the Belo Monte debate involves a conflict related to the role of nature: a utilitarian and anthropocentric western notion of nature is opposed to the leading figure that nature occupies in indigenous ethical view. This paper, therefore, intends to understand through the Belo Monte case how this ethical conflict emerge and how it can reshape non-indigenous ethical boundaries.

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Future for Everyone

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If sustainability can be considered as consensus, ethics should be structurally congruent with sustainability. But what is sustainability, if not the conservation of a certain possibility of future? The right to future for everyone – it should be regarded as just another title for sustainability and it also is a first ethical claim. To make that claim come true, a sustainable candidate in ethics must be found. Responsibility is that candidate which however must be understood in the right way.

While one notion of responsible behavior is based on a retrospective normativity, another notion of responsibility tends to be connected to an openness of future. There is no doubt that it is due to normativity that we know about right and wrong, good and evil. But there is a sense of responsibility that goes beyond the knowledge of good and evil and that one is at stake reflecting moral conditions of an open future.

Being responsible seems to be easy, if one knows what is right to do in a given situation. Essentially however it is this easiness that inactivates the very condition for acting responsibly. Wondering about *Heidegger's Silence* (of not having condemned the Nazi's crimes against humanity after '45), it was Jacques Derrida who claimed that for Heidegger it would have been all too easy just to say that, yes indeed, Auschwitz was the hell on earth (Neske 1988: 157-163). What Derrida was about to say is that such a public disapproval would have been nothing else but the affirmation of an already existing compromise in the normative frame of post-fascism. Infact, responsibility can only be shown, if a given compromise is put into question: in an unforeseen and thus normatively challenging conflict.

One could have been responsible when Nazi crime was about to happen and one can be responsible when and wherever something similar is about to happen. After the happening of such an event however one cannot protest any longer against the happening of that event. At the same time judging about such an event subsequently, disapproving it later on publicly, trying to categorize it by means of normative standards, is tantamount to close the event's happening. Already passing judgement on an event means actually disabling any protest on it. But it is here where responsibility comes into play: Being responsible it not so much about judging but about leaving open the possibility to disagree. It is only via this that the possibility to form a critical opinion – to agree or to disagree, to be ashamed or just to feel chocked – can evolve and endure. It is the condition of the possibility that something essential to that event can still happen in the future. Not taking the easy path whenever possible is as much as to save the happening of the event for others and thereby bringing forward a future which can be divided and joined by others. Responsibility is nothing else but saving the possibility of a common future, a future for everyone.

Understanding responsibility in this Derridean sense seems to be practical, if ethics of an open future are at stake. If sustainability is about dividing resources among each other, including the other of tomorrow, then responsibility can be elaborated structurally as its counterpart.

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Climate as Assemblage and Distributive Agency for Climate Ethics

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In this paper, I reimagine climate in the spirit of Jane Bennett's vital materialism and consider the ethics that follow. Bennett explores Deleuze and Guattari's concept of the *assemblage* to recognize the vibrancy and force of bodies, human and nonhuman, living and nonliving, that come together in heterogeneous arrangements. In contrast to our current metaphysical picture that paints climate as the inert, natural backdrop against which human subjects act, I argue for *climate as assemblage*: that is, an ongoing, co-constitutive relation among various ontological actants that involves and humans and nonhumans as profoundly as it affects them.

Assemblages inaugurate a new kind of ethics wherein the concept of agency undergoes revision. Again following Bennett, the ethic appropriate to the assemblage is an ethic of distributive agency, where 'agency' is broadened to encompass the workings and efficacies of the ontological range of actants involved in the assemblage. I defend several reasons why the model of distributive agency suits climate/climate change ethics, especially focusing the inherent uncertainty in climate science and climate change discourse and the social dimensions that make climate change more than merely 'a carbon problem.' Finally, I consider some ways in which an ethics of distributive agency would bear on climate change discourse and policies.

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Indigenous Ecological Knowledge, Environmental Sustainability and Political Ethics of an Open Future in Ghana

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Indigenous traditions and cultures have been credited for having deep ecological knowledge relevant for environmental governance and sustainability. They have consequently been acknowledged as crucial resources for mitigating climate change and the attitudes that drive it (Klostermaier 1973; Gottlieb 2006, 1996; Tucker and Grim 1994; Grim 2006, 2001; LaDuke 2003, Olupona 2006; Agbanu 2011). One of the reasons for these convictions is the ethics of community of indigenous people, which extend beyond the humanity community to the ecological, due to the people's consciousness of the interrelatedness between the two (Mbiti 1990). This ethic requires that there are liberties for but limits to individual acquisition of property, wealth and ways of attaining the good life (Wiredu 1992; Gyekye 1996,1992). Similarly, communal decisions and ethics are required to reflect this fragile interrelationship. In terms of governing the environmental commons therefore, grassroots and local peoples' perspectives on how the environment is managed, which reflect their beliefs, values and aspirations for the kind of community they would want, are crucial for environmental policies towards the sustainability of the environment. In this paper, I set out to explore the ecological knowledge of the indigenous central Ewe people of Ghana by investigating their perspectives and values of the natural environment from the theoretical ethical position of community and their implications for the place of man in nature. The paper further explores the relevance and legitimacy of these insights for climate policies and environmental governance in contemporary Ghana. The methodology is qualitative utilising both secondary and primary data.

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Ecological Ethics for Contemporary Social Work

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Social work is a value-based profession committed to human rights and social justice. Social workers integrate theory, practice, and research for the purposes of promoting social change, addressing oppression, and helping individuals, families, and communities resolve personal and social difficulties in the context of their environment. Despite these commitments and practices, the profession has been slow to embrace the reality of climate change and its dire consequences for humanity. Reasons for this slowness include the increasing influence of neo-liberalism on the profession - social work is a Western institution under increasing pressure to conform to values and assumptions associated with the market economy. In addition, the continued dominance of modernist assumptions in social work codes of ethics and standards of practice legitimate and perpetuate understandings of ethical practice that privilege individuality, rationality, and the immediate social environment - reference to the natural environment or the rights of future generations are either non-existent or perfunctory. As a social work practitioner and academic, I find this deeply concerning. Social work should be taking a leadership role in addressing climate change and promoting sustainability. This will require an expanded ethic that alters dominant understandings of ethical social work practice to include ecological values, assumptions, and aims. These issues will be explored in this paper and I will discuss the promise of ecological ethics for the social work profession.

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Naturschutz als Grundlage und Voraussetzung für den Erhalt der Freiheit. H. Jonas' Verantwortungsphilosophie und F.W.J. Schellings Metaphysik der Freiheit

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Der freie Wille ist die Bedingung für Moral bzw. das gute Handeln; (Kant, Werke 6, Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten, BA 1,2) wird nun in Bezug auf die Umwelt ein bestimmtes Handeln gefordert oder ist gar geboten, ist die Freiheit vorausgesetzt. Dem Ganzen geht die These voraus, dass die Natur Bedingung für die transzendente Freiheit ist und dass sie schützenswert ist – „Freiheit [...] unser und der Gottheit Höchstes“ (Schelling, Urfassung der Philosophie der Offenbarung, 79) ist, erst durch unseren freien Willen zeichnen wir uns als Wesen aus, die zwischen Gut und Böse wählen können und damit sind wir moralische Wesen, die die Fähigkeit besitzen für unser Handeln verantwortlich zu sein und unser Handeln unserem Willen gemäß zu ändern..

Um die Freiheit der Menschen zu schützen ist notwendig, dass wir mit unseren Mitmenschen nicht willkürlich umgehen, sondern sie in ihrem Wesen anerkennen und respektieren; deutlich wird dies an G.W.F. Hegels Worte „Tötest du jemand, so tötest du alle und dich selbst!“ (Hegel, Werke 4, Rechts-, Pflichten- und Religionslehre für die Unterklasse (1810 ff), 244, § 20.) Dasselbe muss notwendigerweise auch für die Natur gelten, hat nämlich die Natur einen anderen Status erkennen wir sie uns nicht als gleich an und schützen ihrer nur um unserer selbst willen. Erst wenn wir begreifen, dass das Leben mit der Natur, wie auch mit den Menschen, Voraussetzung für den Erhalt unserer Freiheit ist, hat die Natur den kategorialen Status, der für eine Umweltethik so dringend notwendig ist.

Hegels 'Fehler' besteht darin, dass seine Bewusstseinsphilosophie sich auf den Menschen konzentriert und die Natur lediglich als Voraussetzung anerkennt. (Vgl. Hegel, Werke 8-10, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissen I-III; Hackl, An den Grenzen von G.W.F. Hegels System; Höhle, Praktische Philosophie in der modernen Welt, bes. 166 ff.) Damit der Mensch die Gleichwertigkeit von Mensch und Natur erkennt, ist mehr nötig als die Natur als Lebensraum zu begreifen – Hegels Meta-Bestimmung der Natur weist freilich *nur* den Weg, dass die Natur Grundlage für menschliches Leben ist, aber nicht mehr. Der Zweck der Natur muss an sich erkannt werden. (Vgl. Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung; Jonas, Das Prinzip Leben; Jonas, Philosophische Untersuchungen; Hegel, Werke 6, Wissenschaft der Logik, 245 ff.; Höhle, Moral und Politik, 205, 241, 308 f.) Um jene Bedeutung auch metatheoretisch zu thematisieren kommt man nicht umhin, einen Blick in die Schriften von Hans Jonas zu werfen. (Vgl. bes. Jonas, Das Prinzip Leben) Jener hebt auf eindrucksvolle Weise die Bedeutung der Natur hervor und versucht diese in logischer und systematischer Weise hinsichtlich der Bedeutung für den Menschen zu fassen. Hans Jonas' Verantwortungsethik umfasst Mensch und Natur gleichermaßen und verbindet beide gleichermaßen. Mittels des Begriffs Leben konstatiert Jonas die notwendige begriffliche Einheit von Mensch und Natur, hierbei hält er allerdings mit allem Nachdruck an einem objektiven Wert fest. Jener Wert ist das Leben. Zunächst erscheint dies schlüssig, jedoch ist es äußerst problematisch – bes. im Anschluss an D. Hume und I. Kant – an einem realen Sein festzuhalten. (Höhle, Ontologie und Ethik bei Hans Jonas, 113, 119; Höhle, Über die Unmöglichkeit einer naturalistischen Begründung der Ethik, 24) Immerhin ist das Sein und das Nicht-Sein des Lebens gleichermaßen in der Welt und taugt daher schwerlich als objektiv erstrebenswert. Nur ein ideales Sein taugt für ein Sollen – und jenes Sein kann nur das Sein der Freiheit sein, da es notwendig und damit Voraussetzung für ein Sollen ist. Es ist die objektiv-idealistische Theorie F.W.J. Schellings (Vgl. Schelling, Werke VII, Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen; Schelling, Urfassung der Philosophie der Offenbarung), die diesem Anspruch gerecht wird. Schellings Theorie begreift Natur und Mensch Identisch gegenüber dem Ganzen und

erkennt zugleich die Natur als Bedingung für die transzendente Freiheit des Menschen. (Vgl. Schelling, *Urfassung der Philosophie der Offenbarung*; Schelling, *Werke IV, Darstellung meines Systems der Philosophie*; Schelling, *Werke I, Antiquissimi de prima malorum humanorum origine philosophematik Genes. III.*; Schelling, *Werke II, Von der Weltseele, eine Hypothese der höheren Physik.*) Hiermit wird Schellings Theorie dem Anspruch einer Meta-Theorie einer Verantwortungsphilosophie gegenüber der Natur (die Jonas in exzellenter Weise erörtert) gerecht. Diese Gedanken sollen letztlich in systematischer dargelegt und als Grundlage jeglicher Umweltethik gedeutet werden.

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How Much Biodiversity Should We Conserve for Future Generations?

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Besides climate change, the growing population and the increasing scarcity of resources, the loss of biodiversity is one of the major global environmental challenges of the 21st century. In my talk, I will elaborate the cornerstones of a theoretic framework helping to answer the question of how much biodiversity we should preserve for future generations.

To begin, I will shortly introduce the concept of biodiversity as the “variability among living organisms from all sources”. (Convention on Biological Diversity. CBD, Art. 2)

Then I will present a scale to define the amount of biodiversity which we should preserve for future generations which will consist in general conditions of human flourishing. Since not everyone needs the access to biodiversity, besides its life-maintaining functions, we will have to ask ourselves how many future individuals will conceive it as an (necessary) enrichment of their lives. The question of quantity will therefore have to be weighted against on the one hand uncertainty about future generations’ preferences and on the other hand against the individual autonomy of preferences and state’s neutrality towards these. Such a theoretical analysis of concrete environmental duties towards future generations is bound to halt at a point at which the empirical expertise of other disciplines is needed. This is why I will focus on a single ethical aspect of this global issue. (For a conception of 3 key questions with regard to duties towards future generations and the protection of the environment see also Angelika Krebs: »Wieviel Natur schulden wir der Zukunft? Eine Kritik am zukunftsethischen Egalitarismus«, in: Dieter Birnbacher/Gerd Bruder Müller (Hg.), *Zukunftsverantwortung und Generationensolidarität*, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann 2001, S. 158-183)

Consequently, I will analyse how biodiversity and future generations interrelate alongside the scale of the good human life, claiming that biodiversity constitutes a prerequisite for human flourishing. Martha Nussbaum’s *Capabilities Approach* provides the theoretic framework of this analysis, being both a conception of a good life (and of extended human rights) and of social justice. Thus, I step by step reveal biodiversity’s contribution to the ten central capabilities as a necessary, or at least as an essential element of a good life. I will skip biodiversity’s contribution to the provision of life-maintaining resources like e.g. drinking water, conceding this aspect to the domain of science. My focus is going to be on the aesthetic qualities of biodiversity and their eudaimonic contribution. Accordingly, biodiversity is not only providing the access to the eighth capability “to live with and in relation to animals, plants and nature” (See for the latest version: Martha C. Nussbaum: *Creating capabilities. The human development approach*, Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2011), but also to other central capabilities like e.g. the sixth capability of practical reasoning. With regard to the last aspect I will refer to the German philosopher Martin Seel and his “Aesthetics of Nature”. (Martin Seel: *Eine Ästhetik der Natur*, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1991) I will point out that most of the contributions of nature and its variety to the flourishing of our lives can be substituted by experiences like e.g. the contemplation of an artwork. Nonetheless, nature and its biotic variety represent a unique space of especially fundamental aesthetic experiences. Some of us can lead a flourishing life in the absence of these experiences, but most of us conceive them as a fundamental enrichment in our lives. (Kirsten Meyer: *Der Wert der Natur. Begründungsvielfalt im Naturschutz*. Diss. phil. Bielefeld 2002, Paderborn: Mentis 2003)

Having shown this, I will sketch out how to follow Nussbaums transition from prerequisites of a good life to claims of justice. The ethical analysis of conditions of a good life is therefore also the basis for political action, leading the groundwork to open the access for citizens to

minimal standards of a good life, to a just and sustainable state. And this analysis should integrate future generations' claims as well. I will not be able to delve into the details of justifying and conceptualising these. Instead, I hope to have shown how a catalogue of criteria can be developed that indicates *which parts* and *how much* of biodiversity should be preserved for future generations.

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Climate Change and Responsibility to Future Generations: What Normative Questions Should We Address?

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What does responsibility to future generations imply in view of climate change? The present paper maintains that in order to answer this question, we need to consider what normative questions we should ask about climate change and about our response to it. I will take up four normative questions.

(1) How should we respond to uncertainty? We know from the work of scientists that the climate is changing and that the warming of the atmosphere is being caused by humanity's emissions of greenhouse gases. But climate science leaves us with a great deal of uncertainty when it tries to predict the future impacts of greenhouse gases. Only its broad predictions can be taken as clear and safe. How should we act under uncertainty? Should we apply cost-benefit analysis, comparing the costs of climate change with the costs and benefits of combating climate change?

(2) How should we evaluate the emission of greenhouse gases? The broad predictions of climate science give rise to the value judgement that the effects of the emissions on human beings will be bad. For example, farming in the tropics will be damaged by a rise in temperature; drought will be severe, particularly in Africa; coastal areas will be subject to flooding and erosion as the sea level rises; many people's health will be damaged and many people will be killed. Should this evaluation of effects lead us to the further evaluation that the emitters of greenhouse gases harm the receivers and by that do them an injustice?

(3) How should we compare present costs and future benefits? The changed climate will persist for a very long time. Efforts to control climate change will only slowly become effective. For example, the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions will result in benefits only after a very long time. But the costs of such a measure will be borne at present or in the near future. How should we weigh up costs borne by present people against future people's benefits? Should we give little or much weight to future people's benefits and to their well-being?

(4) How should we take heed of human rights? A cost-benefit approach to climate change can be criticized for its aggregative nature. The criticism is that a cost-benefit approach is concerned with the aggregate level of expected value, the total wealth of current and future generations, and that it neglects the plight of the very seriously disadvantaged if their plight is outweighed by the benefit of others. Should we try to avoid this adverse outcome by calling on human rights that specify minimum thresholds to which all individuals are entitled, simply in virtue of their humanity? Should we adopt a human rights approach to climate change? If so, would we still need a cost-benefit analysis?

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About the Possibility of a (Distant) Future Ethics: The Motivation Problem

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Today's environmental issues are global. Climatic change or the increase in the flow of materials, e.g., impact the whole biosphere. Irreversibility and inertia of these transformations constitute a serious threat for humankind in the long run (Bourg, 2000 ; Stern, 2010).

So that, with the environmental issues, it is the future which questions the present - in particular its legitimacy in the way it appropriates the natural resources for its own benefit. In the light of this diagnosis, we will question the resources of the «liberal» ethics - the one dominating the nowadays market society - to face this challenge. Following several authors (Nozick, Van Parijs, Singer). we assume this ethics finds its starting assumptions in Locke and Hume and show that, in virtue of its most decisive premises it can neither recognise an intrinsic value to nature nor grant future a (moral) weight such that it can justify restrictions having compulsory force in our present use of nature (the non-existence, non-identity and non-reciprocity arguments ; e.g. D. Parfitt, 2010 ; S. Gardiner, 2010).

The full understanding of this failure - our claim - makes it compulsory to conceive another ethics - in the wake, in particular, of B. Norton (1987, 2005) or H. Jonas (1990). One of its central ideas is the one of general obligations, i.e. obligations that do not seek out anybody in particular but concern a generation, i.e. a collectivity. Our endeavor will be to specify this new ethics of relating to nature and to ourselves, through a questioning bearing on its resources as well as on its limits. Regarding the latter, one difficulty, central for an applied perspective, concerns the motivation issue, individual and/or collective, to act today in favor of a - distant - future : in Jonas the articulation is conceived under the form of a responsibility for the future, the only feeling able to drive collective action ; however the question remains : how a future which does not exist can interpellate today somebody to act for its benefit ? It seems hard to understand how the distant future of not yet existing generations can motivate actual individuals to opt for a renouncement and sobriety whose beneficiaries do not yet exist.

Our hypothesis is that it is in the present alone that lies the motivational force able to sustain generalised obligations towards the future and future generations. This spirit originates in a fundamental shift or distance from oneself as a maximizing individual. One trail to think the possibility of such a shift is to envisage it as operating on the one hand through a holistic vision-perception of nature (as suggested by ecology and evolution) and on the other hand as a practical disposition -a virtue - adapted to it : watchfulness.

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Auf dem Weg zu einer großen Transformation? Welche Ethik wir angesichts des Klimawandels brauchen

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In den Diskursen über die politischen, ökonomischen und sozialen Probleme rund um den Klimawandel ist durchgängig von komplexen Transformationserfordernissen die Rede. In Deutschland gibt es einen Trend, diese „große Transformation“ als kulturellen Wandel zu verstehen, der in einen neuen, globalen Gesellschaftsvertrag münden soll. Sowohl das Potsdam-Institut für Klimafolgenforschung, das Wuppertal-Institut für Klima, Umwelt, Energie als auch der wissenschaftliche Beirat „Globale Umweltveränderungen“ der Bundesregierung (WBGU) folgen weitgehend dieser Linie. In seiner Studie „Welt im Wandel. Gesellschaftsvertrag für eine Große Transformation“ geht der WBGU davon aus, dass der Klimawandel eine Umgestaltung der gesamten Weltgesellschaft durch staatliche und multilaterale Verordnungen notwendig macht.

Solche Vorstellungen von einer kompletten Umorganisation globaler Ordnungen können sich aber nur unzureichend auf Polanyis stichwortgebende Beobachtungen über die „Große Transformation“ oder auf die gegenwärtige Vielfalt von theoretischen Perspektiven auf gesellschaftliche Transformationsmuster und -pfade beziehen. Die Forderung, man solle durch top-down Regelungen auf gewohnte Lebens- und Wirtschaftsweisen einwirken, wird zu wenig auf ihre demokratischen Verständigungs- und Legitimationserfordernisse hin reflektiert. Zudem setzen diese Forderungen bereits eine Transformation voraus, die sie nicht selbst bewirken können: die Transformation jenes Ethos nämlich, das das Wirtschaften und Zusammenleben trägt. Dieses Ethos ist im Hinblick auf seine Konturen zu thematisieren und zum Gegenstand der Verständigung zu machen. Es müsste auf die politische Tagesordnung, welche Art und welches Maß von Energieverbrauch für uns zu einem guten Leben dazu gehört. Zugleich muss auf die Tagesordnung, was alles getan werden kann, damit niemandem durch unsere Lebensweise mittelbar oder unmittelbar Schaden zugefügt wird. Wir müssten also die Frage nach dem Energieverbrauch mit der Frage nach dem guten Leben und mit der Gerechtigkeitsfrage verknüpfen. In jedem Fall muss den Vorstellungen von einer Nachhaltigkeitsgovernance eine Klärung der ethischen und politischen Voraussetzungen sowie der Reichweite möglicher Transformationspraktiken vorausgeschickt werden. Eingriffe in hochkomplexe Transformationsprozesse lassen sich nicht ohne steuerungstheoretische, auf das jeweils gelebte Ethos bezogene Diskurse über formale und informale Handlungsbeschränkungen und Handlungsanreize auf den Weg bringen.

Gegenüber einer Verwendung der „Großen Transformation“ als Programmbegriff ist also Vorsicht geboten. Nicht weil der Klimawandel keine messbare Größe wäre, sondern weil ein Totalumbau der globalen ökonomischen, politischen und sozialen Ordnungen einer engen Kopplung an ethische Voraussetzungen von Transformationspraktiken, an politische Verfahren zur Erstellung und Legitimation von Transformationsprogrammen sowie an wissenschaftliche Einsichten in die Komplexität von Transformationsvorgängen bedarf – eine Kopplung, die sich bislang noch nicht abzeichnet; auch nicht in lokalen und regionalen Programmen, wie ich in meinem Vortrag exemplarisch anhand von regionalen Initiativen zum Klimawandel analysieren werde.

Angesichts der bestehenden politischen, sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Verwerfungen und Ungerechtigkeiten, müsste eine transformative Praxis neben negativen Pflichten auch den direkten und unaufschiebbaren Einsatz für das Recht und das Wohlergehen von notleidenden Menschen einschließen. Die Reduktion des Energieverbrauchs und mithin auch „Klimaschutz“ wären daher nicht als ein Zweck an sich zu begreifen, sondern als ein

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A Frog Is Not an Elephant ... On Anthropocentrism in Ecological Ethics

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“A frog *is* not an elephant, and neither *will* it become one, nor *can* it become one”. In this way - in the early 1970' - André Wylleman, professor of philosophy at the Catholic University of Leuven, used to counter the often voiced criticism that the efforts to shift ethics into a more ecological direction were all fatally flawed because they remained the prisoner of anthropocentrism. Only a radical shift away from this, so the criticism stated, would signal the beginning of a genuine and lasting change for a better future. Wylleman, however, wanted to remind his (mostly skeptical) audience that for human beings to engage into a critical reflection such as ethics always and inevitably is and remains characterized by 'the human dimension'. The strongly pejorative use of 'anthropocentrism' doesn't change the simple fact that “One cannot jump out of one's own skin”.

The paper takes up this challenge by investigating what can be gained by the position that the real problem of anthropocentrism in ecological ethics lies in the fact that not the human perspective but the male perspective takes the place of pride. Or in other words: anthropocentrism narrowed down to androcentrism and its 'typical' attributes such as objectivity and rational calculus might be the source of a reductionist ethics in which the 'species activity' (Tronto) of care becomes neglected to the detriment of all involved. The thesis of the paper is that an ethic(s) based on care - although still anthropocentric - contributes to a sustainable open future (Vorstenbosch).

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Contents and Process. How the Habermasian Discursive Model Gives Too High Hopes of Solving Global Climate Problems

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For Jürgen Habermas politics is an arena for resolving conflicts and settling different, and opposing, interests. His idea of discourse ethics puts forward a model of rationally-founded human interaction. This discursive will-formation proposes a participatory form of government that is said to take into account the generalizable interests of all individuals. Habermas claims that the model advances mutual understanding by suggesting theories of communication rather than theories of persuasion and dialogue rather than monologue. As such the model seems to fall right at hand in the global climate debate, which reveals a multitude of interests and needs. In the light of the global climate crisis this paper analyses critically the Habermasian discourse ethics as a method of conflict resolution.

The global climate crisis more often than not is presented as being mostly about science, economics, and politics. Public affairs are placed in the hands of technicians, who apply scientific methods to keep the society functioning. In addition, politicians contract together to safeguard short term national interests instead of the wellbeing of the whole planet. This very way of dealing with climate issues results in an important gap between objective facts and subjective values. While the scientific and political aspects indeed help to solve, as well as create, some crucial points of the debate, they alone cannot cover the whole scope of the issue.

Climate issues are, too, urgent moral issues touching eventually each and every individual. Yet, as individual human actions have an ever wider impact on the climate the loosening sense of interdependence between different groups makes the grasping of this challenging. To enable large-scale action, the applicable ethics must accommodate a wide range of cultural viewpoints, including conflicting notions of good and evil, wrong and right, and of what it means to be human. The interaction between political debate, scientific evidence and moral claims makes the whole issue of solving conflicts related to climate complex.

Habermas claims that his communicative model is particularly apt for such conflict solving as it does not rely on thick notions of good life, but on thin procedural requirements allowing for an incorporation of plurality. Yet, in this paper the critique of Habermas is, firstly, comprised of an idea that climate issues cannot be mended by mere rational deliberation that is about winning and losing in a debate. Climate issues pose an ethical dilemma that needs a different kind of an approach.

Secondly, this paper argues that an important shortcoming of Habermas's model is that it is a modern project, whereas the present situation should rather be characterized in terms of late modernity. Most contemporary communities are more based on differences than on a common identity and are thus characterized by plurality and contingency. They do not necessarily share such a basis for a rational deliberation that could serve as a common ground.

After outlining a critique of Habermas, the paper then proposes a more constructive way of going forth in the solving of the urgent climate issues. Such a holistic vision integrates descriptions of ecological realities with personal taking of stand, giving way for the participants' diverse situations. It is proposed that climate issues must be made a personal concern of everyone and possibilities made for personal inclusion in the debate. The paper therefore gives a constructive contribution in dealing with climate issues and in envisioning conflict resolution in a late modern situation.

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The Best Interest of the Child in Times of Migration Management. A Case Study of Decision-Making in the Swedish Migration Court of Appeal

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This paper put light on the global challenge of migration and sustainability. It focuses on a possible tension between at the one hand the promoting of a “migration management” approach in contemporary global migration politics and at the other hand commitments to human rights principles. This tension is exemplified by a case study on the granting and refusal of residence permits to children in the Swedish Migration Court of Appeal.

In the post 2015 UN millennium agenda global migration issues has been put forward as one of the major global challenges of the future (UN 2012). Migration and enhanced mobility are seen as one important enabler for inclusive social and economic development. A migration management approach has for several years been put forward by the UN, Intergovernmental organizations (E.g. IOM, GFMD), states and scholars as a possible way to meet the global challenges of migration. One of the main ideas can be described as ‘properly managed migration can be beneficial for both individuals and societies’ (IOM 2004:3, Spencer 2003, Stenum 2011). It has been described as a third and pragmatic way between a traditional debate about open vs closed borders (Geiger, M., & Pécoud 2010, Zapata-Barrero and Pécoud 2012) and a triple-win situation for sending and receiving states and migrants themselves (Andersson 2012).

Sweden is one state that has been active in promoting a migration management approach in order to take advantage of the effect of migration on development and to make sure that Swedish migration politics at the same is “humane, legally secure and regulated” (Swedish Government 2011). Emphasize has been on facilitating labor force migration and that particular attention should be paid to the best interest of the child. Despite the ambition of managing migration in a sustainable and humane way NGO:s and political parties have been put forward severe criticism towards the Swedish government and authorities for being inhumane and not in accordance with humanitarian commitments, especially in relation to the category of children.

This paper puts a specific focus on how the category of children and their interests are considered in decision-making on asylum within a broader framework of migration management. Asylum decisions from the Swedish Migration Court of Appeal regarding children are analyzed in order to examine the argumentations for and against residence permits. According the UNCRC (Art 3) and the Swedish Aliens Act; “In cases involving a child, particular attention must be given to what is required with regard to the child’s health and development and the best interests of the child in general.” (Chap 1 10§). However, children are a category of asylum seekers that seem to be somewhat less beneficial out of an economic perspective but at the same time are portrayed as in special need of protection. This lead us to some crucial questions; in what way is it possible within the framework of migration management to stay with the commitments to human rights, in this case the best interest of the child? What meanings are given to the Best Interest Principle (BIP) and how are applications and balancing of children’s interests done in practice in the decision-making of asylum by the court?

The results demonstrates that the best interest of children is given changing and ambivalent meanings in relation to different cases in the court and that the best interest of the child is narrowly interpreted and applied within a discourse of restricting migration. The aim of contemporary Swedish migration politics is to accomplish the multiple purposes of economic development and being humane, legally secure and regulated at the same time.

This case study argues that within a framework of migration management the best interest of the child is put on the exception. Finally, the paper highlight some crucial ethical aspects and dilemmas on asylum decision-making that need to be considered in order to make possible a sustainable migration politics for an open future.

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Ethics and the Re-Conceptualization of Sustainability: Application to Processes and Institutions in the EAC

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The realization of sustainability in areas such as ecology, development, political and social processes is a big challenge for both high and low income countries; and climate change has made it all the more complicated. However, climate change discourse provides an avenue within which we can investigate and re-conceptualize the categories that we have traditionally used in thinking about and analyzing sustainability. This paper proposes a re-conceptualization of 'sustainability' by advancing the concept of *ethical sustainability* as a foundational and an indispensable dimension of sustainability. The research was designed as an atypical case-study which applied qualitative methodology to investigate and testing the hypothesis: incorporating ethics reasoning to sustainability discourse would yield more sustainable processes and institutions. It concludes that the ethical is a fundamental aspect of sustainability.

The paper commences with a brief survey of the dominant trends in sustainability thinking and observes a strong tendency to reductionism, which fosters the relegation of ethical dimension of human challenges to the periphery. I advance the 'ethical' as a continuum within which sustainability thinking ought to take place; arguing that the ethical provides a contextual and contingent canvass upon which to engage the challenges in sustainability. The logical premise is that human beings are social creatures and human activities have ethical aspects. We make choices and priorities, and we influence the lives of others. This is not the least true for social and political actions. Therefore, ethics as reflection on normativity, ought to be integrated in social and political processes and agency.

The paper then proceeds to present the case for enriching our conceptualization of sustainability by using the argument that the ethical in human existence and challenges should be taken seriously. As the next logical step I then argue that there is need to generate appropriate concepts to enrich the discourse; concepts that are contingently grounded and relevant towards the realization of sustainability. Using these conditions, I then explain the assumptions by which I conceive the concept of *ethical sustainability*.

In developing the concept of 'ethical sustainability', I rely on the highlighted need for the ethical in sustainability discourse to argue for the advantages of incorporating the *ethical* in sustainability. I therefore lay out the meaning of the concept while relating it to the wider sustainability discourse. I use the schools of 'virtue-ethics' and 'ethical-principlism' in order to elucidate the framework of ethical sustainability; and using 'virtues' and 'principles' I indicate that the concept necessarily has principles that hold it up.

I argue that ethically sustainable processes and institutions are characterised by the principles of: i) *justice*, ii) *ubuntu*, iii) *capabilities* and, iv) *integrity*. These principles are generated as building blocks of the ethical dimension of sustainability. The 'justice' principle is advanced basing on the Rawlsian theory of justice whilst utilizing other theories as deemed applicable. The 'ubuntu' principle is developed basing on the traditional African philosophical notion of "ubuntu". The argument relies on the prevalent use of the prefix '*ntu*' across most of Africa as a connotation of the African communitarian approach to life. The 'capabilities' principle is developed following the Sen-Nussbaum approach as necessary in enhancing both the: i) intrinsic and ii) extrinsic ethical empowerment of the individuals and organizations to which ethical sustainability would be applied. And the 'integrity' principle is developed using qualifiers of personal and organizational alignment with the ethical aspiration of given communities.

The last section of the paper tests the applicability of *ethical sustainability* to developing sustainable i) *political* and ii) *social* processes and institutions in the East African community. It applies the prescriptive philosophical approach to the testing; taking note of the persistent challenges in generating sustainable processes and institutions. In practical terms the testing is applied to the generation of nascent political and social institutions of the East African Community project. As for the political processes, the paper highlights the need for ethical thinking to the governing philosophy in to achieving sustainable governance processes and institutions. While for the social the paper highlights the need for ethical virtues and principles in theorizing and practicalizing social programs to the bloc's realization of sustainable social processes).

Conclusively the paper suggest that if the future of sustainability discourse is to be viable and more applicable to the increasingly complicated challenges in the environmental, political and social condition of humans, it has to incorporate the ethical as a core aspect of its debate.

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Intergenerational and International Justice: Sustainability and the Dilemma of Developing Nations

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Ethical discourses of development often reiterate the proposal of the World Commission on Environment and Development which asserts the obligation of the present generation to meet its needs “without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED, 1987, 2.1). The proposal advocates *intergenerational justice* which is to be accomplished through fair and modest use of natural resources and suggests limits to development inversely related to sustainability. While the proposal has sound justifications, the suggestion to limit development introduces a number of ethical dilemmas that arise within the coordinates of *international justice*. Paying attention to the divide between north and south (Kates et al, 2001, p. 641), that is, between developed nations and developing nations, one could argue that any meaningful discourse on the rights of future generations cannot discount the rights of the present generation. Furthermore, it may be argued that the blame of doing injustice to future generations does not fall equally on everyone, because the polluters are fully accountable for the harm caused. Such considerations make disadvantaged nations believe that global regulations against carbon emission and fossil fuel consumption would paralyze their economic development, perpetuate injustice and, in extreme cases, harm their survival. Similar concerns manifest in the voices of the BRICs and other developing nations, as well as undeveloped countries.

However, the protection of natural resources, conservation of biodiversity and ecosystems, preservation of flora and fauna, stability of climate, and better quality of life are global concerns that necessitate collective actions involving both north and south. The problem with the *polluter pays* principle is that in the contemporary world which is largely multinational it is almost impossible to hold any particular agent or nation responsible for a specific environmental damage. Given that it is difficult to identify anyone individually accountable, the obligation to nurture values that promote taking individual responsibility appears to be the best solution conceivable. Nevertheless, a closer look reveals that the developing nations, especially the BRICs, have a special role in promoting sustainable development. For it is the right time for these nations to turn to those developmental strategies that are really sustainable and to learn from the mistakes made by developed nations. The present paper systematically explores this topic, foregrounding the obligation of developed nations to help developing nations *freely* choose sustainable methods of development. Furthermore, the paper emphasizes the importance of simple, realistic and problem-specific discourses, the urgency of cultural exchange to motivate nations to refrain from unsustainable practices, and the necessity of technological exchange facilitating sustainable trajectories and efficient incentive structures.

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Towards A Christian Voluntary Simplicity? Growth Questioned By Theological Ethics

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Over the 20th century, the productivist-capitalist economy found its fullest development through the social model of mass consumption, leading the western way of life to exploit nature in a manner we now acknowledge as ecologically unsustainable and socially inequitable. Yet the eco-systemic crisis we are facing still fails to provoke effective societal motion.

Several reasons could explain why it has failed so far. One of the most important may be that it puts into question not only an easily pointed-at global system, but the day to day way of life of any citizen of the industrialized world. More precisely and more deeply, it questions the underlying “mental climate” of late modernity: our paradoxical project of building society serving our own personal interest, our “ever-more” view of the fulfilment of existence, our individualistic and hedonistic scale of values, our exploitative relationship to nature. In a word, it calls into question our current social imaginary. There is the core of the eco-systemic problem of mankind. Tackling this issue is, in that respect, of utmost importance. Not realizing this, would condemn in advance any technical institutional effort towards sustainability and justice.

It is a well-known fact that Judaism and Christianity have partly shaped the social imaginary we are talking about, even though there are debates about the extent to which they have done so. In his 1967 paper “The Historical Roots of our Ecological Crisis” published in *Science*, Lynn White Jr.’s position was crystal clear: he accused both faiths to be responsible for the current ecological problems. Christian theologians have subsequently worked hard on the hermeneutics of the incriminated biblical texts, and have articulated a broadly-received eco-theology of stewardship that is tantamount to an anthropocentrism *éclairé*: not renouncing to the belief that the human being had a special place among Creation, they have recognized though that he had to care for it; domination went with preservation.

This was only the first theological step. It can be considered indeed that no Christian grasp of the environmental issue can be content with a reflection about the relationship between man and nature. One must think further and challenge our productivist paradigm of an ever-growing economy. Both issues go indeed hand in hand; one need only read the 2004 report *The Limits to Growth: The Thirty-Year Update*. After all, a sober economy in a steady state causes no ecological footprint overshoot and no climate change, hence no sustainability issue, even when its social imaginary is historically based on a theology of domination.

That is why this paper engages economics theologically. Of course, one cannot accomplish a comprehensive critique of the ideology of growth in so small a reflection. Therefore, leaving the systemic level aside, our presentation is circumscribed to the personal and existential level of ethics, asking: what could be a contemporary Christian stance regarding the modern economic view of the fulfilment of life?

Before examining the Scriptures on that particular matter, the issue will be situated in the broader realm of Christian ethics, especially within the eschatological context of the proclamation and coming of the Kingdom of God, which forbids Christian believers from considering any worldly commitment as able to build Heaven on Earth, but rather keeps them in an attitude of critical hope. Then the New Testament will be put under scrutiny to consider the life of Jesus Christ, who revealed to the world a poor and humble God. The Incarnation’s material conditions convey indeed a message: from the crib to the cross, Jesus’

life was a lesson in simplicity and service. The sayings of Jesus about money, poverty and wealth will be explored, zooming on a few examples, and finding a clear warning against wealth, a call for almsgiving and caring for the poor, and a radical trust in God's providence. From there, a conclusion will be drawn on the ethical level, proposing a very concrete Christian practice of voluntary simplicity, i.e. an evangelical sobriety for our times. This modern way of life was first described by Richard B. Gregg, a disciple of Gandhi, in his 1936 text *The Value of Voluntary Simplicity*. It has already been adopted by millions of people around the world, especially thanks to the books of Duane Elgin and Serge Mongeau on this topic, and could very well be a practical guide for Christians today.

This paper works at the heart of our social imaginary, offering a Christian perspective. In doing so, we humbly hope to answer Henry David Thoreau's implicit critique, when he wrote:

"There are a thousand hacking at the branches of evil to one who is striking at the root."

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Moving-and-Mooring in Uncertain Terrains. A Capabilities Approach to Climate Change Ethics

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The main purpose of this paper is to introduce a discussion about ethics and mobility in a climate change context. This is accomplished through a conceptual analysis of holistic mobility as positive freedom drawing on both mobilities and capabilities research. The analysis interrelates both theoretically and methodologically the fields of climate change ethics, the capabilities approach, and recent mobilities research to link social ethics issues to wellbeing in the context of climate change vulnerability and adaptation.

The paper relays capabilities research on mobility and builds on and develops the concept of holistic mobility drawing on the recent so-called mobilities turn in social science and the humanities.

It is argued that the concept of holistic mobility as a capability, may further inform the significance of mobility as an analytical lens in climate change ethics. Holistic mobility is presented as an alternative concept to geographical and/or social mobility, which often underplay the existential dimension of mobility, mobility's mooring aspects as well as the interrelations between moving and mooring. Thus, the paper concludes that it is important to highlight the simultaneousness of existential, geographical and social mobility and that "existential mobility" should be considered in climate change ethics in order to get an informed notion of the moral challenges situated in the mobility-wellbeing-climate change nexus in relation to climate change vulnerability and adaptation.

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Positive Spillover Between Pro-Environmental Behaviors: The Quest for the Magic Button

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The paper addresses the topic of positive spillover between ethical behaviors, with specific focus on the domain of sustainability. The development of sustainable behavioral patterns clearly represents a prerequisite for the establishment of future societies based on ethical values; the spillover hypothesis claims that behaviors are strictly intertwined, so that the uptake of a virtuous behavior in a specific domain triggers positive spillovers to other (even uncorrelated) domains. A deep understanding of the mechanisms guiding spillover of ethical principles from one behavioral domain to another would have strong implications for a plethora of players: policy makers and the public sector at large, willing to implement policies capable of exploiting the potential for positive contamination across domains, but also private organizations willing to exploit ethical values of citizens-consumers, providing them with sound and sustainable products and services.

To date, there is no general agreement on the nature and the strength of spillover (Thøgersen and Crompton, 2009). The main arguments for the existence of positive spillover find theoretical backing in different psychological theories. Self-Perception Theory (Bem 1972) suggests that individuals acting green in a specific domain develop a self-image of people caring for the environment and holding certain values, so that they will likely act accordingly to this self-representation when having to choose the appropriate behavior also in different contexts. Cognitive Dissonance theory (Festinger 1957) suggests on the other hand that individuals tend to avoid the discomfort deriving from adopting behaviors that are incoherent, so that the uptake of a sustainable behavior in a domain would trigger the adoption of consistent behaviors also in other domains. However, some authors suggest that the spillover could also be negative, due to the so-called moral licensing or contribution ethics (Guagnano et al. 1994) phenomena, according to which people adopting an ethical behavior in a specific context believe they have done their fair share, so that they feel less obliged to act consistently in other domains.

A panel study was conducted on 206 Danish undergraduate students recruited at the University of Århus. The longitudinal study consisted of two waves of online surveys, circulated before and after the treatment which in turn consisted in spurring experimental group members to adopt a specific, sustainable behavior (purchasing organic food and eco-labeled products). Participants had to keep track by means of a shopping diary of their purchases with respect to a list of products, specifying whether they opted for a green or for a traditional option. At the end of the experiment, the online survey was circulated once again, investigating participants' behaviors and behavioral intentions with respect to a battery of items (in the domains of purchasing, recycling, transport mode and energy saving) as well as their ethical values, environmental awareness, habits and resistance to change. Through comparison with the control group it was possible to investigate if and to which extent increasing the purchase of green products triggered the spillover of positive effects in other domains. ANOVA and multiple regression techniques were used for the statistical analysis, which has been conducted using the SPSS19 statistical software. The results show how positive spillover exists, yet is confined to easy to adopt, non-costly and painless behaviors such as paying more attention to switch off lights when exiting rooms or turning off water while soaping or brushing teeth.

Moreover, the study investigated how and to what extent the existence, direction and strength of spillover is affected by variables such as personal values of respondents (Dunlap et al. 2000), the type of incentives (monetary vs praise) adopted to spur the source behavior

(Cognitive evaluation and Self determination theories: Deci and Ryan, 1985) or the subjective resistance to change (Oreg 2003). The paper ends with a paragraph devoted to the discussion of results, and with the identification of limitations of the analysis that should be addressed by future research.

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Transformational Infrastructure and Intergenerational Ethics at Morro Bay

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Morro Bay is the largest estuary on the California Central Coast, framed against the Pacific Ocean by the Santa Lucia coastal mountain range, and terminating at a dramatic 250-meter tall dormant volcanic plug rising from the surf adjacent to windswept dunescapes. The home of the indigenous Northern Chumash for almost ten thousand years, a fishing community also known as Morro Bay grew over the last seventy years about the bay mouth to the sea and along the mountain foothills. The town experienced a post-war motel/lodging boom for those on holiday from the heat and industrial agriculture of the California Central Valley. This visitor-oriented town of ten thousand permanent residents on some weekends swells to fourteen thousand, and currently dumps its sewer effluent into the Pacific Ocean, but was required by Federal law to upgrade to a higher level of effluent treatment. The paper outlines a to date eight-year saga of engineering, ecological, political and ethical twists and turns.

This effluent requirement was coincident with what were initially seen as isolated regional events: several years of severe drought, dramatic collapse to disuse of two local aquifers, expansion of irrigated agriculture taking advantage of unique canyon microclimates, and increasing dependence of the town on tourism for revenue. A critical junction was reached when the initial project permit proposal, a new plant raised on an acropolis of fill rising out of a beachfront flood plain, was appealed by residents to the overarching legal authority, the California Coastal Commission, with the hearing date occurring the same day as the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant earthquake and tsunami disaster.

What began as a narrowly framed engineering problem was challenged and reframed by alternate professional judgment, concerned with holistic sustainable solutions uniting water and wastewater concerns, and a civic ecological district planning opportunity balancing pragmatic and aesthetic concerns. A fifty year old planning vision of the town that guided siting of the original wastewater plant in what were thought of as waterfront 'wastelands' and that guided an initial cursory engineering 'upgrade' came up against new community grassroots understandings of regional and local ecology and the emerging science of climate change, which suggested a managed withdrawal of infrastructure from the coast. This politically divisive issue was decided by the California Coastal Commission in favor of the holistic model, dictating a need for transformational infrastructure: resilient and sustainable water recycling for farm irrigation, stream reclamation supporting steelhead trout, groundwater basin recharge, and drinking water.

At its core, this case study of environmental sustainability, ethics, politics, and praxis is a vivid demonstration of specific eco-phenomenal place gathering and engendering an evolving valuing of the aesthetics of nature. It focuses on competing paradigms of environmental ethics: ego-logical 'mastery' pragmatism, based on isolated analytical framings, versus an eco-logical network paradigm of sustainable natural capital, transgenerational ethics, and latent collateral opportunities and obligations, extending even to the non-human.

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Die Zukunft der Nachhaltigkeit

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Anders als der Titel zunächst nahelegen mag, soll der Vortrag weder der Frage nachgehen, ob und gegebenenfalls in welcher Weise der Nachhaltigkeitsbegriff auch morgen noch Teil der politischen Auseinandersetzung sein wird, noch danach fragen, ob aktuelle Nachhaltigkeitskonzepte in dem Sinne zukunftsfähig sind, dass sie als korrektive oder funktionale Faktoren einer möglichst optimalen Planung vorhersehbarer Szenarien und Entwicklungen in den Bereichen Umwelt, Gesellschaft oder Wirtschaft einsetzbar sind. Hingegen möchte der Vortrag eine Gelegenheit sein, zu fragen, in welcher Weise sich die genannten Konzepte auf die Zukunft beziehen und deren Offenheit zur Sprache bringen bzw. in welcher Weise sich die Offenheit der Zukunft im Nachhaltigkeitsbegriff ausspricht und von diesem in einer Bedeutung gehalten wird.

Die genannte Frage wird in den Rahmen der Thematisierung einer den Menschen in seinem Wohnen aufnehmenden und fördernden Ökonomie gestellt. Die Offenheit der Zukunft ist dabei als wesentliche Dimension dieses Wohnens verstanden. Dem entgegen steht eine Form der Ökonomie, für welche die Zukunft gerade nicht offen ist, insofern sie ausschließlich unter der Voraussetzung ihrer jeweiligen Berechenbarkeit und Planbarkeit gesehen ist. Im Bereich dieser Ökonomie ist der Mensch von vornherein daraufhin abgestellt, gemäß eines auf Werten gegründeten Systems von Regeln und Normen zu handeln – auch dort, wo er sich um die Sicherstellung der Nachhaltigkeit seiner Handlungen bemüht. Grundlegend für unseren Versuch, die Frage nach der *Zukunft der Nachhaltigkeit* zu bedenken, ist also zum einen ein hinreichendes Verständnis der Offenheit der Zukunft, darin sich allererst eine den Menschen in seinem Wohnen aufnehmende und fördernde Ökonomie zu gründen vermag – und zum anderen ein hinreichendes Verständnis jener Form von Ökonomie, welche der Zukunft unausgesetzt bleibt und sich dieser von vornherein verschließt.

Leitend für unser Bemühen um ein solch hinreichendes Verständnis sollen jene Vorträge sein, welche Martin Heidegger 1949 in Bremen gehalten und unter den Titel *Einblick in das was ist* gestellt hat: *Das Ding, Das Ge-stell, Die Gefahr, Die Kehre*. Vor dem Hintergrund des hier von Martin Heidegger zur Sprache gebrachten Wesensreichtum und der Verwahrlosung desselben im technischen Zeitalter, mag die Frage nach der *Zukunft der Nachhaltigkeit* im Rahmen des ökonomischen Wissens neu gestellt werden. Letztgenanntem Vortrag Martin Heidegges entnehmen wir indes das Leitmotiv für die Ausarbeitung unserer Fragestellung: "Solange wir nicht denkend erfahren, was ist, können wie nie dem gehören, was sein wird".

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Authority, Power and Control in the Work of Building Transnational Sustainable Communities within the European Union

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The long-term ecological, financial and social sustainability of the European Union is dependent upon deepening the level of integration among its member states. Sustainable integration among sovereign nation-states requires an increasing level of cooperation and connectivity on multiple levels. Such integration includes not only the monetary dimension of relations, but also the manner through which member states are linked by shared ecological, cultural and ethical practices. This paper seeks to explore how the work of transnational community building within the EU is fortified and diminished by competing definitions of “authority,” “power” and “control” as they are defined through shared technologies and common ecological realities. To this end, this paper will examine how shared technology and a common ecosphere might be used by EU member states to support the project of building and fortifying transnational sustainable communities within the European Union. At the same time, this paper will examine the tension between *espoir* and *desespoir*, (*hope and the risk of being overwhelmed*), in the context of community building in an era of new and unexamined types of connectivity and interdependence. Central to this examination will be an exploration of some possible ways of envisioning the theo-ethical dimension of community building, in the context of an increasingly religiously diverse EU. This paper will draw on a variety of sources in the course of crafting its constructive proposals, including modern diplomatic studies on the subject of sustainability, ecological discourses on the requirements of resilience, and emerging conversations in theology and ethics which engage the lessons of Earth honoring faith communities.

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Just Food: How Our Eating Shapes Our Future

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Contemporary food systems are complex and multinational, involving workers and consumers from diverse cultures and economies. These systems must be capable of feeding large, culturally varied populations without compromising social justice, human health, and the health of the planet. Sustainability scholars and food system practitioners, as well as policy makers and consumers, need to understand these complex food systems and create more sustainable practices in the production and consumption of food across a variety of industries and environments.

Food, like water and energy, is central to human existence and critical to issues of sustainability. More than necessary for survival, food has always constituted a significant part of individual and group identity. Yet, over the last 100 years, people have become increasingly disconnected from the source of their food and the relevance it has to the creation of life and culture. In this nation alone, agriculture has become dramatically less conspicuous and democratic while its importance has increased. In 1935, for example, the number of farms in the United States peaked at 6.8 million just as the nation's population crossed 127 million. Today, out of 310 million Americans, less than 1% claim farming as their occupation. Now, more than ever, we need to re-establish an understanding the moral complexities of food. Our growing lack of awareness about where food comes from, the conditions under which it is produced and transported, and how it shapes human existence presents unique challenges to the planet and the human community that inhabits it.

In this paper, I will explore the following moral issues of sustainable food systems. Environmentally, problems resulting from the industrialization of food production include the loss of biodiversity, depletion of topsoil, increased CO₂ levels in the atmosphere, and pollution of waterways. Other environmental problems such as climate change will further transform where and what we can produce. The transportation of food across vast distances and borders raises questions about the security of national food sources and whether such practices contribute to more equitable and sustainable national economies. From the perspective of human health, contemporary foods have led to an obesity epidemic in developed nations, particularly among the poor and minority populations. Soaring rates of cancer, heart disease, and other lifestyle diseases are also products of our current food practices. At the same time, malnourishment and starvation remain rampant in less developed nations where wholesale loss of cultural food practices have occurred due to increases in agricultural trade and resulting crop choices. Industrial bioengineered plants and animals, and animals raised in concentrated feeding operations, have produced more food, but at what cost to human health, animal welfare, and the welfare of the planet?

Finally, social justice questions are raised by the current food practices. Guest worker programs have increased growers' access to farm labor but have they alleviated or exacerbated the historic problem of depressed wages and itinerancy among farm workers? Are farm workers unnecessarily exposed to pesticides and other dangers in a system pursuing cheap food where workers' have little say in the conditions under which they work? These challenges extend to food distribution. How it is that modern agriculture has increased production but "food deserts" make it difficult to eat in some American cities, and malnutrition continues in Africa? These paradoxes in our global food system raise issues of food security on a national and community level that underscore the difficulty of the challenges confronting us.

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Ethics of the Distant Future and Moral Corruption

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In matters concerning sustainability, we seem in some specific way seriously hampered to making the step from worth doing to doing. The motivational problem to care for the distant future could be formulated as the problem of overcoming the potential psychological inconsistency between our *moral judgement* in favour of some environmental friendly action and the *action*, we in fact carry out following up on that judgement. In this paper I examine the motivational problem of sustainability for strongly willed agents in affluent countries.

Stephen Gardiner has pointed at the concept of moral corruption as the root cause of an agent's attitudes of complacency and procrastination when it comes to taking environmental friendly action, even when such action is supported by the agent's moral judgement. According to the definition I propose in the paper, moral corruption arises as a consequence of sticking to an attitude of staying away from morality in its entirety. Morally corrupt agents are deaf to principal moral questions regarding justice and the good life, and they are conscious of the risk they take that their deafness to morality may result in corrupting their moral character. That is, corruption is not only a moral concept, but also causal or quasi-causal concept. Are we as current people in the affluent countries in some way compartmentalised in the sense that we view and want to view ourselves as moral agents when we act in relation to current people including our children and grandchildren, but that we have to consider ourselves morally corrupt when it comes to acting upon our obligations to people living in the far future?

By reflecting on the consequences of moral corruption for the process of self-constitution of agents, I argue that a morally corrupt agent A constitutes herself as the cause of the ends of current people, whereas she does not constitute herself to be the cause of ends that affect people living in the distant future. At the same time, when A deliberates about her actions and which ones to choose, she regards her choices as hers, as the product of her own activity, because she will regard the principle of choice as expressive, or representative, of herself –of her own causality. In particular, A views her choices regarding the ends promoted for current people and those for future people as an expression of her practical identity. That is, A's practical identity is constituted by the actions she carries out that aim for an end to the benefit of current people and by her action not to act with the objective to save the planet for future generations. But what effect does this division between sets of ends and corresponding actions have on A's practical identity? The least we can say about the self of a morally corrupt agent is that it is divided. On the one hand this self is constituted by actions that pertain to the interests of current people, on the other hand it is formed by the agent's strategy of keeping her current, perfectly convenient status quo, which is being achieved by ignoring the obligations we have to people living in the distant future. The question remains: how could we possibly strive for moral integrity, while simultaneously being infected with the 'disease' of moral corruption?

I argue that our moral integrity is at risk when we consistently do not take care for the distant future whilst living an active life as a present moral agent. Persistently not living up to our obligations to future people, does affect the circumstances in which future people will live negatively, but this also casts doubts over us, current people, when we still believe that we can strive for moral integrity. Not striving for a sustainable world, that is not being able or willing to find good reasons to restrict ones actions voluntarily in view of the obligations we have to people in the distant future, will hamper us in viewing ourselves as candidates for being persons of integrity. A renewed formulation of the concept of moral integrity that I propose could lead us to accepting self-binding as a self-evident way to live up to our

obligation to care for the distant future, and, simultaneously, considering our lives as morally good.

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Theological and Ethical Resources in the Face of Climate Change: Sin, Repentance and Hope

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Stephen Gardiner (2011) describes the crisis of climate change as an 'ethical tragedy': a 'perfect storm' with intergenerational, theoretical and moral aspects. A vivid fictional counterpart to Gardiner's analysis can be found in Ian McEwan's novel *Solar* (2011), in which ordinary and even banal moral flaws come together with disastrous results for international efforts to combat climate change. Understood within a purely this-worldly horizon, the last word about climate change might indeed be 'tragedy'.

In this paper it will be argued, however, that the Christian doctrine of sin offers rich theological and ethical resources for re-framing our analysis of the problem and our response. Following Alistair McFadyen (2000) and others, it will be argued that sin is at heart *idolatry* – a basic refusal to direct our being and energies to God in a response of joy, faith and worship. More specific aspects of sin can be understood in terms of idolatry. For example, Karl Barth (1956: 3-154) thematized sin as pride, sloth and falsehood; pride can be understood as putting ourselves in the place of God, sloth as a refusal to respond in faith to God's love and become all that God calls us to be, and falsehood as the self-destructive worship of that which is not God. Paradoxically, to understand our predicament as sin is fundamentally hopeful, because to know ourselves as sinners is to know ourselves as the objects of God's saving love in Jesus Christ.

Reading the doctrine of sin in the light of climate change is instructive for a theological understanding of sin. The crisis of climate change is a sharp reminder of what the Christian tradition has at times been prone to forget, namely the solidarity of humans with the whole created world. Our sin alienates us not only from God, one another and ourselves, but also from the material world that is our present home (Bonhoeffer 2004: 133-4). The good news of God's saving work in Christ is emphatically not a promise to rescue humankind from an irredeemably broken world, but rather a message of hope for the *whole* creation.

Conversely, analysing the problem of climate change in terms of sin sheds further light on Gardiner's 'perfect moral storm'. Elements of pride, sloth and falsehood can be discerned not only in the origins of climate change but also in present responses. Pride, for example, can be seen in the hubristic assumption that we can and must save the world by our own unaided efforts, sloth in paralyzing despair when we recognize the magnitude of the challenge, which saps our collective motivation to address it, and falsehood in the multiple factors that contribute to the denial or misrepresentation of the problem – such as the cynical manipulation of evidence and the self-deception and cognitive evasion by which we avoid facing up to it.

Understanding climate change in this way unlocks rich resources of faith, understanding and practice to help us address it. The individual and corporate practice of repentance, a central part of daily and weekly Christian worship, is (among other things) a practice of truthfulness that can enable us to confront our evasions and denials in respect of climate change. It is a response to the message of hope at the heart of Christian faith, one that makes Christian people and communities receptive to the theological virtue of hope. This virtue can enable us to see practical human responses to climate change in their proper perspective, countering both the pride which leads us to believe that we alone can and must save the world, and the sloth that results from paralyzing despair. It can thus set people and communities free to discern 'the structure of responsible life' (Bonhoeffer 2005: 257-89) in the face of climate change, and to live such responsible lives in concrete practical ways.

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Composing the future we want?

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How can humans and non-humans come together to face the ecological crises of our time? Bruno Latour has the answer: we need to collectively compose the common world. In this paper I explore the practical implications and boundaries of Latour's concept of *compositionism*. With his plea for the composition of the common world, Latour does nothing less than propose a rearranging, a re-composing of the world. At last, Latour provides a more realistic alternative to modernism (since 'we have never been modern') and his work is relevant for anyone working in science, politics and morality. Under a compositionist constitution, Latour argues, we need political, economic, moralistic and scientific skills. Only then we can properly address the question: who and what will be part of our common world? Compositionism can thus not be practiced inside the walls of a laboratory or university, nor within a (national) parliament, a church or at a meeting of the G8. The question is thus: in what sort of arena *can* the common world be composed?

My hypothesis is that compositionism can best be practiced, at least in theory, in an international arena where, to use Latour's terms, politicians, scientists, moralists, economists, diplomats and administrators from all over the world come together. The one event that came closest to such a compositionist arena is, in my view, the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro in 2012 (UNCSD or Rio+20). Needless to say, this conference was based on other principles (a different constitution) and goals, but it did showcase an unprecedented gathering of people, both in size and composition. Therefore I explore in this paper the conditions under which a conference like Rio+20 could be organized based on the principles of compositionism. Clearly, Latour did not develop this concept with practical applications in mind, his work is mainly theoretical. However, during the Gifford Lectures series at the University of Edinburgh in February 2013, he admitted that it is important to research the implications of his work on political practice in the context of the United Nations.

Furthermore, Latour has indicated that composing the common world is the best chance we have of dealing with the ecological crises that we are faced with, as inhabitants of the Earth. Thus, the UNCSD and Latour seem to share a goal, namely collectively seeking for ways to sustain life on Earth. Yet another reason to use the UNCSD as a practical case. In Rio de Janeiro, the slogan was hopeful: "the future we want". However, as the disappointing outcome of the conference has shown, it takes more than a catchphrase to even begin to speak of a 'we' that would want something. Disagreements on facts and values stand in the way of defining a joint future. It is the distinction between facts and values that the compositionist seeks to leave behind. At first sight, compositionism appears to be just as naively optimistic about the potential 'we', but Latour has repeatedly claimed that the work of a compositionist is rather messy and even more complex than the kind of political arrangements we are used to. Compositionism thus demands a certain slowness and precaution. By using the UNCSD as a first test case we can start to think of ways how to apply compositionism.

In the first part of this theoretical paper I provide an in depth discussion of the concept of compositionism, which has been introduced by Latour in the nineties of the last century, and has been developed ever since. In part two of this paper I explore the practical implications of Latour's vision. If we are to put compositionism into practice at a United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, what conditions have to be met? What problems will arise? Will compositionism lead us down just another, even messier, road to failure? Or will we finally be able to *compose* the future we want?

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Discounting for Epistemic Reasons

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A moral commonplace in everyday life is that one is not morally responsible for all the consequences of one's actions. If cashed out in terms of reactive attitudes, we might say that one is not blameworthy for indefinitely many effects one's actions lead to. The expected and predictable consequences matter far more. What is the import of this observation? I argue that it can be used to defend an important aspect of intergenerational justice---the (social) discount rate δ . The discount rate, which is to be distinguished from individual (intrapersonal) discounting, is an important aspect in modelling the value of policies on future generations. The effective discounting rate is a very important topic for climate policy; the level of discounting determines the urgency of actions both to mitigate and to adapt to climate change (cf. Dietz et al. 2007; Godard 2009; Wahba and Hope 2006). With high rates of discounting, future generations' harms have less weight in decision-making, whereas low rates of discounting raise the valuation of future utility. However, discounting has been objected to on grounds both descriptive (Frederick et al. 2002) and normative (Broome 2005; Gardiner 2011; Parfit 1986; Ramsey 1928).

In this presentation, I argue that on normative grounds a (non-zero) social discount rate is defensible. I do not intend to show that any particular discount rate is correct. Instead, I think they are highly context-dependent, with epistemic access being a primary contextually salient factor. It is both normatively and rationally defensible to discount intergenerationally due to the possibility of future radical societal reconstruction, including the possibilities (a) that future generations do not exist; (b) are not Earth-bound; or (c) have radically different needs (e.g. transhumanism). The appropriate discount depends on the actions or policies being evaluated as well as the epistemic reasons. I also consider objections by Parfit and Broome.

I also consider objections by Parfit and Broome. Parfit's objection is that it is immoral to discount the utility of other individuals simply in virtue of the fact that they are temporally distant. Broome's objection is that discounting introduces objectionable time-relativity into judgments of goodness. I respond that intergenerational discounting is not a moral judgment of the value of future generations, but instead a decision-making heuristic. Thus, it is not problematic to have temporal relativity, since our epistemic position towards the past (certainty) is different from the past's position towards the present (risk or uncertainty).

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Conclusions from a Project on Meat Production and Climate Change

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Between 2009 and 2012 a team consisting of ethicists and veterinarians carried out a project funded by the Swedish Research Council. The title was "Meat production and climate change: an ethical investigation". A basic presumption in the project was that meat production contributes to climate change by emissions of various greenhouse gases. The project consisted of two parts, one empirical and one theoretical.

The empirical part was an interview study with representatives of twelve Swedish stakeholders on how to mitigate climate change to the extent it is caused by meat production. The stakeholders included meat producer organisations, governmental agencies with direct influence on meat production, political parties and non-governmental organisations. As expected, the views reflected the interests of the organisations. There was agreement on many issues. Regarding meat production, several organisations argued against the mitigation option of reducing beef production despite the higher greenhouse gas intensity of beef compared to pork and chicken meat (according to life cycle analysis). Regarding meat consumption, several organisations proposed that we should throw away less food as waste and eat less meat but the "best" (most climate-friendly) meat, which was considered to be Swedish meat in contrast to imported meat. Most disagreement was found regarding political steering. We considered many of the stakeholders' mitigation proposals acceptable, although we were to some extent critical to their defence of Swedish beef production. We also criticized the suggestion to reduce consumption of imported meat but not of domestically produced meat.

In the theoretical part of the project, we analysed topical literature and presented certain normative proposals. We found three different types of views on the nature and scale of the impact of meat production on climate change: the life cycle model, the complex impact model and the additional emissions model. Moreover, we investigated various mitigation approaches such as different technological solutions and more or less radical proposals for reduction of livestock numbers. We also identified various ethical aspects of the mitigation approaches, e.g., intergenerational justice, intragenerational justice, feasibility, and political steering. We argued in favour of the view—on which many different ethical approaches converge—that the present generation has a moral obligation to mitigate climate change for the benefit of future generations (intergenerational justice) and that developed countries should take the lead in the process (intragenerational justice). Moreover, we stressed that mitigation measures should be undertaken not only in, for example, the transport and energy sectors, but also in the livestock sector, although the relative contribution to climate change by the livestock sector may vary substantially from one country to another. However, since technological solutions seem insufficient in this sector, this leaves us with the option of reduced meat production and meat consumption. In order to reach significant results in mitigation of climate change to the extent it is caused by meat production, political steering seems necessary. For example, it might be necessary with a tax on meat consumption, although there seems to be great resistance to such a tax among many stakeholders, as indicated by the interview study.

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The Reformed and Evangelical Doctrine of Total Depravity and Ecological Wisdom

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In ecological ethics there is an ongoing debate about the place and role of humanity in nature. Based on the Bible, the classical Reformed worldview provides us with a unique type of soft anthropocentrism and yet it is very critical about the contemporary “turn to nature”, egalitarian biocentrism (J. Cobb) or even some types of theocentric panentheism (J. Moltmann). The Reformed and evangelical tradition positions ‘man-under-God’ as lord over temporal creation: God made the world for his own glory and for man’s use and sustenance (A. Auer, P. Nullens). Humanity has fallen away from God’s purpose and is sinful, arrogant and full of greed. Humanity is inclined to all evil (Heidelberg Catechism Q8). Because of the fall we do not faithfully tend the world with care, but instead we ravage and plunder it (F. Schaeffer).

Reformed and evangelical Christians remain committed to this hierarchical worldview, man under God, nature under man. The importance and impact of the evangelical worldview on the ecological discourse worldwide should not be underestimated and requires more attention (J. Simmons). Unfortunately, this Reformed anthropology, which might be theologically correct, has often been misappropriated in order to morally justify greed and an exploitation of the earth (and subsequently our fellow human beings). This paper agrees with the basic doctrinal outset of Reformed evangelicalism, but calls for some important nuances and moral consequences. Comparable to the attempt of the conservative philosopher Roger Scruton, I want to demonstrate from a moral theological perspective how a conservative and in particular a negative appraisal of human capacities can foster ecological wisdom and realism. In this paper I want to limit myself to the Reformed and evangelical (Wesleyan) doctrine of total depravity. The doctrine of sin should not be misused for ecological pessimism and moral apathy but on the contrary, it can be a rich source of green intelligence (D. Coleman).

First we have to understand Calvin’s stress on the depravity or even perversion of humanity. Man is mastered by sin and in deep need for salvation. However, in humanity there remains a divine spark. He makes a distinction between the natural and the spiritual. Due to the fall, man is totally deprived of spiritual gifts and corrupted in natural gifts. There is this tension between Calvin’s doctrine of total perversity and his doctrine of a divine remnant in the *imago dei* (T.F. Torrance). Providentially God maintains order in the world and blesses those who cultivate virtue and justice. Perversion doesn’t mean annihilation and total distortion. In fact, I submit that ecological wisdom should be considered as a divine act of God’s providence against the powers of sin in the world.

Yet, this realistic, albeit pessimistic, view of humanity calls for caution about any form of technological (J. Ellul) as well as ecological utopianism (S. Furfari). Theologically speaking both extremes are contemporary forms of idolatry. Since idolatry is deeply rooted in our perverted nature, we are called to continuous caution about utopic solutions. The philosophical consequences of idolatry are distortions of our value system (M. Scheler) and they are manifested in an estrangement of person from God, nature, and our fellow human beings.

The doctrine of perversity is also important for an ecological virtue ethics. Traditionally there has been a close connection between virtue ethics and the human inclination to evil (A. Kinneging). The notion of sin and greed requires a condemnation of selfish consumerism and a continuous nourishment of the green virtue of contentment. Sin is not so much a

mistake, or a simple lack of goodness. It is an active power within us. Therefore the virtue of contentment requires a continuous ascetic practice – which assumes daily practices that nurture this contentment (cf. e.g. Jamie Smith's Cultural Liturgies series). Contentment and simplicity should become an integral part of Christian spirituality. Concern for the next generations and care for the earth must become an integral part of evangelical faith (Sider, Bouma-Prediger).

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From Knowledge to Action: Developing Sustainable Lifestyles in Response to Climate Change

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The alarm bells for ecocrises have been sounding for some time now. There is abundant literature—academic, scientific, policy pieces, as well as popular literature—detailing the decline in biodiversity, the loss of wild places and habitats, and a changing climate with all the attending affects to the health and sustainability of the planet and human populations worldwide. While continued monitoring of the health of our planet is necessary, along with literature conveying the scope of the problem, what is desperately needed now are creative solutions that inspire individuals and communities to respond willfully and optimistically to confronting the staggering challenges raised by global climate change. All too often the response to dire predictions of endangered natural resources, climatic disruption, and ecosystem collapse is a kind of shock-induced paralysis. The problem we face is not that people are unaware of, or unconcerned about the threats posed by climate change (although certainly there are such people), but rather that it is difficult to make the lifestyle changes that are needed to ensure a healthy and secure planet for future generations. This paper brings interdisciplinary (but primarily philosophical) literature on the problem of moral motivation to bear on the issue of inspiring people to make the transition from simply knowing about climate change to consciously adopting habits and making choices that can facilitate a more sustainable lifestyle.

Since at least the time of Socrates, philosophers have questioned whether *knowing* the good is sufficient to doing or pursuing that good. In the *Protagoras*, Socrates claims that knowing the good or best course of action is sufficient to doing it—that is, no one could know the right course of action and then pursue some other course. A person who says “I know I should ride my bicycle to work rather than drive,” but then proceeds to drive, is not demonstrating a weakness of the will according to Socrates, but rather is ignorant or confused as to what really is the best course of action. Other philosophers, most famously David Hume, contest that a moral belief is insufficient to inspire action—the individual must also *desire* to do the good.

A Humean might suggest that in regards to climate change, people know they ought to do something, but as of yet, have not been sufficiently motivated to act on that knowledge. The tone of some climate change literature appears to embrace the Socratic position, however, assuming that telling people about climate change is sufficient to inspire individuals to take action, or at least inspire policy makers to implement effective laws that will require individuals to take appropriate actions. In the life of Aldo Leopold, who has been heralded as the father of the American conservation movement, we can witness a movement from the Socratic view to the Humean view. Earlier in his life, Leopold became actively engaged in politics and political action with the goal of promoting environmental conservation efforts. Later, becoming frustrated with the failures of political action, he concluded that without feelings of love and respect towards the natural world, landowners and other citizens would not be inspired to commit themselves to environmentally responsible actions when such actions conflicted with their self-interests. He went on to develop his famous *Land Ethic*, which is founded on the idea that, “We can be ethical only in relation to something we can see, feel, understand, love, or otherwise have faith in.” Consequently, without cultivating such feelings towards the environment, we will not be inspired to act ethically in relation to it, even if on some level we know that we ought to. This paper engages the question of how we can inspire diverse individuals and communities in the 21st century to develop a more ethical relationship to the natural world, and in so doing, to future generations who will depend upon it.

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Conceptual Frameworks and Climate Change: (Re-)Framing the Debate

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Along with empirical science and its predictive models, critical to the discussions over climate change are the conceptual frameworks by which the public understands both climate and climate change. Some widespread understandings – e.g., that the scientific jury (as reflected in e.g. peer-reviewed publications) remains out on whether or not human-mediated climate change is happening – are simply wrong. Others – e.g., a tendency to frame climate change solely in terms of global warming, while ignoring such converging issues as resource sustainability, deforestation, loss of species, loss of terrestrial biomass, acidification of the oceans, pollution-related health issues, human population pressures, etc. – are not so much wrong as, arguably, misleading and unhelpful; fed, in part, by the way scientific findings filter through to public perceptions. By any scientific measure, these other issues are *not* tangential to climate change: collectively, they suggest that, unless the human species radically changes the ways in which it engages with its environment, it faces threats up to and including its continued existence. Our examinations to date of the geological record lead us to the conclusion that all species, sooner or later, go extinct, often sooner than later; in any case, continued existence of the species cannot simply be taken for granted. Assumptions that the species *will* continue, no matter what, seem to reflect a more general conceptual bias toward assuming that the way things are (or the way they are understood to be) is, *ceteris paribus*, the way they will continue.

My own background is not in climate science but theoretical philosophy: in particular, that sub-area of philosophy of mind known as *theories of concepts*, where concepts are, roughly speaking, the building blocks of structured thought (or, equally, those abilities by which certain agents are able to think systematically, productively, and compositionally). Using the framework of Peter Gärdenfors' (2004) *conceptual spaces theory* – based, in part, on Eleanor Rosch's pioneering work (1999, 1975) on prototypes – and my own (2013a, 2013b, 2011) *unified conceptual space theory*, which serves as an extension of conceptual spaces theory, I argue that an analysis of conceptual frameworks can be helpful both for understanding contemporary public debate and reframing that debate in ways that bring it more in line with climate-change science: an exercise in practical, hands-on philosophy with a potentially highly visible impact on people's everyday lives and the ways they reflect on and go about their interactions with their physical and social environment. Such analysis can help to modify inaccurate and misleading conceptual frameworks and, in the limit, lead to a kind of *radical re-conceptualization*: my name (2013c) for a generalization on Thomas Kuhn's (1990, 1970) notion of paradigm shifts. Something like the Pyrrhonian agenda of exploiting the weaknesses and contradictions in existing conceptual frameworks (Lind 2013) is needed in order to break them down and allow new frameworks to take their place. In a slogan: ideas are often the most powerful tools for bringing change.

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The Last Man Argument Revisited

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Imagine that you are the last person on Earth. The rest of mankind has been eradicated, perhaps as the result of some disaster. What would you do? What should you do? Are there things you ought not to do? This situation figures in an ingenious thought experiment designed to show that nature is valuable not just in an instrumental sense, but also has some non-instrumental value. The argument is known as the Last Man Argument and was introduced by Richard Routley in 1973. Routley asks us to imagine that,

[t]he last man (or person) surviving the collapse of the world system lays about him, eliminating, as far as he can, every living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly if you like, as at the best abattoirs). What he does is quite permissible according to basic chauvinism, but on environmental grounds what he does is wrong. (Routley 1973:487)

Routley's term "chauvinism" is synonymous with what today is called "anthropocentrism". If nature has some non-instrumental value then the traditional anthropocentric approach to ethics is mistaken. Humans, and other sentient beings, are not the only entities that are of direct moral importance.

Since the 1970s, the Last Man Argument has been a stock example in the literature on environmental ethics. One commentator describes Routley's original paper as "extremely seminal" and the argument is cited in a number of textbooks, reprinted in collections, and has been adopted and altered by several authors for a wide range of purposes. Robin Attfield, for instance, presents two different scenarios. In the first scenario, Last Man knows that all life is about to be destroyed by a nuclear holocaust. Himself being the only remaining sentient organism, he has the ability to destroy earth's remaining resources of diamond. By hypothesis, no sentient life will appear in the future. "[T]he answer is surely that there is nothing wrong with this act, morally indifferent as I should certainly recognize it to be. The world would not through his act be any the poorer." This version of the argument is intended to show that *diversity* is *not* valuable in a non-instrumental sense or, in Attfield's terms, "intrinsically desirable". (For Attfield, "diversity" means that the world contains more kinds of things rather than less. Thus, a world from which all diamonds, or granite rocks, or blue things, is removed is less diverse than a similar world containing those things.)

Attfield's second scenario is like the first, but instead of trashing diamonds, Last Man considers hewing down the last tree of its kind, "a hitherto healthy elm which has survived the nuclear explosions and which could propagate its kind if left unassaulted". According to Attfield, our considered moral intuition in the second scenario differs from that in the first: "Most people [...] would, I believe, conclude that the world would be the poorer for this act of the 'last man' and that it would be wrong". Attfield concludes that the interests of trees, unlike destructive events that affect diamonds, are of moral significance.

Despite all these extensive discussions of the Last Man Argument, the argument itself has arguably received less critical scrutiny than it deserves. Does it really show what it purports to show? In this article it will be argued that the Last Man Argument is not as convincing as it is often thought to be. Briefly put, the problem is that the argument, if reworked and applied to other slightly different but morally equivalent scenarios, triggers different intuitions. The argument is not robust. Intuitions about Last Man's behavior can be explained by precepts about his character traits and motives, and other considerations that have nothing to do with the value of natural objects. The axiological claim that nature has non-instrumental value therefore remains unaffected by the argument.

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How Sufficiencyarianism Can Help Us Improve Our Accounts of Precaution

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This paper aims to improve on some prominent, recent and substantively strong precautionary approaches, Stephen Gardiner's (2006) and Henry Shue's (2010). This improvement also leads to progress, I argue, concerning the integration of future-related considerations into human rights.

Precautionary approaches elucidate which actions should be taken to avoid future bads, given that such actions can be costly to the performing agents and to causes that could have been addressed instead. Gardiner's and Shue's precautionary accounts face problems concerning both scope and content: they do not cover all the situations that we'd want precautionary approaches to address, and they sometimes deal implausibly with the situations they do address. These defects could be remedied, I argue, by drawing on a suitable *sufficiencyarianism* – an approach to justice which holds that the reasons to benefit persons shift importantly (in weight and kind) after some threshold level of goods has been secured (cf. Shields 2012).

What improvements, more specifically, does sufficiencyarianism offer? *First*, Gardiner argues for a 'Rawlsian core precautionary principle', which requires us to adopt a maximin strategy, *i.e.*, to choose the option where the worst possible outcome is, comparatively, best. At least, we would have to do this if certain conditions are fulfilled. One is that we have good reason to care a lot about realizing the best worst outcome. However, when is this so? Gardiner does not tell us. Shue, whose approach speaks to cases of 'massive loss', could be helpful here. However, I will suggest that we can do still better with an appropriate sufficiencyarian account. *Second*, one other condition that Gardiner mentions for maximin to apply is that we care *relatively little* for what we lose by realizing the best minimum. However, what produces a more plausible precautionary approach: an absolute or a relative reading of this condition? (Absolutely, 'relatively little' is understood as 'not all that much'. Relatively –which is closer to Gardiner– it means 'little compared to what we care for the gains'.) Once more, sufficiencyarianism can help us see more clearly which reading is best; and, more important still, it does –different from Gardiner and Shue– address cases where we care *relatively much* about what we lose, or what third parties lose. *Third*, Gardiner's maximin approach applies to cases of uncertainty only. However, what about cases of risk, where at least rough probabilities *are* known? Shue argues that those probabilities ought sometimes to be disregarded. This may be plausible where massive losses confront trivial losses. But it is certainly implausible in some other cases. Again, a plausible sufficiencyarianism can help to illuminate just when probabilities may (not) be disregarded.

Clearly, this paper cannot try fully to develop an improved precautionary approach. Instead I want argue for the fruitfulness of a certain direction of research. The paper will also discuss certain difficulties, for example, that it seems crucial for the prospects of sufficiencyarianism that we can determine, in certain contexts, a more concrete and plausible threshold of goods (cf. Casal 2007).

Finally, the paper will exploit a philosophical opportunity: it will mobilize a more sufficiencyarian precautionary approach to improve our accounts of *human rights*. Human rights, in many respects the globally dominant discourse about (broadly speaking) justice issues, grapple with how to integrate intergenerational considerations. One particularly urgent problem is how to set priorities between present and future. A suitable sufficiencyarianism, I will say, can reconstruct the discourse of human rights without 'changing the subject' (Griffin 2008; cf. Beitz 2009). If so, human rights can benefit from what sufficiencyarianism has to offer concerning the integration of future generations and concerning priority-setting between the present and the future.

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Irreversible Social Change

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One of the ethical problems with global climate change is that it is not only accompanied by ecosystem changes that are detrimental to our wellbeing, but also that some of those changes are *irreversible*, such as species going extinct through habitat loss. Environmental ethicists have claimed that this irreversibility is an extra, moral, reason to prevent irreversible damage (climate change, species loss) over and above reasons concerning the value of what is lost in the change (cf. Dobson 1998). This special treatment of irreversibility is for example made explicit in the precautionary principle as stated in the UN Rio Declaration (UN 1992, Principle 15), which claims that lack of full scientific certainty is no reason to postpone taking action against ‘threats of serious or irreversible damage’. In a similar vein, economists have suggested that valuing irreversible damages cannot adequately be done by standard cost-benefit analysis and requires other principles, such as the Safe Minimum Standard (Bishop 1978).

Interestingly, the notion of irreversible damage is usually tied to *ecological* changes. Those changes can lead to loss of value either because the process disrupted or species lost has intrinsic value, or because it is of instrumental value to us (Norton 2005, Chapter 5; McShane 2012). In this paper we propose that the notion can, and should, also be applied to *social* changes, such as damage to institutions, cultures or social relations. Social institutions can be valuable for the same reasons as ecological processes or species: they can be intrinsically valuable, e.g. as part of a cultural identity or heritage, and instrumentally valuable, e.g. through supporting the economy or maintaining and updating local knowledge, enabling a community’s long-term survival (Norton 2005, chapter 2). Moreover, irreversible environmental and social changes can be closely tied, such as when soil degradation or sea level rise enforces lifestyle adaptation. Yet the importance of social structures for sustainable development tends to be undervalued (cf. Adger et al. 2009).

In this paper we examine the applicability of the notion of irreversible change to social structures. As a theoretical framework we use Habermas’s concept of ‘colonisation of the lifeworld’ (Habermas 1985/1987) to help explicate some of the drivers for irreversible social change, and articulate what can be lost in this change. More specifically, in the first part of our paper we work out a notion of social irreversibility and compare it to notions of ecological irreversibility (e.g. Verbruggen 2013). We argue that irreversible social damages may have physical causes (such as a language dying with its last speaker) and social causes (such as a law coming into effect), yet that both can count as irreversible. We also argue that, as with ecological irreversibility, social irreversibility gives us a moral reason for action in itself, and a moral reason for going beyond cost-benefit analysis when evaluating such changes economically.

In the second part of our paper we conduct a case study on irreversible social changes brought about in Tanzania by the global biofuel trade. Academic studies on the impact of the biofuel trade have largely focused on economic and environmental impacts (Ribeiro 2013), whereas local communities are also very much concerned about social impacts and distortion of the social fabric (Amigun et al. 2011). In particular, we argue that past land acquisition projects for biofuel projects have led to socially irreversible damages, and that many decisions to discontinue biofuel projects have not adequately taken into account the potential for irreversible social damages for local smallholder farmers. We close by offering recommendations on how policy-makers and investors in the global biofuel chain could take

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Individual Responsibility and Climate Change: Beyond Selfishness and Altruism

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The question whether cutting GHG emissions is a moral responsibility of governments or of individuals has been the centre of a recent debate among moral philosophers. While some insist that governments ought to work on a more serious and legally binding GHG reduction plan, since individual efforts cannot arguably obtain any significant effect on climate change, and therefore individuals cannot be held morally responsible for not reducing their emissions since what they do is basically moot (Sinnot-Armstrong 2005; Johnson 2003, 2011), others have oppositely claimed that also individual emissions may in fact cause a great damage (Nolt 2011), and individuals have therefore a responsibility to cut GHG emissions (Hourdequin 2010, 2011; Baatz 2013).

But what ought the individual practically do? As Caney (2012) has shown, the individual cannot be held morally responsible for an equal emission cut based on the principle of “equal share of emissions”, since people in fact have different emission-needs: terminally ill people need more emissions than others, so do people living in cold regions of the world.

Echoing Shue’s distinction between “subsistence” and “luxury” emissions (Shue 1993), I will distinguish between three kinds of individual emissions: 1. Non reducible; 2. Reducible with high economic or personal costs; 3. Reducible with low personal and economic costs. I will argue that individuals can be held responsible for a cut of just the third kind’s. It remains to discuss the moral basis of such responsibility.

The consequentialist argument may be advocated, arguing that emissions produced by a single individual will never have relevant effects on the state of affairs. Yet this is not completely true. Such argument considers individual actions as if autonomously taken, as if adopted and performed in isolation. Yet, the behaviours that are mostly responsible of unnecessary emissions are socially-rooted (those implying consumption and transport habits, lifestyle, etc.). Given the social nature of such behaviours, and given the well documented potential of social imitation, individuals cannot be considered as actors with such a minimal reciprocal influence. On the contrary, actions should be considered with their potential influence on friends, neighbours, family, etc. Small actions, or actions performed by few individuals, may in fact result in big effects (Gladwell 2000).

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Sustainability and Jewish Law?

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Why should we ask **Jewish law**, a mere niche subject, and a law system without territory for responses to questions of sustainability? Why should we look back to its tradition to find solutions for an open future?

There are many reasons. First of all people might feel the urge to take a look at what our **forefathers** thought. Religion, and foremost Jewish law with a history of more than **3,000 years**, offers a unique documentation of these thoughts, and related discussions. These are not limited to Biblical times though. What is mostly forgotten in Western Europe nowadays: Before the outbreak of **WWII** Jewish positions had a notable impact on parliamentary discussions in Germany and other European countries, inter alia concerning criminal law and land law. And these positions usually were of ethical nature because due to the diaspora and its non-territoriality the Jewish legal system was forced to develop primarily as a **system of ethics**. Especially during the **Middle Ages** as the advance of science informed by Aristotelian philosophy questioned the literally meaning and authority of the Bible, its legal commandments needed despite their divine origin an additional ethical or philosophical basis to keep the system alive and working as it already did not depend on state coercion, but on inner or social conviction. This basis developed through lengthy discussions led by scholars and rabbis on the major documents of Jewish law: **Mishnah, Talmud, and Midrash Halakhah**. The results made their way into codices and commentaries. With relatively small influence of industrial interests and every day politics that too often aim at short term goals Jewish law was able to think in **long terms**. Besides that there has been no separation between ethics and law in Jewish law which instead is a rather recent phenomenon of secularism. Jewish law still has the aim to make the people observing it morally “better” according to the divine values. Due to its tradition and the authority of the founding documents, people who deal with Jewish law always have to go back to the original sources and look for the inherent principles to adopt them to new circumstances by (re-)**interpretation**. These core values of Jewish law - free from mere religious rituals - even atheists can consider for their reflection on topics like sustainability, climate change, and intergenerational justice.

The next question is: **How can these values be realised?** The first answer of Jewish law is: by **education**. The obligation to educate is a central aspect of Jewish law and religion, and had a major impact on the development of Jewish ethics and discussion culture. Today religion is still playing an important role in education. And as a multiplier of ideas and a root of communal action it can help to revive a spiritual approach to questions of sustainability, bringing it back to the political and legal discourse where a technocratic approach prevails in most Western European societies. The second answer is: by **obligations**. The Western-secular approach sees humans as having (basic) rights which protect them from actions and non-actions of others and especially the state. Jewish law offers a methodologically different approach; instead of rights it is **obligation** based. In most cases this leads to less practical differences than one would expect, but the mindset is a different one. Besides that even in our Western legal cultures sustainability already is a question of duties, not of rights. Future generations and nature cannot “claim their rights” but are rather dependent on the good will and the self-imposed rules and obligations of the present generation. Jewish law has a long tradition and deep knowledge of how to formulate and establish a system of obligations. The legal implementation of ideas and concepts of sustainability is the place to use this knowledge. In the past Judaism has already proven being capable of making environmental policies, if certain rules are kept in mind during the process of adaptation. And it still has a lot of untapped potential.

In my presentation I will focus on the history and possibilities of **Jewish land law** by showing how a line can be drawn from the books of Moses to urban planning concepts applied in the 21st century and how the principles of Jewish land law can offer a fresh perspective on questions of land and sustainability.

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Carbon Leakage and the Argument From No Difference

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Critics of curbs on carbon emissions often argue they will simply prompt a rise in other countries' emissions, cancelling out any benefits. When presented as an excuse for continued emissions, such criticisms appeal to Jonathan Glover has called 'the argument from no difference': that is to say, 'If I don't do it, someone else will' (1975: 172). I assume—unrealistically—that carbon leakage can cancel out any emissions reductions that the industrialized countries make. The purpose is to examine the argument from no difference and identify where it goes wrong.

The paper considers at length one of Glover's examples, originally stated in greater detail by Bernard Williams (1973: 97-98), that of George the chemist, who badly needs a job, and is offered a post in a chemical weapons laboratory. He is told that if he does not accept, the job will go to another, less scrupulous chemist, who will likely make more progress in the research than George would. George's decision is structurally identical with the decision faced by rich emitters, at least to hear the *Wall Street Journal* tell the story. In both cases, performing the noxious action will not harm any of the victims, in the sense of making them worse off than they would otherwise have been. Indeed, they will be *better* off than if the agent's self-restraint leads another agent to perform the act instead.

I argue that the central objection to both actions is that they involve *unjust enrichment*. Even if George doesn't *harm* anyone, he earns a good salary from which he and his family benefit at the expense of the victims of chemical weapons. Similarly, Northern states have gained unjustly at the cost of others. They have used far more than their fair share of carbon emissions in the past, and they continue to benefit at the expense of other countries, species and generations (Gardiner 2011: 304-5; Page 2012). This does not prove that George should refuse the job, or that the rich countries should curb their emissions and allow them to go somewhere else. That would not prevent unjust enrichment—it would just mean that other agents would scoop the gains. Rather, the mistake of the argument from no difference is to assume that this justifies the status quo. If one cannot *prevent* unjust enrichment, the next best thing is to *rectify* it. Doing so often means compensating the victims, but it can also mean using the unjust gains to fight the injustice (Brooks 1989: 41-42). Having benefited from far more than their fair share of emissions, the rich countries are obliged to make restitution in the form of funds spent on mitigation and adaptation. It is widely agreed that in cases of unjust enrichment, one must compensate the victims only up to the point that one is no longer benefiting (Butts 2007: 142; Page 2012: 309-10). On this logic, high-emitting countries ought to fund mitigation and adaptation efforts to the point that they are no better off than if their emissions matched their fair share of total emissions around the world.

This sum is not possible to calculate exactly, but clearly it amounts to a lot. On one estimate, to achieve a worldwide 50% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions compared with the year 2000 could require sacrifices of up to 10% of consumption from some rich states by 2050. While side-payments may persuade poor states to join a climate regime, the cost of financing them could encourage rich states to defect (Pearson 2011: 182-83, 190-92). Eric Posner and David Weisbach have recently argued that any international climate agreement must leave all parties at least roughly as well off as they were before (2010). That would preclude redistribution from the rich countries on the scale that is morally obligatory. In the last part of the paper I argue that the North can and should fund its contribution by passing on much of the costs to its own future generations.

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In Search of an Open Future – Against an Unsustainable Society. Derrida’s Criticisms and Marcuse’s Alternatives

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In 1964, at the height of the Cold War, Herbert Marcuse published his widely read philosophical criticism of the ‘advanced industrial society’, under the title *One Dimensional Man*. After a period of neglect, this work is nowadays rediscovered, in protest circles like ‘occupy’, as well as academically. Many of Marcuse’s reflections might still be valid for present day society. Although we do not live in the conditions of the cold war any more, some main characteristics of modern society described in *One Dimensional Man* have survived, if not grown more outspoken.

After what Derrida has called the ‘noisiest gospel’ on the death of Marxism – Fukuyama’s *End of History*, we have not come to live in a brave new world without injustice. Despite the spread of belief in free markets, in capabilities, and in free development for men and women, poverty, tradition and inequalities in economic power still haunt human relations. In this world situation it seems inevitable that new protests and revolutions will come about. As Derrida suggests: we have tried to exorcise the specters of Marx, but in vain. In the pressures of what he called the ‘New International’ (comprised of ‘sans papiers’ as well as anarchistic hackers) we sense the unsustainability of the dominant ideology of freedom and growth.

Whereas Derrida is a critical writer, with a very keen eye towards the unsolved issues in modern society and its political institutions, its economical disasters and its more or less silent wars – Marcuse tried to show alternative approaches for these issues. Therefore it is worthwhile to revisit not only Derrida’s more recent, but also Marcuse’s older work, investigating the viability of his alternatives for the present situation.

In my paper I will research Derrida’s criticisms and Marcuse’s alternatives in light of the question whether they offer views of a more sustainable society. Important elements which I propose to discuss are:

- The interconnectedness of environmental and social sustainability
- The necessity to question what Marcuse has called ‘repressive desublimation’

Central to Marcuse’s proposal to open up the lost dimensions of humanity’s future is his idea that it is necessary to work towards the repression of repressive freedoms. I will try to assess the viability of this idea as a central one towards sustainability.

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Wild Things: Stories, Transition and the Sacred in Ecological Social Movements

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This paper examines the role of stories in ecological activism. It first situates stories inside object ecologies, encompassing relationships of reliance, care and maintenance of things. It suggests that ecologies of this sort work as an extended mind where our cognition takes place and meaning is apprehended, so that what we can think of is always a function of what we have 'at hand'.

The paper then considers how these ecologies are impacted by discourses on climate change and peak oil, which stress the impossibility to keep ordering our lives through the same entanglements that have supported them so far. A dissonance arises between the sort of demands and dependencies we are still subject to on a daily basis and the anticipation that those demands and dependencies shall not be able to endure. Stories of transition, which tread a middle ground between denial and collapse hysteria, dissipate this tension.

In so doing, they contribute to the growing of alternative sacred forms, working as attractors that constitute groups as moral collectives. These forms are woven through alternative entanglements of objects, bodies and other stories, providing determinate implication for action, from the indeterminacy of the unknowns of climate change and peak oil.

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The Most Dangerous Assumption in the Climate Change Debate: Neutrality and Future Generations

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This paper examines the debate on the ethics of policy-making in the context of the intergenerational problem of climate change.

Part 1 considers an assumption that is implicit in much of the literature and which I call the Neutrality Assumption (NA). NA advances: firstly, that it is *possible* to draw concrete ethical conclusions on climate change whilst adopting a neutral approach to the good; secondly, that this neutral approach is *desirable*, since we need to take into account people living in the distant future, whose conceptions of the good we ignore and should not prejudge. Section 1.1 examines the role that NA has played in the extant literature, notably in (actual and expected) utility theories drawing on cost-benefit models inspired by economics. Section 1.2 argues that our ignorance concerning future generations only arbitrates in favour of adopting a neutral approach to the good if we operate within a framework of actual utilitarianism. However, expected utilitarianism is superior as a theory in the context of this debate, so it is legitimate for us to adopt a substantive approach to the good, subject to certain theoretical constraints. Section 1.3 argues that it is not possible to deliver concrete ethical conclusions or usable policy recommendations whilst relying on a genuinely neutral conception of the good. Indeed, purportedly neutral theories have, for this reason, tended implicitly to endorse a substantive conception of the good that is both highly questionable and surprisingly pervasive. In this conception, something is morally good to the extent that it contributes to well-being and the degree to which it contributes to well-being is shown by the equilibrium market value placed on it by purchasers and producers. Since much of our existing consumption and production is harmful in terms of emissions, this serves to promote the highly damaging belief that, by well-being we must mean here *precisely the type of well-being derived from the environmentally most damaging consumption and production*. This dangerously restricts the range of alternative policy scenarios that are taken into account in discussions of the intergenerational problem of climate change and has, in my view, unduly added to the sense that the problem is intractable.

Part 2. Section 2.1 argues that we should work with a substantive conception of well-being, one informed by current empirical research in psychology. Section 2.2 argues that this substantive conception enables us to replace the blanket approach to consumption with a more discriminating theoretical approach which emphasises the idea that different forms of human activity (including, but not limited to, different forms of consumption, labour and production) have different environmental and well-being impacts. I therefore posit a new theoretical tool: the notion of a *consumption elasticity of well-being*, which captures the degree to which levels of well-being vary with respect to changes in the consumption levels of different types of commodities. Section 2.3 uses the literature from empirical psychology to explore the idea that we are, in developed countries, close to a situation of zero marginal well-being *for certain types of consumption*: we are at the flattened end of the curve of diminishing marginal well-being for these types of consumption, so that further increases to our well-being are compatible with falls in these types of consumption. By refocusing our ethical policy goals on well-being (rather than on consumption or economic growth as such), we are now able to consider policy scenarios that involve *reorienting* the economy away from those sectors and industries that are environmentally most damaging and do not make significant contributions to well-being and towards the promotion of those sectors of the economy (e.g. physical and psychological health), those human activities (e.g. social engagement, leisure, education and training) and those legislative frameworks (e.g. equality

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Carbon Emission Rights in the Context of Climate Change

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The question of how to distribute Greenhouse gas emission rights is one of the crucial topics in discussions about global climate change. The growing use of market-based instruments has led to the evolution of the concept of “carbon emission rights” which, while poorly defined, is important in terms of policy design, jurisdiction and justice. Rather than focusing on the argument of why we have (or don't have) the right to emit carbon dioxide, this paper instead aims at clarifying the nature of these emission rights. For instance, can this notion be regarded as an extension of that of property right? Is it a new legal right or just a tradable commodity, allowance or permit? Determining the meaning or value of Greenhouse gas emission is a necessary starting point to determining its rightful distribution, and we will make the comparison with other common resources. Furthermore, we will present and justify various forms of emission rights according to different forms of resource control and management.

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Sustainability politics and the liberal dilemma

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In this paper we shall have a closer look at the capability of liberal democracy to deal with sustainability politics. Questions of sustainability relate to different kind of natural and human resources, among them the capability resources to deal with governance of natural resources. In this perspective we shall look at liberal democratic governance as a human resource, and the efforts trying to solve the problems of e.g. over-consumption and unequal sharing of non-human natural resources.

Here we ask to what extent sustainability as such is compatible with liberal democracy. As a preliminary we will assume that sustainability politics will impose constraints on people in ways that delimit the range of consumption choices to them. The key question is then: is there a real antinomy that cannot be dissolved within a liberal democratic regime? If there is, then the conclusion seems to be that there are antinomies in liberal democracy such that it is incompatible with sustainability politics. Another way of considering this problem is based on the suspicion that democracy is used as legitimation of sustainability.

In outlining the argument I shall look into the Norwegian philosopher Hans Skjervheim's discussion of "the liberal dilemma". Skjervheim's main context of reference is liberal freedoms, like tolerance and freedom of religion. In this paper I shall examine his basic argument in a slightly different context, having to do with freedom of consumption, and discuss whether liberalism runs victim to the claim that constraints of freedom implies intolerance, and hence is incompatible with the basic claims of liberal democracy.

Stating that e.g. religion is a private matter does not imply that this statement itself is conceived as a private matter, but rather as a general principle (Skjervheim 1968). The moral concern is that liberalism is here understood as a position beyond all competing ideologies. Translated into the context of a multicultural community, stating that religion is a private matter was meant by the left wings to indicate a tolerant and inclusive society. However, the utterance that religion is a private matter actually seems to counter a secularised, liberal and democratic viewpoint. In Skjervheim's words the problem consists in the following: "When the liberal principles are turned absolute they are transformed to illiberalism" (Skjervheim 1968, author's transl.). In our context this translates into a question whether turning the question of sustainability into a private matter implies illiberalism.

Skjervheim's claim is that liberalism carries with itself its own caricature by acting as superior to competing positions in the debate. This is the liberal dilemma, or inherent antinomy in liberal democracy. One important premise in Skjervheim's argument is that there is no such thing as a superior neutral position. This interpretation of liberalism has, however, been countered by e.g. Gunnar Skirbekk (2004). In a philosophical and intellectual context – although perhaps not in a political context – there is such a neutral position, conceived as discursive rationality committing itself to the better argument, including the belief that all people are reasonable and fallible. This is Habermas' position, as well. Within the multicultural debate on tolerance this debate is about tolerance and limits to value pluralism.

Likewise, we may ask whether sustainability of natural resources represent a value comparable to religion and other basic liberal values. If the answer is affirmative (which I shall argue that it is), one could argue with Skjervheim that the liberal dilemma prevails, i.e. speaking of sustainability as if it were a private matter while in fact it is not. The main question then amounts to whether liberal democracy is being used as legitimation of

sustainability. Even so, it still remains to decide whether we shall have to choose between illiberalism and sustainability.

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Environmental Pragmatism and the Objection from Impracticality

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Within the environmental ethical debate, there is the view that ethicists have traditionally focused too much on theoretical aspects of morality – such as on what makes acts right/wrong, and what makes things good/bad. On this view, ethicists have thus neglected the practical aim of morality – i.e. to help us determine which particular acts to perform in concrete situations. They have also overlooked the fact that they could anyway contribute to the resolution of environmental problems when there is overlapping consensus on what should be done. Environmental Pragmatism (EP) is a reaction to this predominant theoretical focus in ethics – motivated by the urgent need of solutions to environmental problems. The chief aim of EP is to make environmental ethics more practically relevant for environmental policy making, and so in mainly two ways: (i) by offering a new substantive ethic that is more practically helpful than traditional ethical theories, and (ii) by supplementing existing ethical theories with a method that can be used to promote environmental friendly policies. In this paper, I argue that both of these attempts of EP are themselves practically problematic, as they fail to meet the practicality standard implicitly presumed in EP. Although EP is troublesome also for theoretical reasons, I claim that this practicality objection singly undermines the legitimacy of the position in the environmental ethical debate.

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Human Beings as Masters over Nature: The Relevance of Bonhoeffer's Anthropocentrism for Environmental Ethics

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A central issue in environmental ethics is whether there can be a non-anthropocentric environmental ethic. Anthropocentrism is often criticized for bearing responsibility for the present ecological crisis. Instead, ecologists try to develop non-anthropocentric accounts of nature (cf. Callicott 1984). There are, however, also ecologists who are critical of non-anthropocentrism and of the arguments used to back it up (cf. Katz, 1999). There are also theologians who continue to see anthropocentrism as the proper way of conceiving the relationship between human beings and nature (cf. Hall 2004). In this paper I seek to strengthen the case for anthropocentrism by researching the theology of nature of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. I will focus on his exegetical lectures on Genesis 1-3 (Bonhoeffer 2007). There he gives an account of nature that is in line with the traditional Christian understanding of the place of human beings in creation, while also providing great openings for environmental ethics. I will present four major themes in his theology of nature that have relevance for environmental ethics.

The first theme is Bonhoeffer's contention that nature itself is valuable to God apart from human beings. Although he does not develop a fully theocentric approach to nature, the relative independence of nature forms the necessary context for his anthropocentrism, which as a result is not a total or 'strong' anthropocentrism but rather a weak anthropocentrism. This connects with Brian Norton's well-known call for weak anthropocentrism as a viable framework for environmental ethics (Norton 1984).

Secondly, Bonhoeffer insists on the fundamental bodily form of human existence: human life is *earthly* life, he asserts. This notion is highly relevant in today's debates in environmental ethics – many ecologists stress the importance of our physical bond with nature (cf. Conradie 2005). Bonhoeffer is unique in combining this stress on embodied existence with his anthropocentric outlook on nature.

The third theme is Bonhoeffer's anthropocentric approach to nature. He argues for the special status of human beings in creation. According to him, it is the fact that human beings are created in freedom, with the capacity to enter into relationships of responsibility, that sets them apart from non-human beings. This is a novel conception of the *imago Dei*, and it connects with the widespread recognition of the fact that the environmental crisis is also a social crisis – social problems help create it, and the crisis in turn leads to more social problems (cf. Bookchin 2005). Bonhoeffer's theology of sociality can help to address these problems.

The fourth theme is Bonhoeffer's insistence that human beings are the rulers over nature. Such a claim is contested – it is believed that the imagery of mastery has played an important role in creating the environmental crisis. The way Bonhoeffer conceptualizes this mastery, however, is different from how it is often understood. He is critical of dominating nature by the excessive use of technology, and at the same time he resists a sentimental approach to nature. In between these extremes he sketches his own approach in which God, human beings, non-human beings and the earth belong together and where human mastery over nature is not exercised by brute force, but by wise leadership. This connects well with recent proposals for a theology of nature (cf. Northcott 1996).

Taken together, these concepts can be an important source for Christian environmental ethics.

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Inevitability Ethics: Revisiting Eco-Authoritarianism

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In this paper, I will first articulate the position of eco-authoritarianism, with a specific focus on the work of William Ophuls then discuss the creation of an ethical calculus for how one ought to act in light of an undesirable situation that is ultimately inevitable.

In the 1970s, eco-authoritarians came out with the findings of their scientific and philosophical investigations. Among them, Ophuls, made claims both of the cause and the inevitable impacts of what our overconsumption has done. Rather than focusing solely on the Malthusian calculation of population versus resources, Ophuls finds that there is a multiplying force that increases consumption amongst certain populations. Rights increase both the capacity and the ability of individual consumption levels, as people are free to buy more products and have more money with which to purchase them.

Ophuls further argues that there will be a time in which the ecological impacts of our consumption will be catastrophically realized and that in this moment the political response will be equally dramatic. Population levels and rights will have to be severely tightened to deal with the decreased carrying capacity of the planet and will be done so though the establishment of a steady state.

The argument did not sit well throughout the environmentalist community that sought to prevent the effects of environmental degradation rather than deal with what was already happening. Even today, with the ineffectiveness of various democratic reforms and the continued destruction of the Earth's resources, it seems as if no one in the environmentalist movement wants to deal with what has always been inevitable. We still act as if we can have our freedoms and the planet too.

The arguments put forth against the eco-authoritarian proposals are focused on the immorality of their position. Essentially the claim is that institutions such as democracy are good and that taking away rights is wrong. However, this is an incredibly shortsighted point of view that does not account for how ethics can and must be temporally situated.

Ophuls and his companions do not merely suggest the steady state as the solution but rather recognize that it is the inevitability that is to come. Eco-authoritarians do not have to like their conclusions to admit they are true, and in fact most do not. A steady state is not a proposal; it is what is to come. Perhaps rights should not be limited but they will be.

The question of inevitability and its effect on ethical considerations is overlooked by the mainstream of the environmental movement. The ethical question no longer has an answer that can stop the political and environmental events that are looming just ahead, if indeed they ever did.

Rather, our focus must now be on the aftermath of the event. If one cannot stop what is coming, their acts must be focused on making the best possible outcome. Only this kind of predictive thinking can allow for the preservation of those things and ideals held most dear.

Ironically, those that refuse to embrace the ethical calculus put forth because of its sacrificial nature are the greatest threat to what they fear losing. The steady state will threaten the consensus morality, but to fail to make the transition to it will only make the inevitable shift that much more dramatic. Every delay to the transition means more environmental consumption and degradation. The result is a harsher aftermath and a stricter government. Most simply, the more rights and freedoms we have now, the fewer we will have later.

This ethical paradigm, which is neither deontological nor strictly utilitarian, is the only one that takes advantage of the predictive mechanisms that are now at our disposal. Scientific and technological advancements have increased both our capability for foresight and the accuracy of our projections. In addition, they have created situations that are beyond the capacity of ethical philosophies created centuries ago. The question of inevitability is not simply an environmental consideration but also affects our ethical decisions dealing with such things as euthanasia. Without addressing what will or at least what will almost certainly happen, our actions are always inherently shortsighted risking undesirable consequences and nihilism towards, if not the promotion of, events that risk the very ideals that formulate our basic ethical principles in the first place.

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Shall I Cooperate? Duties for Individuals Arising from Climate Change and the Capacity of Utilitarianism to Solve Collective Action Problems

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Is an individual agent morally required to participate in measures to reduce CO₂ emissions, even if these measures will come at a cost to the individual while their effect on alleviating climate change seems trivial or non-existent? For instance, do I have the duty to minimise car driving? Imagine that not using my car would make commuting more inconvenient and time consuming for me, while leaving my car in the garage would reduce the overall emission of CO₂ by at best a tiny bit, and would very likely not make any remarkable difference to the climate. Would I still have a duty to cooperate?

On the face of it, the concern about CO₂ emission and climate change seems to be a concern about the consequences of our actions. Therefore, one should expect that consequentialist moral theories, such as act-utilitarianism be well equipped to deal with these problems. However, collective action problems have been identified as posing a major challenge to utilitarianism (Regan 1980). Do these problems defeat utilitarianism? Does utilitarianism require non-cooperation in huge collective action problems, where every individual's action makes only a minor difference to the outcome, if at all? This problem is also relevant for all other versions of consequentialist ethics, and also for non-consequentialists (Nefsky 2012). Is it possible to morally criticise individual actions because of their consequences, when these actions do not make any difference to the overall outcome? If a consequentialist moral theory does not require our contribution to collective efforts to mitigate climate change, what consequences would this have?

This discussion is not new (Parfit 1986, Regan 1980, Glover 1975). Parfit famously pointed out that one should not ignore even small chances of one's act bringing about a benefit, if that *benefit is large enough* to outweigh the small likelihood of its being realised. Parfit also discussed scenarios in which individual acts do not even have a tiny chance of having a large impact. In these cases, while the consequences of each individual act are trivial, the result of a group of people acting in a certain way is said to be significant. Parfit's way of dealing with collective harm or benefit cases has both gained support and inspired criticism (Vanderheiden 2006, Eggleston 2003, Gruzalski 1986, Shrader-Frchette 1987). At times it seems that Parfit addresses the problem on the level of single actions, other times he clearly focuses on sets of actions and group action instead. The convincingness of each of these strategies is controversial (Regan, 1980). Furthermore, it is unclear whether the latter strategy is compatible with act-utilitarianism (Nolt 2011, Kagan 2011).

The discussion about act utilitarianism and individual responsibilities in collective harm and benefit cases has recently been revived with regard to climate change (Sinnott-Armstrong 2005, Hiller 2011, Kagan 2011, Nefsky 2012). Sinnott-Armstrong (2005, 29) argues that individual car drives are no cause of climate change or of the damage caused by climate change. Hiller (2011, 349), on the other hand, counters that even single actions do have a negative impact. Vanderheiden (2006) sides with Hiller, claiming that Parfit has long solved this problem. Others, per contrast, are still convinced that the problem is unsolvable within act-utilitarianism (Jamieson 2007). It is thus controversial whether or not act-utilitarianism requires cooperation in collective harm and benefit cases.

Kagan (2011) and Nefsky (2012) have recently brought forward interesting contributions to this debate. According to Kagan, act-utilitarianism requires cooperation in collective harm and benefit cases. According to Nefsky, however, this claim has not convincingly been established.

In my paper, I will review arguments by Parfit, Hiller, Vanderheiden, Singer, Kagan and others, which claim that act- utilitarianism requires cooperation in collective action cases, such as the alleviation of climate change. I will show why these arguments fail and conclude that these authors have not convincingly established that act-utilitarianism requires cooperation. I will end with a brief assessment of possible alternative ways of dealing with this challenge within utilitarianism.

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Sustainable Development in Between the Priority of the Right and the Priority of the Good: The Need for a Substantial but Incomprehensive Notion of the Good Within a Concept of SD

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Sustainable development (SD) constitutes a leading model for contemporary societal development. Liberalism aims at political institutions that are acceptable for proponents of different comprehensive conceptions of the good. My paper investigates how the concept of SD and this liberal principle of neutrality relate to each other: I demonstrate that a concept of SD necessarily needs to draw on certain notions regarding what it means to live a good human life and formally characterize such notions. Ultimately, I propose that such notions need to be more substantial than commonly assumed.

The first part of the paper presents a formal framework for conceptions of SD: SD has often been used as a catch-phrase. Different parties interpret the concept according to their interests. In so far as this is the case, the concept is no longer suited for orienting societal development. One way of responding consists in taking a meta-perspective: A *concept* of SD lists all those questions to which any *conception* of SD must provide answers (Dobson 2003; Norton 2005; Christen, Schmidt 2012).

I present a concept of SD which encompasses two main dimensions (cf. Christen, Schmidt 2012):

- The 'dimension of justice' specifies what we mean when we ask for intra- and intergenerational justice. Specifying this dimension necessitates arguing for a scope, metric and pattern of justice.
- The 'dimension of the circumstances of sustainability' specifies those natural and social conditions that are of relevance for our ability to meet claims for justice, that is natural and social capital.

The second part of the paper focuses on links between a concept of SD and ideas about what it means to live a good human life. First, I argue why specifying a metric and pattern of justice draws on ideas about a good human life.

Second, I discuss two concrete, action-guiding questions. I thereby demonstrate how answering such questions draws on certain ideas of a good human life. My examples refer to (i) distinguishing claims for nature protection from sustainability-based claims for the preservation of natural capital, and (ii) reasoning political measures aiming at getting individuals to take up (more) sustainable lifestyles.

Third, I offer a formal characterization of the account of the good required by a concept of SD. I argue that such an account needs to be compatible with the priority of the right (*sensu* Rawls 1988). Thus it needs to be 'incomprehensive' (cf. Rawls 1973, 1988; Nussbaum 1990).

Finally, I reason why the need for an incomprehensive but substantial conception of the good cannot be substituted for by public deliberation. I draw on another action-guiding sustainability problem, namely large-scale land acquisition in developing countries. I employ this example to show the need for specifying requirements that a deliberative process must meet in order to qualify as legitimate. Ultimately I argue that such specifications do in turn rest on certain notions about a good human life.

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How to Defend Institutional Redesign for Sustainable Policy Making

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In green political theory there are two strands of argument concerning how well democracy conforms to demands of sustainability. Pessimists argue that democracy is incompatible with sustainability, why a concentration of power or even a green dictatorship is needed. More optimistic are those who believe that more and direct political participation is necessary to reach green goals (Barry 1999). This paper argues in a first part that in the light of the ideal of liberal democracy neither of these two perspectives is satisfactory (1.). In a second part, recent arguments for institutions to represent future generations to overcome democracy's tendency to neglect long-term interests are critically analysed (2.). This analyses leads to the conclusion that institutions to represent future generations stand in conflict with the ideal of democracy. In consequence, an alternative argument to defend mechanisms to guide political practice to ensure sustainable policy making is needed (3.).

(1.) The pessimist strand of argument in green political theory is in conflict with the ideal of equal moral standing grounding the democratic idea of political legitimacy since it gives some green authorities a special role in political decision making (Holden 2002). The optimists line of argument is simply too optimistic. It starts from the belief (or hope) that more intense political participation necessarily leads to sustainable policy decisions without any further institutional mechanisms needed. But due to the self-referring mechanisms of accountability in democracy it is highly questionable where this necessity shall come from (Held et al. 2011). For these reasons a middle path must be aimed for. This path could be realised by institutions of representation to secure at least consideration of demands of sustainability.

(2.) Some recent attempts to explore the goal of such institutions have argued that they should represent the interests of future generations (Ekeli 2005; Thompson 2010). Using Rehfeld's general theory of political representation, it will be shown, why such argument is in conflict with the idea of legitimate political representation in democracy (Rehfeld 2006). In democracy for legitimate political representation the relevant audience to be represented is the people of a nation-state. It must be able to recognize and make accountable its representatives. Thus, representing the interests of future generations can only be legitimate if these very generations are conceived as part of the people to be represented. But it is implausible to claim that non-existent future people can accept and make accountable their representatives.

(3.) In consequence, an alternative argument for mechanisms to guide democratic practice towards sustainability is needed. If citizens of democracies accept the risk of short-termism in democratic decision making, they will accept the need for some kinds of mechanisms securing sustainable policy decisions. The third part of this paper argues that this actual interest of democratic citizens should be the normative ground to defend mechanisms to secure sustainable policy making. As the ideal of democracy presumes equal moral standing of all citizens mechanisms to secure sustainable policy decisions cannot draw on special rights of experts in decision-making but must involve all citizens equally. To overcome potential short-termed strategic behaviour of claimants to represent the interest for sustainability, procedures for their acceptance and accountability should exclusively focus on this representing function.

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Call for papers

SPECIAL ISSUE: CLIMATE CHANGE, SUSTAINABILITY, AND THE ETHICS OF AN OPEN FUTURE

De Ethica is a new journal seeking to publish scholarly works at the intersections of philosophical, theological and applied ethics. It is a fully peer-reviewed, open-access publication hosted by Linköping University Electronic Press. We are committed to making papers of high academic quality accessible to a wide audience.

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The first issue of *De Ethica* will be devoted to the theme of this year's 50th *Societas Ethica* Annual Conference: "Climate Change, Sustainability, and an Ethics of an Open Future." (<http://www.societasethica.info/annual-conference-2013?l=en>) Dwindling resources, significant demographic changes, and the effects of climate change are challenges that have been on the political agenda for several decades. And while there seems to be a consensus that sustainability is a "master value" in addressing these challenges, there is little agreement on what sustainability means, and even less agreement on how to achieve it in practice.

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About Societas Ethica

SOCIETAS ETHICA, the European Society for Research in Ethics, was founded in 1964 on the initiative of the theologian Hendrik von Oyen in Basle (Switzerland). Among those who shaped the society in the early years were well-known theologians such as Franz Böckle, Arthur Rich, Dietrich Ritschl, Niels Hansen Søe and Gustav Wingren. Today SOCIETAS ETHICA has more than 270 members from more than 20 countries, from both theological and philosophical backgrounds. While at first the character of the society was shaped by the dialogue between Catholic and Protestant moral theology, today moral philosophy has equal standing alongside the theological tradition.

SOCIETAS ETHICA is a platform that bridges the gap between the different philosophical and theological traditions. We facilitate academic contacts across political, ideological and religious boundaries. Both research in the analytical tradition and research in the traditions of continental philosophy have an intellectual home within the society.

SOCIETAS ETHICA is bilingual: English and German are the official languages for conferences and publications. French is welcome, but it is not understood as widely as English and German.

Each year SOCIETAS ETHICA organises a conference, usually at the end of August. This year marks the 50th anniversary of these annual conferences, and we are proud to have assembled such a large number of excellent scholars to discuss a topic of profound contemporary relevance: Climate Change, Sustainability, and an Ethics of an Open Future.

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WEBSITE:

www.societasethica.info

Societas Ethica - Satzung

§ 1 Name

Die Forschungsgesellschaft trägt den Namen Societas Ethica. Sie ist ein Verein gemäß dem Schweizerischen Zivilgesetzbuch, Art. 60ff.

§ 2 Zweck

Die Forschungsgesellschaft hat die Aufgabe, regelmäßige Zusammenkünfte der Dozentinnen und Dozenten sowie der Forscherinnen und Forscher an Universitäten und Hochschulen zur Diskussion aktueller Fragen der Ethik herbeizuführen. Die Diskussion soll sich sowohl grundlegenden Problemen der philosophischen und theologischen Ethik als auch Fragen der angewandten Ethik zuwenden.

§ 3 Sitz

Sitz der Forschungsgesellschaft ist Basel/Schweiz.

§ 4 Mitgliedschaft

Mitglieder können Dozenten/innen und Forscher/innen für Ethik und verwandte Disziplinen werden. Über die Aufnahme entscheidet der Vorstand im Einvernehmen mit dem Praeses.

Die Mitgliedschaft kann unter Einhaltung einer sechsmonatigen Frist jeweils zum Ende des laufenden Kalenderjahres gekündigt werden.

Mitglieder, die drei Jahre ihren Beitrag trotz wiederholter Mahnung nicht entrichtet haben, können ausgeschlossen werden.

§ 5 Organisation

Die Organe des Vereines sind:

1. Die Mitgliederversammlung
2. Der Vorstand
3. Das Präsidium

§ 6. Mitgliederversammlung

Oberstes Organ des Vereins ist die Mitgliederversammlung.

Die Mitgliederversammlung wird in der Regel jährlich zusammengerufen sowie dann, wenn mindestens ein Fünftel der Mitglieder es verlangt.

Die Mitgliederversammlung genehmigt den Jahresbericht und die Jahresrechnung, entscheidet über Satzungsänderungen sowie über Anträge des Vorstandes und einzelner Mitglieder und setzt den Jahresbeitrag fest.

Die Mitgliederversammlung wählt den Vorstand und die Rechnungsprüfer/innen.

Jedes Mitglied ist berechtigt, Mitglieder zur Wahl in den Vorstand vorzuschlagen. Die Begründung der Vorschläge soll das Kriterium der »angemessenen Repräsentation der Mitgliedschaft« im Vorstand (§7) berücksichtigen.

Die Vorschläge sind dem Vorstand schriftlich (bis spätestens 48 Stunden vor der Mitgliederversammlung) vorzulegen und vom Vorstand (spätestens 24 Stunden) vor der Mitgliederversammlung den Mitgliedern am jeweiligen Ort der Mitgliederversammlung durch Aushang bekanntzugeben.

In der Mitgliederversammlung entscheidet die einfache Mehrheit der gültig abgegebenen Stimmen. Wahlen regelt das Wahlreglement. Satzungsänderungen können nur mit einer Zweidrittel-Mehrheit der anwesenden Stimmberechtigten beschlossen werden.

§ 7 Vorstand

Der Vorstand besteht aus mindestens fünf und höchstens neun Mitgliedern. Bei der Wahl sollte auf eine angemessene Repräsentation der Mitgliedschaft, insbesondere der verschiedenen Regionen und der verschiedenen fachlichen Kompetenzen, geachtet werden. Die Vorstandsmitglieder werden für die Dauer von vier Jahren gewählt. Sie sind nur einmal wiederwählbar.

Den Vorsitz führt der Praeses.

§ 8 Präsidium

Der Praeses wird für die Dauer von vier Jahren gewählt. Er ist in der unmittelbar darauf folgenden Periode als Praeses nicht wiederwählbar.

Der Praeses und der Vorstand können gemeinsam einen Vicarius aus ihrer Mitte benennen.

Der Praeses führt die laufenden Geschäfte der Societas Ethica mit Hilfe des Scriba und des Quaestors, die auf Vorschlag des Praeses von der Mitgliederversammlung bestätigt werden.

Die drei bzw. vier bilden das Präsidium des Vereins.

§ 9 Finanzen

Die Einnahmen des Vereins bestehen aus Mitgliederbeiträgen, Subventionen und Spenden.

Das Rechnungsjahr ist das Kalenderjahr.

Eine Haftung der Mitglieder für Verbindlichkeiten des Vereins bleibt auf beschlossene, aber noch nicht eingezogene Mitgliedsbeiträge beschränkt.

§ 10 Archiv

Das Archiv des Vereins befindet sich im Staatsarchiv Basel. Zugang haben das Präsidium und mit einer Bewilligung des Praeses ausgestattete Personen.

§ 11 Auflösung des Vereins

Die Auflösung des Vereins kann nur mit Zweidrittel-Mehrheit aller anwesenden Stimmberechtigten beschlossen werden. Der Antrag auf Auflösung muss den Mitgliedern sechs Monate vorher zugegangen sein. Im Falle der Auflösung des Vereins soll das Vereinsvermögen der Studienabteilung des Ökumenischen Rates der Kirchen in Genf zufallen.

Revidiert bei den Jahrestagungen 1976 (Balantonfüred), 1995 (Brixen), 1997 (Gdansk-Oliwa), 2004 (Ljubljana).

Societas Ethica - Statutes

Please note: this translation is for reference only; the legally authoritative text is the German original.

§ 1 Name

The name of the research society is Societas Ethica. It is a society according to the Swiss Civil Code of Law, Art. 60ff.

§ 2 Purpose

The purpose of the research society is to organise regular meetings of teachers and researchers at universities and higher education institutions in order to discuss contemporary ethical issues. The discussion should deal with fundamental problems in philosophical and theological ethics as well as with questions of applied ethics.

§ 3 Location

The research society is based in Basel, Switzerland.

§ 4 Membership

Membership is open to teachers and researchers in ethics and related disciplines. Membership is granted by the board with the approval of the President. Observing a six month term, membership can be terminated at the end of the current calendar year. Members who, notwithstanding repeated admonition, have not paid their subscriptions for three years can be excluded.

§ 5 Organisation

The bodies of the society are:

1. The General Assembly
2. The Board
3. The Praesidium

§ 6 The General Assembly

The General Assembly is the supreme body of the society. A meeting of the General Assembly is normally called annually and also whenever at least one fifth of the membership so demand. The General Assembly approves the annual report and the annual accounts, decides on changes of the statutes and also on proposals from the Board and individual members, and determines the amount of the annual subscription. The General Assembly elects the members of the Board and the auditors of the accounts. Each member is entitled to propose members for election to the Board. In making proposals, the criterion that the composition of the Board be representative of the membership (§7) should be taken into account. Proposals should be submitted to the Board in writing (at the latest 48 hours before the General Assembly) and announced by the Board to the members (at the latest 24 hours before the General Assembly) by means of a notice posted at the meeting place of the General Assembly. In the General Assembly, decisions are made by a simple majority of the valid votes cast. The voting procedure is regulated by the voting rules. Changes to the statutes can only be agreed by a two-thirds majority of the members present who are entitled to vote.

§ 7 Board

The Board consists of at least five and at most nine members. At the election, adequate representation of the membership should be taken into account, particularly with regards to the various regions and professional backgrounds. The members of the Board are elected for

a period of four years. They are eligible for re-election only once. The Board is chaired by the President.

§ 8 Praesidium

The President is elected for a period of four years. S/he is not eligible for re-election as President for the period immediately following. The President and the Board together can elect a representative from among their number. The President runs the day-to-day activities of Societas Ethica with the assistance of the Scriba and the Quaestor, who are proposed by the President and confirmed by the General Assembly. These three, or four, constitute the Praesidium of the Society

§ 9 Finances

The revenues of the Society consist of the membership subscriptions, subsidies and donations. The accounting year is the calendar year. The liability of the members with regard to the debts of the Society is limited to any membership subscriptions agreed upon but not yet collected.

§ 10 Archive

The archive of the Society is located in the State Archive of Basel. Access to the archive is open to the Praesidium and persons who have been approved for access by the President.

§ 11 Dissolution of the Society

Dissolution of the Society can only be decided upon by a two-thirds majority of all the members present entitled to vote. The proposal for dissolution must have been sent to the members six months beforehand. In the case of dissolution of the Society, the assets of the Society must be transferred to the research department of the ecumenical World Council of Churches in Geneva.

Revised at the annual conferences of 1976 (Balantonfüred), 1995 (Brixen), 1997 (Gdansk-Oliwa), 2004 (Ljubljana).